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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

5. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION SUGGESTED BY [REDACTED]

b7C

On April 30, 1961, [REDACTED] [REDACTED], identified himself as a Cuban exile who formerly served as [REDACTED] [REDACTED], and as [REDACTED] of the Cuban National Police during the government of Dr. CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS. He now regards himself as a politically independent Cuban.

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b7C

ANALYSIS

[REDACTED] said that the majority of the Cuban exiles in Miami have lost heart due to the failure of the April 17, 1961 liberation attempt. They are puzzled and dismayed over the weak and vacillating policy of the United States toward Cuba. For example, the United States is still exporting various products to Cuba (as of April 30, 1961).

b7C

[REDACTED] stated that the Cuban exiles are also "fed up" with the political leadership of the Revolutionary Council under [REDACTED] and others who are suspected of believing in "FIDELISMA without FIDEL". He claimed that the majority of anti-CASTRO Cubans will not support this same leadership in another liberation attempt.

b7C

He expressed the opinion that the United States had suffered a terrific loss of prestige among all Latin American countries who are beginning to feel that the United States is a declining world power because of its inability to oust Communism from Cuba.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

He said the Central Intelligence Agency is being blamed by a great many Cuban exiles for the failure of the April 17, 1961 attempt.

SOLUTION

a) Establishment of a new anti-CASTRO Cuban leadership under persons such as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in the PRIO government, who he said is regarded as a man of integrity and ability, and [REDACTED], age [REDACTED], a career Cuban military officer who formerly served as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and as [REDACTED] at Camp Colombia, who has a character and reputation similar to that of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].

b) Invasion of Cuba by U. S. Marines with the aid and participation of able-bodied anti-Communist Cubans, with sufficient air cover protection.

He expressed the opinion that 2,000 Cuban exiles should be incorporated into a 7,000 man force of Marines for intensified training at some base in the United States. This force would then launch commando-type landings simultaneously at various strategic points along the Cuban coast. He felt that the arrival of these men in the uniforms of U. S. Marines would not only be militarily successful, but would inspire the anti-CASTRO people inside Cuba to rise up against CASTRO.

He expressed the belief that forceful military action of this type would renew confidence in the United States on the part of all the Latin American countries, and that they would approve of this action. He felt that with the exception of the Communists, these Latin American countries did not regard the United States as an aggressor but as a liberator.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

6. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION SUGGESTED BY [REDACTED]

b7C

On May 2, 1961, [REDACTED], a Cuban exile who was formerly an immensely wealthy [REDACTED] anti-CASTRO organization known as "Unidad Cubana de Liberacion", furnished the following information:

b7C

ANALYSIS

The Cuban situation can be solved only by United States military intervention, as FIDEL CASTRO has firmly established a Communist regime which is being aided and supported by the Soviet Union and its satellites.

The liberation attempt of April 17, 1961 was of insufficient force to solve the Cuban problem even had the initial landing been successful. The size of the task had been underestimated.

The full potential of the anti-CASTRO Cuban exiles had never fully been realized due to lack of unity, poor morale, and poor leadership.

The United States failed to back up the landing at the Bahia de Cochinas during the crucial moments of the invasion.

The United States cannot rely upon assistance from the Organization of American States (OAS) for decisive action against CASTRO, because the member countries of the OAS are fearful of internal disorders within their

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

own borders. Some of these countries are profiting because of the disruption of relations between Cuba and the United States, and many of them feel that the Soviet Union has become more powerful than the United States, and they do not want to align themselves with a lost cause.

The Cuban problem is as much a United States problem as it is a Cuban problem. Intervention by the United States would restore United States prestige and at the same time solve the security problem which is now posed by a Soviet Cuba.

CASTRO is daily tightening his grip on Cuba and the task of overthrowing him is daily becoming more difficult; therefore, time is of the essence.

SOLUTION

a) United States military intervention.

[redacted] pointed out that he first expressed the opinion that the United States intervention only would solve the Cuban problem in July, 1960. He said he is now more firmly convinced than ever that this is true. b7C

Anti-CASTRO Cuban forces should be combined with United States liberation forces.

In order to set the stage for this action, the United States should seek the cooperation of a friendly country such as Haiti or Nicaragua; arrange to provoke a war by CASTRO against that country. The United States should then intervene in defense of the country attacked by CASTRO. This would provide the necessary justification for United States military intervention.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

7. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION SUGGESTED BY [REDACTED] b7C

On May 2, 1961, [REDACTED], identified himself as a former [REDACTED] official in the Cuban government who served as [REDACTED] in the government of CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS. [REDACTED] b7C He said after the CASTRO regime took over the government in Cuba, he began working in the underground against CASTRO, coming to the United States in January, 1961, after learning he was about to be arrested.

ANALYSIS

It is no longer possible for Cuban exiles alone to overthrow the government of CASTRO, although this could have been successfully carried out four or five months ago before the CASTRO regime secured such a firm stranglehold on the country.

The political leadership of [REDACTED], and other members of the Revolutionary Council, did more harm than good, as it only served to divide the Cuban military potential. b7C

The failure of the April 17, 1961 liberation attempt has hurt the United States as a world leader.

The United States has suffered loss of prestige and confidence among the free nations of the world.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

SOLUTION

The United States should step up its propaganda against Communism and against the FIDEL CASTRO regime throughout this hemisphere and especially in Cuba. This should be done on an "around-the-clock" basis by many different broadcasting stations utilizing qualified anti-Communist Cubans and other Latins who fully understand the psychology of the Latin mind.

[redacted] said that up to this time, the Communist propaganda of FIDEL CASTRO has completely out-classed United States propaganda, which has been very feeble and ineffective. b7C

The United States should create a new anti-CASTRO force by naming an American as the coordinator to meet with the group of all prominent Cuban exile leaders at a round-table to hear their views. This American coordinator should then instruct these Cuban leaders to carry out a plan of military action in furtherance of a United States approved plan. [redacted] pointed out that the Cubans themselves realize that they are not capable of achieving unity among themselves without United States domination. b7C

[redacted] said there are approximately 20,000 former Cuban military career officers and enlisted men still in Cuba who constitute an excellent underground reserve. He expressed the opinion that this potential underground reserve should be coordinated with whatever plans the United States decides upon. Volunteers from other Latin American countries should be sought, accepted, and incorporated into the plans. b7C

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

These plans should be drawn up without any political council or junta, which would serve only to create disunity. The plans should be strictly military.

After military success is achieved, then consideration can be given to the establishment of a provisional government on a temporary basis, to be followed by a constitutional and democratic form of government.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

8. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION SUGGESTED BY [REDACTED]

b7C

On May 4, 1961, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], identified himself as a former employee of the Customs Service in Cuba during the period 1952-1958, after which he served as [REDACTED] b7C for Trac Service, S. A., Havana, Cuba. He stated he is not a member of any Cuban political organization at the present time, but as a Cuban exile and an anti-Communist, he desired to furnish the following information:

ANALYSIS

The United States has suffered a terrific loss of prestige throughout Latin America due to the failure of the April 17, 1961 liberation attempt, and also due to a series of circumstances leading up to that event. The hopes of the anti-Communist people in Cuba have received a serious setback, and CASTRO has become more firmly entrenched than ever. The United States must act rapidly in order to solve the Cuban situation and in order to regain its prestige in the world.

Christianity is still the most powerful force against Communism throughout Latin America.

SOLUTION

- a) Mobilize and coordinate the power of the church against Communism.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

b) Since the Catholic Church is the predominant church in Cuba as well as in other Latin American countries, the United States should consult with the Vatican to work out a program.

c) Propaganda should be immediately stepped up through all available media directed toward the masses. This propaganda should be based upon the theme of Christianity versus Communism, rather than the United States versus FIDEL CASTRO. This propaganda should include organized religious processions against Communism, wide distribution of radio and written propaganda which can fully be understood by the uneducated, and appropriate anti-Communist instructions throughout the schools of Latin America. This propaganda should be directed to all classes of society, and especially to the laboring classes.

d) Organization of a counter-espionage system, manned by anti-Communist Latins to operate throughout Latin America and especially inside Cuba.

e) Organization of an armed force totaling at least 15,000 men, composed of volunteers from various Latin American countries, the United States, and from among Cuban exiles, including former career officers and soldiers of the regular army in Cuba. A base of operations should be set up in a friendly Latin American country with military equipment, including planes supplied by the United States.

The country in which this force is established should then declare war on Cuba and attack immediately. This procedure would preclude the United States from being regarded as an aggressor against a weaker neighbor. It would be regarded as a war of Christianity against Communism.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

9. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION SUGGESTED BY [REDACTED]

b7C

On May 9, 1961, [REDACTED]

b7C

[REDACTED], who resides at [REDACTED], furnished the following information.

ANALYSIS

[REDACTED] said that he is more convinced than ever as a result of the April 17, 1961 unsuccessful liberation attempt, that 1) this failure is regarded throughout the world as a great set back for the United States; 2) the Cuban situation is now more than ever a problem for the United States, rather than for the Cuban people or for the people of Latin America, and, 3) that immediate action is needed if the United States is to survive.

b7C

SOLUTION

United States military intervention with or without help from the OAS.

He expressed the opinion that the OAS could never be counted upon to solve the Cuban problem. He pointed out that it is to the economic advantage of many Latin American countries to have trade relations disrupted between Cuba and the United States; also, many of these countries are delighted to see the United States humiliated by Cuba, even though they are opposed to Communism.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

In other countries, the political leaders fear serious internal disturbances should they join the OAS in mutual action against Cuba.

[redacted] stated that decisive military action by the United States would restore its prestige throughout Latin America, where the people respect power and not weakness. He said that the Latin mind only has contempt for weakness, especially where a country does not exercise the power which it possesses to defend itself. b7c

He expressed fear that the United States' foreign policy has become too timid and unrealistic to take decisive military action against Cuba, even though such action would be welcomed by the free world.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

10. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION SUGGESTED BY [REDACTED]

b7C

On May 10, 1961, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] identified himself as [REDACTED]  
from [REDACTED]

F1A

[REDACTED] graduate of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], is a prisoner of FIDEL CASTRO, having been captured during the April 17, 1961 liberation attempt, and [REDACTED], is presently in [REDACTED]. He said that he considers himself to be a businessman rather than a politician, although he served as [REDACTED] from [REDACTED].

b7C

[REDACTED] said that he always enjoyed excellent business relations with citizens of the United States, and that he had always looked upon the United States as Cuba's closest friend and protector.

b7C

ANALYSIS

a) Anti-CASTRO Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba can never dispose of the CASTRO regime without United States participation. The CASTRO regime is more firmly entrenched now than ever before because of the unsuccessful April 17, 1961 liberation attempt.

b) The failure is attributable to 1) underestimation of CASTRO's strength; 2) political feuding, resulting from the unpopular Revolutionary Council and the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, which he said were promoted by CIA.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

c) The United States has lost tremendous prestige throughout the world and especially in Latin America.

SOLUTION

a) Direct military intervention by the United States.

He expressed the opinion that immediate action would preclude the possibility of the Soviet Union coming to the aid of CASTRO and thus initiating a third world war. He was of the opinion that the longer CASTRO remains in power, the greater will become the investment and interests of the Soviet Union in Cuba. He felt that the possibility of the Cuban situation sparking a third world war would increase in direct ratio to the passage of time.

[redacted] said he believed, however, that the United States is unlikely to take direct military action, and consequently he proposed the following as an alternate plan. b7c

b) Alternate plan: 1) development of an anti-Communist, non-political military force headed by a volunteer American staff with a Cuban advisory board of officers; 2) this force should consist of anti-Communist volunteers from Cuba, Latin America and the United States. It should total at least 20,000 to 25,000 men; 3) this force should be supplied and equipped by the United States.

[redacted] said that although he is a Cuban independent, he has had talks with the following persons who believe that it is essential for the Cuban exiles to unite as a military non-political force: [redacted], who b7c

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

reportedly heads an anti-CASTRO underground composed of former soldiers now in Cuba; [REDACTED], associated with Cuban anti-CASTRO forces which were until recently fighting in the Escambray Mountains against CASTRO; [REDACTED], who reportedly was in charge of a landing force scheduled to participate in the recent liberation attempt against CASTRO, but which did not land; [REDACTED], member of "Rescate", an anti-CASTRO organization; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], who is reportedly connected with underground operation in Havana and Santa Clara Provinces; [REDACTED] (First Name Unknown) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (First Name Unknown) [REDACTED], both former Cuban career military officers, and [REDACTED], a former career officer under the BATISTA government.

[REDACTED] also stated that he and a friend, [REDACTED], Cuban exiled attorney, recently purchased [REDACTED], now docked at Miami, which they would like to offer and put to use against FIDEL CASTRO in any military operation or plan sanctioned by the United States.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

11. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION SUGGESTED BY  
~~[REDACTED]~~

On May 17, 1961, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], a Cuban citizen identified himself as [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] who had recently returned to [REDACTED] FLO  
Miami after participating in the April 17, 1961 liberation  
attempt which failed against the CASTRO regime. He explained  
he had [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] in the Bahia de Cochinas area.  
[REDACTED] furnished the following information:

LIBERATION ATTEMPT

Training of the liberation air force was excellent and morale was high among all Cuban exiles, even though they represented all shades of political belief, ranging from "BATISTIANOS" to former "FIDELISTAS". An aerial attack on April 15, 1961 against Cuba was highly successful, and all CASTRO planes were knocked out except six fighter planes, T-33's and Sea Furies, which according to intelligence reports had been junked for spare parts and were no longer serviceable. When the liberation attempt of April 17, 1961 took place, it was these same six Cuban fighter planes which had reportedly become non-serviceable, that were the deciding factor in the defeat of the liberation forces which had no fighter plane protection against these six Cuban fighter planes. About ten B-26's of the liberation forces were destroyed and the remaining planes were filled with holes from Cuban fighter planes and anti-aircraft fire.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

The anti-CASTRO forces had been assured that they would have command of the air, but no promises of fighter protection had ever been made to them by anyone.

The CASTRO anti-aircraft fire was extremely effective. One or more anti-aircraft weapons were on top of every hill. Their fire was expertly executed in the form of a curtain in areas in block patterns. Not one B-26 escaped damage.

Approximately one-half million pounds of weapons and ammunition was dropped by the B-26 planes, and are now presumed to be in the hands of CASTRO.

The anti-CASTRO air force totaling between 120 to 135 pilots, mechanics, and the ground force personnel has returned to Miami. Their "esprit de corps" is excellent and they are eager to make another try as soon as possible. In the meantime (as of May 17, 1961) no one from the Revolutionary Council nor anyone representing the United States has contacted them, thanked them, counseled them, nor recognized them. This force faces the possibility of disintegration unless some action is taken soon.

[redacted] said that he and [redacted], another member of this group, had been attempting to keep the force intact pending instructions from responsible sources. b7C

#### ANALYSIS

a) Although there is reason to believe that CASTRO could have been defeated had the Bahia de Cochinas landing

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

succeeded, the task of overthrowing CASTRO has now become much greater. His victory has given his regime a big boost. Many people who were "on the fence" have now jumped to CASTRO's side. Of his total 300,000 to 500,000 militia, it is believed that at least 50,000 are "die hards" who will never surrender. Consequently, a vastly larger liberation force, equipped with the best weapons, will now be required to defeat CASTRO.

b) Speedy action is imperative. Time is on the side of CASTRO. He is daily receiving more military aid from the Soviet bloc, and it can now be safely assumed that he has at his disposal the world-wide intelligence system of the Communists. Each day CASTRO becomes more firmly entrenched. Also, it can be safely assumed that the Soviet Union will steadily increase its investment in Cuba. It is predicted that soon the Soviet Union will have missile, submarine, air force, or other strategic installations on Cuban soil.

c) The United States cannot rely upon the OAS to solve the Cuban problem. At present the OAS countries are successfully blackmailing the United States into furnishing them "hand-outs".

d) The Cuban situation constitutes the most serious problem for democracy in the world today. It is not merely a struggle between pro and anti-CASTRO forces. It is a crucial round in the struggle for survival between Communism headed by the Soviet Union, and democracy headed by the United States.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

e) CASTRO cannot be contained if he is permitted to exist. His Communist propaganda throughout Latin America is far more effective than that of the United States. He has become a hero to millions of Latins who have been deceived by his propaganda. He is promoting hate campaigns against the United States throughout Latin America.

f) If the United States is to survive, CASTRO must be destroyed. The Cuban exiles cannot destroy CASTRO without abundant United States help and participation.

g) The United States has suffered terrific loss of prestige because of its weak and ineffective handling of the Cuban problem. The reputation of the United States sank to a new low because of the April 17, 1961 defeat. Everyone throughout Latin America knows that the United States supported the liberation attempt. Only by bold and successful action can the United States recover its rightful position as a great and democratic leader of nations.

SOLUTION

a) The United States should completely step up its propaganda throughout Latin America, including Cuba. This should be done on a twenty-four hour daily basis by every possible medium, and keyed to every strata of Latin intellect, especially toward the masses. Radio SWAN is ineffective and United States propaganda in general is shamefully poor. The United States should teach democracy and promote it with a positive program.

b) Prompt military action with United States participation against CASTRO.

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Re: CUBAN SITUATION

c) A large and powerful armed force must be formed immediately, consisting of 1) Cuban exile volunteers, including those who survived the April 17, 1961 attack; 2) United States military forces equipped with planes, boats, arms, and equipment of the very best, and 3) volunteer freedom fighters from other countries, in order to give this operation the flavor of united action by the forces of freedom against Communism.

d) A selective service system for Cuban exiles should be set up for the purpose of establishing a file on able-bodied men of military age, in order to recruit them into a training program. This should be carried out on a non-political military basis.

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Date:

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OTHERWISE

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

## PLAIN TEXT

(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL

## AIR MAIL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

FOJ/PA # 293984

APRIL 1

GIVEN AND

M.T. 12336DATE 9-26-90

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
 FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-3902)  
 RE: CUBAN SITUATION  
 IS - CUBA

~~9-26-90~~  
 Classified by SP/SC  
 Declassify on: OADR Up  
 FOIA \* 293984

REC-66

*Please cc m  
 [initials] 9993 (CLP) (u)*

*FBI (11-6-61)*  
 The following is submitted solely for the Bureau's confidential information. Dissemination of this information would definitely jeopardize [REDACTED], PSI, Miami, who is [REDACTED]

b7C  
D

[REDACTED], Miami, and who is a close confidant of [REDACTED] of the Revolutionary Council. [REDACTED] has furnished reliable information in the past.] ~~(S)(u)~~ (u)

On June 2, 1961, [REDACTED] advised Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that on the previous day he had returned from a ten day trip to Washington, having been invited there by some friends in the Pentagon. He identified these friends as [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]

b7C  
D

a27

- P.  
 ③ - Bureau (AM - RM)  
 4 - Miami (2 - 105-3902)  
 1 - 62-3573  
 1 - [REDACTED]

Ex. - 136

4/22/04  
 CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] b7C  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X [REDACTED] b7C  
 classified per OSA 6th dated 4/21/04

GED:ems  
 (7)

*cc - Nick Coover  
 Memo Breaks to  
 W.C. Sullivan*

*6-8-61 VHN:bar*

*Set ag 1-Flag*

*6-9-61 VHN:bar*

*Set for 1st Sat. State McDonnell M Per*

Approved: WG/wshSpecial Agent in Charge 6-12-61 VHN:bar*Set Secretary State McDonnell**Set G.P.A. Agency*~~SECRET~~~~NAT. INVEST/SEC~~

MM 105-3902(4)

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~~ALL INFORMATION ON THIS  
PAGE IS CLASSIFIED b7D  
EXCEPT AS NOTED OTHERWISE~~

[REDACTED] made available a handprinted diary that he maintained during this trip concerning his contacts b7D with various Pentagon officials, which reads as follows;

"WASH.

1.

"May 24-1300 [REDACTED]

D C

b7C

"Made known purpose of visit. Get info. of invasion members into proper hands. Try to develop a future program. [REDACTED] a good friend of Cuba. Suggested a series of meetings. Suggested he would, along with [REDACTED], coordinate successive interviews.

b7C

"Sol. thinks invasion not properly planned. Information leaked. Considers promoters of invasion, amateurs, and inexperienced. Thinks U.S. should get into it soon as possible by giving support to Cuban exiles, and in a joint effort, with carriers and marines. Suggested we use F 86H's and B 57 (Canberras) with C 54 as transports. Above all have top cover at all times. Suggested strongly to use at least two F 104's at proper time at M 2 sonic barrier over principal towns to create confusion without major damage and casualties. He would decidedly give all necessary support and advice, and training. Suggested using Boca Chica as base for air force.

"Suggested we work together on a planification program then present it to navy and army for approval and hence to the President. Made appointment with [REDACTED]

b7C

D C

"May 24, 1500 [REDACTED]

2.

b7C

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~~EXCEPT THAT WHICH IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

b7C

"Knew already purpose of visit through [REDACTED]  
Very interested in recordings, when explained what all about.

"Very disgusted at C.I.A. Thinks they made an awful mess about invasion, specially on beachhead spot location. Air support insufficient and not properly planned. Navy not enough. Thinks U.S. should have followed through behind brigade with full strength.

"Called [REDACTED]

b7C

"Suggested two theories. One, give Cubans full support, and attack combined with paratroopers, infantry, armored division, and air force, with joint U.S. forces at Pinar del Rio, Las Villas and Isle of Pines. Two, attack with half million U.S. troops and finish off in one morning. In all cases, establish a military junta which would lead country to elections. Above all, get rid of Castro as soon as possible.

"Thinks this is a matter for the Pentagon exclusively. We should develop future plans and work alongside Pentagon.

"I suggested laying the whole matter with Gen. LeMay. He thinks Gen. LeMay might not want to handle it before he

3.

"is made Chief of Staff on July, because his superiors might not judge him well. Then again, he thinks, he might like it, because he'll come into office with a new plan of action and something firm on his hands, with a line to follow.

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MM 105-3902(4)

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DATE 10-10-2010 BY SP5 JAS

"Absolutely sure CIA has Communist infiltration,  
since Castro knew all moves. Blames Chester Bowles  
and Adlai Stevenson for influencing the President  
into changing his mind and not giving orders to  
follow with air cover and support on invasion day.

4.S

"Spoke about other things in general as to the  
how abouts of this operations and made other appointments.  
Agreed to meet soon again.

\* \* \*

"May 25 0800- [REDACTED] (Pentagon's Office)  
Discussed matters further. Said he would hold off  
planning till after other interviews and appointments.

b7C

\* \* \*

"May 25 0900- [REDACTED] (Pentagon's  
Office), [REDACTED]

b7C  
D.C  
URG

[REDACTED] very interested on recordings. Kept them  
for copying, translation and resuming, to discuss with b7C  
Gen.

4.

Curtis

D.C

X LeMay. Wants to meet next day. Asked for our  
immediate plans. Wanted to know about [REDACTED].  
Said the boys across the river (CIA) had thrown him  
ice and had left for Miami very discouraged, was  
worried about him.

b7C

"Discussed some plans with him. Said he flew to  
K.W. the morning of the invasion. Said he would  
resign his post and commission if he had to, in  
order to work with us. Approves a decided total  
and complete armed support for Cuban exiles. [REDACTED]

b1  
b3

[REDACTED] (S) Thinks  
Pentagon should handle military matters and not CIA,

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b7C

"but doesn't think Pentagon should request it from President. His advice is to work on a plan, then I would present it to [REDACTED], and in turn to the President, with a request to let Pentagon handle Cuban military affairs.

"Suggested we meet with navy and army to discuss plans and present a memo to the President.

"Said the whole thing had been done amateurishly, that CIA seemed to deliberately given the thing over to Castro.

"Wants to keep on working and come up with something definite. He would return recordings next day.

5.

"May 26-1000--

b7C

"Gen. states that he has spoken to a few. He stated the solution is a combined task force of US and Cubans. US troops would attack and liberate territories, Cuban troops would then take over control. Make an operation to last no more than a few days. Cuban troops should be trained specially on occupation and government matters to run the country, in more of a police fashion than anything else. He thinks the only way is for the Pentagon to run matters professionally, but that when the matter is laid before the right parties a strong opposition will come from Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, [REDACTED], and a few others.

b7C

"The matter was well discussed for a period of a couple of hours.

"The General insisted I move to his house and be their guest; I refused, not wanting to inconvenience them. [REDACTED] gave me a present for my wife.

b7C

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EXCEPT FOR CITATION~~

"General is sure that nothing will be done regarding Cuban matters before President Kennedy goes to Paris to meet Kruschew, and then to Montevideo to meet with other

6.

Latin American Presidents; consequently, no decisions will be made before the middle of July.

"He states that the present political situation is very extremely tense, and some radical decisions must be taken if we are to keep democracy.

"He called the second chief of CIA, and asked if he wanted to talk to me, but the answer was 'no.' He didn't give my exact identity, and when asked about it, he said he didn't know.

"The General drove us down town to the OAS, and we agreed to meet on Monday again to plan the week's work.

"May 26 - 2000 (Called [REDACTED] at Miami to rush up. He'll come up Monday). b7C

"May 29, 0900-[REDACTED] (Pentagon's Office) b7C

[REDACTED] said his impressions were very good, but he would not say exactly how or why. He feels we should lose no time, advised me to go ahead and work on the line I was following, that I was on the right track, and it was the only way. It seemed to me that he had spoken to higher officials but he was not very transmutive. He gave the impression of being very optimistic, but it's logical he can not get involved, due to his position. He agreed to return

b7C

7.

"the recordings Wed. 31st a.m. He, however, said that

~~SECRET~~

MM 105-3902 (u)

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION ON THIS  
PAGE IS CLASSIFIED ~~6/17/68~~ (S)  
UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

"the recordings had proven very effective and not only had created a very good impression but had helped out a lot and cleared a lot of things. Somehow there was a feeling [redacted] Gen. LeMay, and [redacted] were aware.

b7C

"May 29-1500-[redacted]

b7C

"We discussed the whole plan again. He said he had spoken to [redacted] (CIA) about it, and would discuss it with [redacted] and [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7C

[redacted] and he was very much surprised. He spoke of a meeting, April 17th where Stevenson and Bowles had been present. He feels stronger than ever that we must accomplish this task as soon as possible, and that if we don't we'll loose the U.S. before we put a man on the moon, we have all the probabilities against us. The whole organization plan was discussed again. He mentioned the importance of talking to politicians and specially to Sen. Smathers. He would than talk to others. He also mentioned the importance of talking to [redacted] and he would go ahead and do his work with them.

8.

"May 31-1000-[redacted]

b7C

"He returned the recordings, said he was very optimistic, very well impressed and for me to relax. I advised that I would be leaving, and would send him a copy of my memorandum so that he would present it to the proper authorities for opinion and consultation, and advise before I present it to [redacted]."

b7C

The recordings mentioned in the above diary are recordings which [redacted] made of interviews conducted by him of men who returned to Miami after participating in the unsuccessful invasion attempt of April 17, 1961. The information contained in the recordings related to

b7D

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~~SECRET~~

operations of the organization, the camps, circumstances of the landing, reasons for failure, and estimates of the strength of the enemy. He said that opinions concerning the camps range from "good" to "bad;" that the food was generally considered good; that there were no complaints about the quarters, but some of the men complained about mistreatment and about the inexperience of the Cuban officers who were in charge at the camp. He said that all of them, without exception, complained of the lack of fighter air support, lack of sufficient number of bombers and supplies. ~~(S)(u)~~

[redacted] mentioned in the diary, is [redacted]

b1  
b3  
Cuba

b7C

~~(S)~~

[redacted] said that the Pentagon officers identified in his diary told him that they are not in a position to make a direct approach to President Kennedy with respect to their views as indicated in the above diary. They stated that for internal political reasons, it would be preferable for [redacted] to ask President Kennedy to give the United States military forces authority to take care of the Cuban situation through direct military intervention. ~~(S)(u)~~ (u)

b7C

Cuba

U.S.

[redacted] said that when he returned to Miami, he immediately advised [redacted] concerning his contacts with the Pentagon. [redacted] appeared to be very receptive to the idea of military intervention by the United States, and he requested [redacted] to prepare a memorandum expressing the views of the anti-CASTRO Cuban forces, including a recommendation that the anti-CASTRO Cuban forces be allowed to participate, along with the Americans, in any military intervention. ~~(S)(u)~~ (u)

b7C  
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~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] said that he planned to start working on this memorandum immediately, as [REDACTED] planned to go to Washington on Monday, June 5th. [REDACTED] presumed that [REDACTED] would present this memorandum to President Kennedy personally. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED] said that he planned to stress in this memorandum the opinion that anti-Communist Cuban forces should be given an intensive course in the United States on civil and military government, in order to prepare them for the takeover. He said that some of the men who returned from the unsuccessful invasion told him that they felt it was probably a good thing, after all, that the invasion had not succeeded, because they had received no preparation for taking over and administering a temporary or provisional government. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

b7D

On June 6, 1961, [REDACTED] advised that he plans to return to Washington, D. C., upon invitation of his friends in the Pentagon, after [REDACTED] comes back to Miami, on or about June 7, 1961, from Washington.

b7C  
b7D~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ U.S.b1  
b3Cuba  
U.S.~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~~~SECRET~~

MM 105-3902

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b2

(S) (S)

Miami will keep the Bureau advised of further pertinent developments.

~~SECRET~~

- 10\* -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Belmont  
 1 - Evans  
 1 - Sullivan  
 1 - Donahoe  
 1 - [REDACTED]

b7C  
 THE INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
 OTHERWISE

REC- 66

109-12-210-3096

June 12, 1961

BY COURIER SERVICE

EX- 136

105-89923  
 Classified by [REDACTED]

Declassify on: QADR

109-12-210-3096

Honorable Robert S. McNamara  
 The Secretary of Defense  
 Washington 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED]  
 ON 4/23/01

My dear Mr. McNamara:

[REDACTED] per 25A for dated 4/23/01

We have been advised that [REDACTED] an official of the Frente Revolucionario Democrático, an anti-Castro organization, recently conferred with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]; and [REDACTED]

Washington, D. C., concerning the Cuban situation. [REDACTED] claimed that these officials expressed themselves as follows: (u)

[REDACTED] believed that the recent abortive invasion of Cuba had not been properly planned; that those promoting the invasion were inexperienced amateurs; that information concerning the invasion had leaked out; that the United States should support the anti-Castro Cuban exiles in their efforts to oust Castro; and that a joint effort should be undertaken in this regard using United States carriers and Marines. (S) (S) (u)

[REDACTED] was of the opinion that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) made a mess of the invasion; that the air support for the invasion was insufficient and not properly planned; that CIA was communist infiltrated because Castro knew about the invasion; and that the United States should have followed through on the invasion with troops. With reference to possible future action against Cuba, two possibilities developed during [REDACTED] discussion with [REDACTED]: (1) that a force composed of United States and Cuban exile troops attack specific areas in Cuba; and (2) that an attack be made using a half million United States troops so that the whole thing would be over in one morning. [REDACTED] reportedly felt the solution would be a combined task force of United States and Cuban exile troops with our troops.

109-12-210

1 - [REDACTED] 105-89923 (CLIP) (S) (u)

VHN:bar

(8)

~~SECRET~~ See NOTE page three

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
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 iandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM

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~~SECRET~~

Honorable Robert S. McNamara

doing the attacking and liberating and the Cuban exiles then assuming control of the liberated areas. This operation would be so designed so as to last for only a few days. [redacted] also felt that no decisions would be made with respect to the Cuban situation before mid-July, 1961. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

b7C

[redacted] reportedly advocated full armed support for the Cuban exiles. He commented that the recent Cuban invasion had been amateurishly handled. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

b7C

[redacted] also claimed that the foregoing officials told him they were not in a position to directly approach President Kennedy concerning their views. These officials stated that because of internal political reasons, it would be preferable for [redacted] of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, to ask the President to give the United States military authority to take care of the Cuban situation through direct military intervention. [redacted] indicated he contacted [redacted] who appeared receptive to the idea of United States military intervention. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

b7C D

It is our understanding that [redacted] asked [redacted] to prepare a memorandum setting forth the views of the anti-Castro forces, including a recommendation that these forces be allowed to participate, along with the Americans, in any military intervention. [redacted] planned to urge in his memorandum that the anti-Castro forces be given training in civil and military government since some of those who participated in the abortive invasion indicated they had not received such training. [redacted] presumed [redacted] would present this memorandum to the President personally as [redacted] had planned to go to Washington, D. C., on June 5, 1961. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

b7C D

It is recognized that this version of the matters discussed emanates solely from [redacted]. It is not known whether the above-mentioned officers were authorized to conduct such conversations; however, we are furnishing these data for your information. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

b7C D

Sincerely yours,

J. EDGAR HOOVER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Honorable Robert S. McNamara

**NOTE:** Classified "Secret" since the unauthorized disclosure of this information could have effect on our national defense and jeopardize the security of the United States.

See cover memorandum Donahoe to W. C. Sullivan,  
6/9/61, same subject, prepared by VHN:bar.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*5*  
**Memorandum**

TO : Director, FBI (109-12-210)

FROM : Legal Attaché, Madrid (109-16)

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBA

DATE: 6-12-61

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Re Bureau cable 6-3-61, which supplied information b1  
INS had obtained from an air freight crew to the effect that  
they had seen FIDEL CASTRO in the Azores on 6-1-61. Reference  
also Madrid cable of 6-5-61 reporting that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (C)

Attached are nine copies of a letterhead memorandum  
and nine copies of an evaluation memorandum concerning this  
matter. [REDACTED] b2d mentioned in

the memorandum is  
abroad is [REDACTED]

The

b1  
b2d

[REDACTED] memorandum has been classified confidential to protect  
[REDACTED], who furnishes information of Bureau interest on  
a continuing basis to the Madrid Office. No local dissemination  
was made of the memorandum.

b1

[REDACTED]  
It has been previously  
reported to the Bureau that the Compañía Cubana de Aviación  
stops in the Azores for refueling on its regular flights  
between Havana and Prague, Czechoslovakia, and it is believed  
possible that the air freight crew furnishing the information  
to INS may have seen some other bearded Cuban at the Santa  
Maria airport.

50 JUN 21 1961

REC-53 109-12-210-309

**CONFIDENTIAL**

8 JUN 14 1961

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 18)  
 1 - Paris (Enc. 18) (sent direct)  
 1 - Madrid  
 CDA:HD ENCLOSURE (4)

Place CC:

Ex-113

NAT. FO

b7c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Madrid 109-16

On 6-5-61 the writer contacted [REDACTED], mentioned above, and [REDACTED] and requested them to endeavor to verify whether CASTRO had passed through the Azores. This was done inasmuch as they were known to be in contact with [REDACTED], a Cuban who is one of the European representatives of [REDACTED]. b7C DA

[REDACTED], is known to be quite anti-CASTRO, and is known to follow rather closely the identity of passengers traveling on Cubana on its flights to Europe.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] was then in Paris but that they could contact him to determine whether he had any information concerning CASTRO's supposed travel. On 6-9-61 [REDACTED] made available a copy of a letter they had received from [REDACTED] pertinent parts of which letter are set forth in the letterhead memorandum. b7C DA

A copy of this letter, together with one copy each of the letterhead and evaluation memoranda, is being sent direct to the Paris Office for information. The Madrid Office will continue to follow this matter here, and the Bureau will be advised.

P.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
June 12, 1961

*Heads of  
CLASSIFIED BY 6/21/64  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25/6/2029*

Re: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

[REDACTED]

(C)

b7D

On June 9, 1961, [REDACTED] abroad advised that he had been unable to obtain any information to date indicating that CASTRO had passed through the Azores. He mentioned that he had received information from a friend that RAUL ROA, Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Paris, France, on June 2, 1961, spent the night at the Hotel Quai D'Orsay, and left the following day for Cairo, Egypt.

The source said that the friend had received information from persons who had spoken with ROA and his wife in Paris and that these latter indicated that ROA is very sad and distressed, as is his wife. They gained the impression that he is not in a very comfortable position and now is only a "stooge" for [REDACTED] in Havana, and members of the party. ROA was reported to be going to Cairo for the preparatory meeting for a "Neutralist" Conference to be held there at a future date.

[REDACTED] Source said that his friend claimed to have received information from reliable sources that there is a "cooling" atmosphere between NASSER in Cairo and FIDEL CASTRO in Havana.

According to the source, his friend advised him that a Cuban labor leader named [REDACTED] arrived in Paris on May 30, 1961, and spent four days there. He attended a meeting given by the French Communists in favor of Cuba. The only Cubans attending this meeting were persons from the Cuban Embassy in Paris. Source said that he was advised that [REDACTED] spoke with ROA during the time they coincided in Paris.

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

109-12-210-3097

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 12, 1961

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Re: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

In connection with the memorandum dated June 12, 1961, on the above subject, the confidential sources abroad mentioned therein are ones who have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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DATE 4/22/04 BY 60250AMCPG/A6/clj

109-12-210 - 3097  
ENCLOSURE

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
 FOIPA  
 DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

4 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

- (b)(1)  
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Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

\_\_\_\_ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

\_\_\_\_ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

\_\_\_\_ Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): This document has been removed from the file pursuant to the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992. Public access is available through the National Archives at College Park, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, Maryland, 20740.

The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : W. C. Sullivan *Sullivan*

FROM : S. B. Donahoe *SD*

SUBJECT: THE CUBAN SITUATION  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

DATE: 6/12/61  
1 - Belmont  
1 - Evans  
1 - Sullivan  
1 - Donahoe  
1 - [REDACTED]

4/22/64  
CLASSIFIED BY NUS/AG/dj6/267 DRAFTIVE  
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Bulahan
Conrad
Delmont
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b7C

Anti-Castro leader recently conferred with U. S. military officials who allegedly advocated U. S. intervention in Cuba. These officials reportedly expressed opinion [REDACTED] Cuban Revolutionary Council, should seek presidential authority to have U. S. military forces intervene in Cuba. Dissemination being made to Attorney General and Secretary of Defense.

By airtel 6/6/61 Miami Office advised [REDACTED] for Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), an anti-Castro organization [REDACTED] made available diary he kept during recent trip to Washington, D. C., which dealt with his contacts with various U. S. military officials. [REDACTED] made trip at invitation of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. b7C b7D

Review of diary indicates following:

Purpose of trip was to get data concerning abortive Cuban invasion into proper hands and to attempt to develop a future program concerning Cuba.

[REDACTED] believed invasion not properly planned; considered invasion promoters amateurs and inexperienced; and that information concerning invasion had leaked out. [REDACTED] of belief U. S. should support Cuban exiles and that joint effort should be undertaken using U. S. carriers and Marines. b7C

[REDACTED] believes CIA made mess of invasion; that air support was insufficient and not properly planned; that CIA was communist infiltrated since Castro knew invasion moves; and that U. S. should have followed through with troops. Two possibilities developed during discussion: (1) that a force composed of U. S. and Cuban exile troops attack specific areas in Cuba; and (2) that attack be made with half million U. S. troops so whole thing would be over in one morning. [REDACTED] felt solution was combined task force of U. S. troops and Cuban exiles with U. S. troops attacking and liberating and

Enclosure sent 6-12-61

REC-37

109-12-210-3099

109-12-210  
1 - 105-89923 (CLIP)

25 JUN 15 1961

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b7C

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to W. C. Sullivan  
Re: THE CUBAN SITUATION  
109-12-210

Cuban exiles then assuming control of liberated areas. This entire operation would last no more than few days. [redacted] felt no decisions would be made with respect to Cuba before mid-July, 1961.

b7C

[redacted], advocated complete armed support for Cuban exiles and also indicated abortive invasion had been amateurishly handled.

b7C

In addition, [redacted] stated above officials told him they were not in position to directly approach President Kennedy concerning their views. For internal political reasons they said it would be preferable for [redacted], Cuban Revolutionary Council, to ask President to give the U. S. military authority to take care of Cuban situation through direct military intervention.

[redacted] stated he contacted [redacted] and [redacted] appeared receptive to idea of U. S. military intervention. [redacted] requested him to prepare memorandum expressing views of anti-Castro Cuban forces, including recommendation that these forces be allowed to participate, along with Americans, in any military intervention. [redacted] in memorandum planned to stress that anti-Castro forces be given course in U. S. on civil and military government to prepare them for the takeover because some of invasion participants indicated they had not received such training. [redacted] presumed [redacted] would present this memorandum to the President personally as [redacted] planned to go to Washington on 6/5/61.

b7C  
D

OBSERVATIONS:

Miami Office furnished the foregoing information solely for Bureau's confidential information and noted that dissemination of the data furnished by [redacted] would definitely jeopardize him. We feel Bureau cannot hold this information. While we do not know to what extent these officers were authorized to conduct these discussions, we feel Attorney General and Secretary of Defense McNamara are entitled to know of this. It is also felt dissemination of this data could serve to point up need for more coordinated direction of activities of anti-Castro elements in this country by U. S. Government. We, in fact, emphasized this need in our letter to the Attorney General on 4/28/61, following the National Security Council meeting which was held the previous day.

b7D

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Memorandum to W. C. Sullivan  
Re: THE CUBAN SITUATION  
109-12-210

ACTION:

Attached for your approval are letters to Attorney General,\* and Secretary of Defense McNamara transmitting this data. In the letter to the Attorney General attention is called to the possible need for coordinated direction of the activities of anti-Castro elements and to our comments in this regard on 4/28/61.

also

\*Secretary of State Rusk

W.C.S.  
J.W.C.S.  
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of all Cuban activities for the present situation.

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B.C. 19

admitted, off their list of those that he had personally visited hospitals,  
a member of the anti-Castro group, United Monarchs.  
On May 31, 1961, [REDACTED]

connection with the Cuban situation.

1. Загризти потенциал розриву Ажурної  
2. Відкрити в новій секторальній структурі єдність та  
координацію діяльності всіх підрозділів  
3. Відкрити в новій секторальній структурі єдність та  
координацію діяльності всіх підрозділів  
4. Відкрити в новій секторальній структурі єдність та  
координацію діяльності всіх підрозділів

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I - MR. COTTER  
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The Acton Library General June 2, 1961

**SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

[redacted] further claimed that [redacted] of [redacted], who was previously associated with [redacted] at the Sugar Institute in Havana during early 1959, has also visited Washington and has spoken to [redacted].

b1  
b7C

[redacted] (S) said that, based on his contacts with various people in Washington, [redacted] is totally incapable of handling the Cuban question and should be removed from his position in the present Administration.

On June 1, 1961, [redacted] of the Francisco Sugar Company, 106 Wall Street, New York City, advised our New York Office that he had recently been in touch with [redacted] and had learned that the latter had conferred with [redacted] and [redacted] of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, about May 15, 1961. [redacted] said he had also learned from various Wall Street businessmen that [redacted] is in complete charge of Cuban matters for the Kennedy Administration and works out of the White House. According to [redacted] has no knowledge of Cuba and no experience in those matters.

b7C

These data are for your information. No further dissemination is being made of this information by this Bureau.

1 - Mr. Byron R. White  
Deputy Attorney General

Note: Initial data herein based on memo W.C. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont 5-29-61 regarding [redacted] Broadcast, Station WTOP, Washington, D.C. 6:45 p.m. 5-27-61" (JMK:blw). b7C

Cuban data based on New York teletype to Bureau, 6-1-61, regarding [redacted] b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Liaison  
1 - [REDACTED]

b7C

**SECRET**

105-76203

4/22/64  
CLASSIFIED BY ALIS ASIC/6-6261  
DECLASSIFY ON: 23X 4/22/2029

Date: June 8, 1961

To: Office of Security  
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: [REDACTED]

INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA  
REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

b7C

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent [REDACTED], dated May 11, 1961, at Miami, Florida, concerning the captioned individual.

Subject appeared at FBI headquarters on May 23, 1961, expressed himself as anticomunist and anti-Castro and stated he desired to offer his services to the United States as a patriotic American. He stated he was willing to do whatever he could to cause Castro's overthrow.

Subject stated he was a close friend of [REDACTED] of the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), an anti-Castro organization, and worked closely with [REDACTED] in anti-Castro endeavors. He stated he was not a member of the MRP but performed many tasks for that organization. In addition, he stated his relationship with [REDACTED] went back to the days of the Batista regime when he was involved with [REDACTED] in efforts to unseat Batista.

Subject pointed out that of all the organizations opposing Castro he felt the MRP had the best organization and the best plan for Cuba following Castro's overthrow. He felt the MRP should be given serious consideration in future plans to oust Castro. He indicated [REDACTED] had been falsely accused of being procommunist but stated [REDACTED] was not procommunist although he acknowledged he should be termed a "liberal."

Subject called attention to recent mistakes allegedly made by the Central Intelligence Agency [REDACTED] reported in the press, in planning the Cuban invasion. [REDACTED] pointed out that

NO ATTACHED  
NO INDEX

1 - Miami (105-3109) (Enclosure)

1 - 105-92704 (MRP)

1 - 109-12-210 (Foreign Political Matters - Cuba) MAILED

58 JUN 16 1961  
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(14)

109-12-210

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**SECRET**

See NOTE page two

7  
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Office of Security  
Department of State

[REDACTED]

b1

- (S)

Subject furnished a copy of a report in the Spanish language dated May 9, 1961, dealing with conditions in Cuba following the abortive invasion. A translation of this report is attached for each of the recipients.

Enclosure

1 - Director (Enclosure)  
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (Enclosure)  
Department of the Army

Attention: Chief, Security Division

1 - Director of Naval Intelligence (Enclosure)

1 - Office of Special Investigations (Enclosure)  
Air Force

Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence Division

1 - Director, Office of Security (Enclosure)  
U. S. Information Agency

1 - Assistant Attorney General (Enclosure)  
J. Walter Yeagley

NOTE: Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont 5/24/61 sets forth results of Bureau interview with subject. It was recommended and approved that following translation of report that copies be sent to interested intelligence agencies together with the pertinent data furnished by subject. Review of report shows frustration of Cubans over invasion failure, roundup of Cubans during invasion and difficulties of underground as result of abortive invasion. Report also indicates American and OAS intervention is only solution to the Cuban problem.

TELE32  
~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6-12-61

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

1 - Belmont  
1 - Sullivan  
1 - Donahoe  
1 - CotterSUBJECT: CUBAN SITUATION  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBAALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/22/04 BY SP/PA/MS/AS/CH

DRAFT

By airtel 6-5-61 Miami Office has forwarded letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination setting forth views of eleven Cuban exiles in Miami area with regard to effect of recent unsuccessful invasion of Cuba as well as recommended action to be taken in future against Castro regime. Memorandum notes these opinions were voluntarily given and represent beliefs of individuals from various walks of life. Group included former leader of anti-Castro underground who recently escaped to US [REDACTED] of Castro's air force who defected in [REDACTED]; several former Cuban officials who held office prior to advent of Castro [REDACTED] b7C ; several prominent businessmen [REDACTED] ; and a Cuban pilot who participated in recent invasion [REDACTED].

In summary, they almost unanimously expressed belief that anti-Castro movement suffered disastrous setback as result of failure of recent invasion attempt; that US prestige throughout Latin America suffered tremendously; that Castro was getting stronger every day with substantial Soviet support; and that overthrow of Castro would only be accomplished with substantial help from US including direct military intervention by this country. Some, in fact, recommended direct action of US Marines supported by American ships and planes and expressed belief such action by US was only way to stop Castro. One suggested that US cede Guantanamo Naval Base to an anti-Castro government in exile which would then receive aid from US for attack on Castro. Practically all expressed belief that unilateral action by US was essential and that no reliance could be placed on joint action by Organization of American States. Almost all felt any future military action against Castro would require heavy commitment by US forces in order to insure success and expressed belief that, although there are many anti-Castro Cubans available and eager for this struggle, they need US leadership and supplies.

Most appeared to have considered this matter simply from a standpoint of what force would be necessary, US as well as anti-Castro elements, to overthrow Castro. They appear to have given little, if

RDC:njp:slj:slj.  
(5)

109-1281-210-3100

EX-REG 21  
1 JUN 15 1961

50 JUN 21 1961

Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan  
Re: CUBAN SITUATION  
109-12-210

any, thought to the possibility that military intervention by the US could provoke an all-out war with the Soviet Union or could gravely damage US moral prestige and leadership throughout the world. In short, those interviewed have considered this simply a question of how much support from US is needed by anti-Castro elements to unseat Castro and establish the anti-Castro forces in power. Significantly, none commented on what action would be necessary to maintain the successor government in power or whether the Cuban people generally would support such a new regime.

ACTION:

We have disseminated copies of the memorandum prepared by Miami to State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, the military agencies, the Internal Security Division of the Department and US Information Agency. It is recommended that no dissemination be made of this material at a high level (such as Attorney General and Secretary of State). Although all of the opinions set forth in the Miami memorandum are attributed to Cuban exiles on voluntary basis, the compilation of these opinions which are virtually unanimous in recommending US military intervention might create the impression that such information was being furnished to Attorney General or Secretary of State in order to influence these officials in favor of such aggressive action. It is felt this should be avoided, particularly since data set forth in Miami memorandum is based entirely on opinion and speculation by Cuban exiles, a number of whom may have self-serving interest in US military action.

Re/Ram SBP/mon O'Dell G DD V.  
EAC  
W/Copy of K

UNITED STATES GOV

~~SECRET~~  
Memorandum

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

FROM :

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

DATE: June 9, 1961

[REDACTED]  
 POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA 4/22/61  
 CUBAN SITUATION  
 CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] b7C  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 4/22/2019  
 C1, TR. 2 4 per 664 Ltr dated 4/21/61 D

Reference is made to Miami teletype 6-7-61.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.b1  
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(S)

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b3

(S)

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b3

(S)

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(S)

LOI-XE

REC-92

109-12-210-300 3101

JUN 15 1961

WES

1-Belmont; 1-Sullivan  
1-Donahoe; 1-Liaison; 1-Papich

SJP: jad JUN 19 1961

XEROX

JUN 16 1961

~~SECRET~~

UNRECORDED JPN FILED IN 6-2-8075-0

2-13-61

~~SECRET~~

DECODED COPY

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Radio

4/22/61  
CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] 4/22/04 DERIVATIVE  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 4/22/2029  
[REDACTED] classified per OGA [REDACTED] dated 4/21/04

Teletype

*enc*  
URGENT

6-7-61 9:30 PM EST RGT

TO DIRECTOR  
Political Matters - CUBA  
FROM SAC MIAMI

INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DO NOT  
DISCLOSE

CUBAN SITUATION

072350

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UNRECORDED QPN FILED IN 6-2-80750 -

FOR FURTHER ACTION BY MIAMI UACB.

REC-92

109-12-310-3102

RECEIVED:

10:35 PM TELETYPE

10:48 PM 200106 JUN 15 1961

TOP SECRET

memo

SIP/pcd 6-7-61

b7c

33 JUN 1961

c/o: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

XEROX  
JUN 16 1961

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

F B I

~~REC-92~~

Date:

6/14/61

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via **AIRTEL** **REGISTERED MAIL**  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-45672)

SUBJECT: CUBAN SITUATION  
IS - CUBAALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/20/04 BY 6627904/AMR/adjPolitical Matters

Enclosed herewith are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum setting forth information concerning above-captioned subject matter, and 11 copies of a reliability memorandum setting forth the reliability of the informant used.

[redacted] mentioned in enclosed memorandum, is [redacted] b2  
 has [redacted] presently residing in [redacted] b7C  
 telephone number [redacted] D  
 stated that he was returning to Cuba very shortly  
 in order to convince [redacted], to  
 leave Cuba. [redacted] stated that [redacted] does not desire  
 [redacted] which he knows will be confiscated if he leaves  
 the country.

place cc: 113-7-210  
 (Mil. cuba)  
 AM

109-12-210-3103

3 - Bureau (109-12-210) (Encls. 22) (RM)  
 1 - Miami (105-1747) (Encls. 2) (Info) (RM)  
 1 - WFO (97-1017) (Encls. 2) (Info) (RM)  
 1 - NY 109-112 (FPM - CUBA)  
 1 - NY 105-45672

Copy to: CIA/State/RAB  
 ONI/OSI/G-2/ASIA

FJO:B:mfw (312)  
 (8)

by routing slip for info.  
 Date [redacted] by [redacted]

NAT

b7C

58 JUN 22 1961

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent: \_\_\_\_\_ M Per: \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

C. C. Wick

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

June 14, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/20/04 BY 60210 Anon/AF/adj

Re: Cuban Situation

[redacted] currently in the United States who intends to return to Cuba in order to bring out members of his family, advised on June 7, 1961, that the situation in Cuba today is desperate as far as the people inside the country are concerned. [redacted] advised that as a result of the recent unsuccessful invasion in April, 1961, the Cuban people are now depressed and the opposition to Castro has been rendered almost inoperative. [redacted] stated that the people inside Cuba today are doing the best they can to stay alive and do not want to show in any way that they are opposed to the Government of Prime Minister Fidel Castro because they realize the possible penalty for such opposition to the government.

b2  
b7D

[redacted] advised that during the recent invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Cochinos from April 17 through April 19, 1961, the Cuban Government rounded up many people throughout the country and it is estimated that about 50,000 were arrested in Havana alone. [redacted] advised that the Cuban Government was not prepared for such wholesale arrests and the prisoners were thrown into existing prisons already overcrowded, into the Sports Palace, theaters and public halls. [redacted] advised that there were no sanitation facilities present in these places to take care of the numerous people and after two or three days the living conditions were unbearable. [redacted] stated that he had spoken to one individual who had been so arrested who was an employee of the National Bank of Cuba and because her maid was picked up during the wholesale arrests, she did not report to work because she had three children to care for and she was put into the G-2 Headquarters for two days, then moved to La Cabana Fortress for several more days. [redacted] stated that at the end

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109-12-210-3103

ENCLOSURE

Re: Cuban Situation

of six days she was released and the authorities apologized to her by stating that she had been arrested by mistake. The authorities also requested that she return to her work and in fact, insisted that she return.

~~ME JES EN NY~~ ~~R APPROX 1891~~ ~~Cuba USA~~  
[redacted] further stated that [redacted] Stewart, a man in his 70's an American citizen who was in charge of Woolworth's in Havana for many years, and his wife, also in her 70's, were arrested during the wholesale arrests and held in the Blanquita Theater for two or three days. [redacted] stated that Stewart and his wife had never participated in any political activity in Cuba, had loved Cuba and had lived there for many years, and had given to Cuba more than they had ever taken out of Cuba. [redacted] stated that there were no formal charges brought against Mr. and Mrs. Stewart but they were detained as others, and while detained, their American papers were taken from them and not returned. [redacted] stated that, to his knowledge, Mr. and Mrs. Stewart are still inside Cuba and unable to leave because of the lack of proper documents.

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[redacted] advised that the prisoners of the recent invasion of Cuba are being detained at the Naval Hospital near La Cabana Fortress. [redacted] stated that Prime Minister Fidel Castro visits the prisoners everyday and is trying to entice them to remain in Cuba and to work there as he sees the possibility of making propaganda against the United States if some of these prisoners will remain in Cuba. [redacted] advised that he had heard on June 7, 1961, that Prime Minister Castro had asked that the members of the executive board of the group collecting funds for the purchase of tractors in exchange for prisoners come to Havana to speak with him personally regarding the matter. [redacted] stated that he feels that if this were done by Dr. Milton Eisenhower and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Castro would make propaganda out of their visit to Cuba and he feels sure that Castro would show them just what he wanted them to see and that Mrs. Roosevelt would return to the United States filled with Castro's propaganda and deify Castro. [redacted] stated that, in his opinion, he feels that Mrs. Roosevelt, Dr. Eisenhower and Walter Reuther, President of the United Automobile Workers, and also a member of the group collecting funds for the purchase of tractors, should, in fact, be restricted from going to Cuba.

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b7D

Re: Cuban Situation

[redacted] further stated on June 7, 1961, that Havana is an armed camp and that daily boats are bringing arms and military equipment into Havana from Iron Curtain countries, especially from Czechoslovakia. [redacted] stated that throughout Havana and the suburbs, the Castro Government has installed anti-aircraft guns on rooftops wherever possible and that these guns are the four barrelled Czechoslovakian type anti-aircraft guns. [redacted] further stated that throughout Havana there are many places which are being used by the government to store arms and ammunition, and at the military base at Managua, there is much construction going on in a small hill immediately behind the base and it is alleged that there is much concrete being put into this area possibly as a munition dump or as some kind of a missile installation.

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[redacted] also advised that there is enough money among the people because the government is paying fairly good salaries for the purpose of keeping the people happy and not inciting revolution. [redacted] also stated that there is enough food in Havana and that they are getting canned meats, fish, vegetables, condensed and powdered milk from Poland, rice from Red China and canned goods from Russia. [redacted] stated that the people in Havana can not understand how the United States allows some people to continue to ship food into Cuba as individuals in the United States continue to ship to Cuba lard, canned foods and cattle. [redacted] stated that, in his opinion, the United States should take immediate remedial measures to stop the export of lard, cattle and canned foods into Cuba. [redacted] also advised that, in his opinion, one of the most effective measures the United States could take against Cuba is to stop the export of lard as this is the most important commodity in Cuba, and also because Russia can not supply lard.

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[redacted] advised that he believes that the United States should enforce a strict, immediate and comprehensive embargo on all goods to Cuba. [redacted] also stated that, in his opinion, an embargo of United States goods may have already lost its effectiveness and the next step the United States must take is a total blockade of the island.

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Re: Cuban Situation

[redacted] advised that from his knowledge of the internal situation in Cuba and also from his knowledge of the Cuban people, there is only one hope for Cuba today, and that is intervention by American troops. [redacted] stated that without the American troops coming into Cuba to overthrow Prime Minister Castro and his Communist Regime, there is no hope. [redacted] stated that this is not a fight of Cuban against Cuban, but rather, it is a fight of Cubans against Russians, Chinese, Poles, Czechs and other Iron Curtain countries. [redacted] stated that the Cubans can not fight against the Russians, Czechs, Poles and Chinese and the people of Cuba are looking and asking for help from the United States. [redacted] stated that Fidel Castro is the controlling force in Cuba today but Castro is totally in the hands of the Communists.

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[redacted] stated that during 1960 and the early part of 1961, the people inside Cuba lived for the day that the island would be invaded and they were content to put up with the situation inside the country because they knew, or at least believed, that the United States would give full support to any action in Cuba and that such an effort to overthrow Castro would be successful. [redacted] stated that the people in Cuba today can not understand how the United States supported the invasion force only to a limited degree and allowed the invasion to take place and then allowed it to fail. [redacted] stated Cuba today is lost unless the United States takes drastic action to overthrow the Communist Regime in that country, and if the United States takes no action, there will be more Latin countries falling the same way Cuba did before the end of 1961. [redacted] stated that as far as the United States is concerned, this is a time not for political talking but for positive, drastic action.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

June 14, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/20/07 BY b290kuw/abj

Re: Cuban Situation

Reference is made to the memorandum dated and captioned as above.

[redacted], mentioned in referenced memorandum, is an informant contact with whom has been insufficient to determine his reliability.

b2  
b7D

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

109-12-210 - 3103  
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: JUN 15 1961

SAC, MIAMI (105-3902)

SUBJECT:

CUBAN SITUATION  
IS - CUBA4/22/04  
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/A6/dj b-267 DERIVATIVE  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 4/22/2029  
Pg. 2 [ ] per OGA letter dated 4/21/04

Political Matters - Cuba

Enclosed are five copies of a letterhead memorandum dated as above, captioned "Cuban Situation."

This memorandum is classified "Secret," as unauthorized disclosure could result in serious damage to the United States and could have a bearing on our national defense. As information set forth reflects unfavorably upon various partially unidentified CIA representatives, it is recommended the Bureau limit dissemination to CIA and any other agency on a need-to-know basis.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISEis [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Floridab2  
b7C  
d

cuba

For the information of the Bureau, [REDACTED] stated that he served [REDACTED] in the Cuban National Army from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. During the PRIO, GRAU, SAN MARTIN Governments, he served as [REDACTED] in Cuba, as [REDACTED], and as [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] Cuba. During the BATISTA regime, he was arrested 35 times; he was a volunteer in the U. S. Army during

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E

③ Bureau (2) - 109-12-210,  
1 - 105-89923, CLIP) (Encls-5) (RM)  
3 - Miami (2 - 105-3902  
1 - 6208573, CLIP)

EX-114  
REG-74

109-12-210-3104

14 JUN 19 1961

GED:ush  
(6)ENCLOSURE  
RECEIVED  
FEB. 1961  
BEC.D

55 JUN 23 1961

**SECRET**

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~~TOP SECRET~~

MM 105-3902

World War II, holding the rank of corporal. He is a member of [REDACTED] and of [REDACTED]

b7D

Immediately upon the arrival of FIDEL CASTRO in Havana in January, 1959, [REDACTED] who had been retired but was working in the anti-BATISTA underground, attempted to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] but when CASTRO appointed CAMILO CIENFUEGOS to a high military position, it became obvious to [REDACTED] that Cuba was going communist. He then began [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], upon request of the FRD to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who had also been working in the Cuban underground, came to Miami in [REDACTED], upon instructions of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] served on [REDACTED] of the FRD immediately under [REDACTED]. He was in charge of [REDACTED]

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(S) He said he was also in charge of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] expressed bitterness toward CIA for the manner in which they had handled the camps [REDACTED] and for superseding the authority of [REDACTED], this being responsible for the resignation of [REDACTED] and other members of his staff.

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[REDACTED] specifically requested that his identity be treated confidentially. Several times during the interview he related that he wants to prevent the United States from making the same mistakes twice.

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~~TOP SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

105-3902

Miami, Florida

JUN 15 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

4/22/04  
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted] dated [redacted]  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X [redacted] 4/22/2019  
All E1's classified per per [redacted] dated 4/21/04

~~SECRET~~

CUBAN SITUATION

On May 19, 1961, [redacted], who has furnished insufficient information to enable his reliability to be evaluated, but who is a Cuban citizen connected with the Frente Revolucionario Democratico and in a position to know, furnished the following information:

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[redacted] predicated his information by stating his motive is to prevent the United States and the anti-CASTRO Cubans from making the same mistakes which were made relative to organizing the liberation forces which made an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the CASTRO regime in Cuba on April 17, 1961.

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[redacted] said that when the FRD under the civilian leadership of [redacted] began to organize, in conjunction with representative of the Central Intelligence Agency, an invasion force to overthrow FIDEL CASTRO, the following individuals were appointed members of the military staff of the FRD:

*Guatemala*

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

*Guatemala*

~~SECRET~~

109-12-210- 3104  
ENCLOSURE

Re: CUBAN SITUATION

**SECRET**

[REDACTED] was placed in charge of [REDACTED]

(S) In September, 1960, the military staff began to receive reports of bad morale, lack of discipline, and other problems from men at the [REDACTED]. Subsequently, the military staff, [REDACTED] (S)

camp two liaison officers,

sent to the [REDACTED] (S)

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and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] accompanied by [REDACTED] of the military staff.

Cuba  
Guatemala

On May 22, 1961, [REDACTED] furnished a series of reports as follows:

Florida

b2  
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(NOTE: "EMC" stands for ESTADO MAYOR CONJUNTO, JOINT STAFF).

Miami, February 11, 1961

"RE: Background and present situation at [REDACTED] (S) b1

b3

"TO: Coordinator General of the F.R.D.

"1. In compliance with the verbal order received from you today, I am making this report, stressing the most important facts which, in my opinion, have caused the present crisis in the military sector.

"2. About the middle of December of last year, [REDACTED], who is now [REDACTED], communicated to [REDACTED], who at that time was acting as [REDACTED] (S)

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Chief of the American Staff at the aforementioned Base, had told him that he would appoint a committee of six persons who were to carry on a recruiting campaign in Mexico, Venezuela and Miami. [REDACTED] asked him if it would be presented to the Chief of the EMC, since he understood that this was the only organization legally

**RE: CUBAN SITUATION**

**SECRET**

authorized to exercise such functions. [REDACTED] later told him that he had conferred with [REDACTED] who said that it did not matter to him whether the Committee did that or not, since it was working on its own.

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"3. On January 7 of this year, [REDACTED] of the Air Base, told [REDACTED], who was acting as [REDACTED] that the (S) Staff was to arrive the next day, and that as soon as he arrived [REDACTED] (S) he should advise [REDACTED]. This was done. Later, [REDACTED] accompanied by [REDACTED] (S) who was at that time acting as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had a conversation with [REDACTED] and when it was over, the aforementioned [REDACTED] sent a radiogram asking that the arrival of the members of the Joint Staff be postponed.

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"4. About the middle of January, 5 pilots belonging to the Air Base went on a hunger strike, and after they had been on it for 3 days, the Security Chief at the Base told them to stop it or they would be transferred to Miami. Later, a campaign was carried on against the Staff, which caused the rest of the personnel to see that the transfer of the aforementioned pilots to this city was made because of pressure from the members of the Joint Staff, itself.

"5. The matters discussed above show that the position of the American Staff in regard to the Joint Staff daily gave more and more signs of non-recognition, and far from getting better, events kept getting worse and worse until they ended in the events mentioned below.

"6. About January 20, an unsupported rumor began to circulate among the personnel that members who composed the Command of the Attack Brigade, along with [redacted], were

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**SECRET**

RE: CUBAN SITUATION

**SECRET**

carrying on a campaign with conspiratorial ends, in order to get the rest of the personnel to approve the non-recognition of the command and the hierarchy of the EMC, for they claimed that the EMC was not recognized by the directors of the F.R.D. The personnel regarded this as a coup d'etat, and they said that if such were the case, they would not approve it, since they believed that only the F.R.D. was in a position to effect the dismissal, since the Staff was a projection of what the civil power was supposed to be in the future.

"7. On January 31, at approximately 8 P.M., [redacted] told [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] that on the order of [redacted] they were to go immediately to the Air Base, so that they could take a plane to Miami the following morning. When the aforementioned gentlemen asked [redacted] why they were being sent there, and why in such haste, he said that he did not know the reasons for this order. Both [redacted] and [redacted] said that since they were there as [redacted], they had to obey only the orders of the EMC and those given by [redacted]. [redacted] told them to go to [redacted] who, after deliberating for a while, gave them the order to return and to rejoin their original unit, which was that of the EMC in Miami.

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"8. The morning of the following day, shortly after boarding the plane which was to take them to Miami, [redacted] presented himself and said that the personnel of [redacted] had taken a seditious position, and (S) that it was behaving this way because both [redacted] and [redacted] had been taken from the base so unexpectedly (1). But [redacted] and [redacted] knew that the position taken by the personnel was due to the fact that

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**SECRET**

RE: CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] had, on the same morning of the 31st, read a letter in which both he and other members of the Command did not recognize the existence of the EMC, and had invited the rest of the personnel to give their approval by signing that letter, which the personnel refused to do. A division was created thereby, in which the units of Battalions 2 and 3, part of the Heavy Arms Company and the Transport Section, with their leaders at their head, presented their resignations in case such an action was carried out, for they said that the primary purpose of this fight was to re-establish a democratic regime in our country, based on the Constitution and the Laws, and they would not support seditious movements which had brought such sad results to Cuba.

b7C

"9. Later, the units mentioned in the above paragraph agreed not to present themselves for drill until the members of the F.R.D. and the E.M.C. showed up. This action was postponed temporarily since part of the American Staff formally promised them that before the 10th of this month, their request would be granted. However, there are about 50 men who maintained and are still maintaining their position, for which reason they have been isolated from the rest of the personnel. Those who went along with the American Staff and are continuing to train are waiting for the leaders of the F.R.D. and the members of the E.M.C. to come there.

"10. Approximately 10 days ago, [redacted] (S) returned to the camp, telling all the personnel that those who did not accept the command of [redacted] would be arrested and that they should know that for the fight in Cuba which is drawing close, they (the Americans) were not taking into account either the F.R.D. or the

b1  
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~~SECRET~~

RE: CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

E.M.C., since they believed that the sole functions of the EMC were those of recruiting, and not of exercising command at the said Base."

"Respectfully yours,

/s/ [REDACTED]

b7C

[REDACTED], F.R.D. Army of Liberation."

\* \* \*

(Summary translation)

"Writer states that some of this information is obtained from personal observation and some from persons whom he trusts.

"He left Miami for [REDACTED] in September, 1960. Upon his arrival at the base, he found [REDACTED] in charge. [REDACTED] (S) *Guanahacabana*

The men at the base were being trained for guerrilla warfare. [REDACTED] (S) *Florida*

and [REDACTED] were in charge of the military (S) - training, but it soon became obvious that [REDACTED] (S) - were not in agreement and frequently contradicted each other's orders. (S)

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b7C

[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] (S) that he was dissatisfied with his conduct. [REDACTED] (S) promised to comply with the Captain's orders, but he continued to do just what he pleased. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] (S) that he was going to ask for permission to go to Miami, so that he could explain the situation at the base. [REDACTED] (S) said that the EMC would not grant him his request.

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b7C

"That afternoon, after speaking to [REDACTED] (S)

and two other members of [REDACTED] went to the Air Base to ask [REDACTED] of the Air Base at that time, to send a radio-gram via the communications system which the Americans had at the Base asking the EMC for permission to come to headquarters to explain the

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RE: CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

difficulties at the base. In spite of the fact  
that [redacted] promised to send the radiogram,  
he did not do so.

b7C

"When the personnel at [redacted] realized  
that no answer was forthcoming from Miami,  
they started to mutiny, and the prisoners also  
began to give trouble. The European instructors,  
called 'Halcones' (Falcons), conferred with the  
prisoners and promised to release them. At this  
time, there were rumors to the effect that the  
personnel at the Base planned to attack the  
Armory and seize all the arms.

b1  
b3

"The Americans decided to call upon  
[redacted] and asked him to come to  
[redacted] to see if he could pacify the person-<sup>(S)</sup>  
nel at [redacted]. At first, he was successful.  
The Americans then decided that [redacted] should  
take over [redacted]. All the personnel were  
summoned and told that [redacted]  
was at the Air Base, waiting to leave on a very  
important mission. But the truth of the matter  
was that he was being held incommunicado at a  
farm called [redacted] which was located about  
5 kilometers from [redacted].<sup>(S)</sup>

b1  
b3  
b7C

"All this took place around November 13,  
1960. Just about that time, 200 men, completely  
equipped, were sent from [redacted] in two planes<sup>(S)</sup>  
to Puerto Barrios to participate in something  
which had absolutely nothing to do with their  
reason for being at the Base. They were told  
that they were going on orders from "superiors,"  
but they never knew who the "superiors" were.

b1  
b3

"This, plus the failure to recognize the  
leaders at the Base and the disappearance of  
[redacted] resulted in a loss of  
15 days training time and a loss of morale  
among the men. As soon as the troops learned that

b7C

~~SECRET~~

RE: CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] was being held prisoner, they began to mutiny, and one of the men left the camp and decided to rescue [redacted].

b7C

"When the Advisors and the Malcones found they had been discovered, they sent [redacted], [redacted] and 4 or 5 other men on a mission, but neither the EMC nor the Command at the Base were informed about who went on the mission or what it was.

b7C

"At that time, [redacted] was made [redacted] and [redacted] was appointed to [redacted], but since the latter was not capable of filling his position, he was relieved of [redacted] and made [redacted] of the Brigade. This shows that men were appointed to positions not because of what they knew but because of their connections.

b7C

"The writer says that he has heard that in G-2 there are persons who are completely untrained for that type of work, while there are men in the camp who have taken courses given by the FBI [redacted] in the United States, who are not put into positions where they can use that knowledge.

"About the middle of December of last year, [redacted], who is [redacted], told [redacted] who was at that time [redacted] to [redacted] (S) that [redacted] at that base, had said that he was going to appoint a committee of six men to carry on a recruiting campaign in Mexico, Venezuela and Miami. [redacted] asked whether the Chief of the EMC knew about this, but was told that [redacted] did (S) not think it necessary to have the committee present itself to the Chief of the EMC, for it would work on its own.

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RE: CUBAN SITUATION

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"On January 6, of this year, the two officers who were acting as [redacted] at [redacted] received appointments in writing, signed by (S) the Chief of the EMC, in which their obligations and rights were given. This was due to the fact that the Chief of the EMC knew that the American Advisors were not giving these officers recognition. [redacted] took them to [redacted] who said (S) that he wanted a copy of each, so that he could consult with his superiors, which he has not done to date.

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b7C

"On January 9, 1961, [redacted] called a (S) meeting at which the members of the Staff of the Attack Brigade, [redacted] at [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] were present. At that time, [redacted] announced that he was in command and that in the Brigade the only one that could command was [redacted]. Thus, the hands of the delegates are tied.

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b7C

"The writer mentions other occasion when the delegates of the EMC have been completely ignored and kept in the dark as to what is going on, [redacted] and he says that this situation is daily getting worse. He accuses [redacted] of trying to get the personnel of the Attack Brigade to go along with him in not recognizing the EMC, but the personnel refused to cooperate with him.

b7C

"On January 30, [redacted] advised [redacted] and [redacted] that [redacted] had ordered them to go immediately to the Air Base so that they could leave for Miami on the following day. The latter two were not told why they were being so ordered and said that they were not obliged to obey orders from [redacted] told them to go to [redacted] to see whether or not they were to (S) obey them. [redacted] after some deliberation, told (S) them to rejoin their unit of origin in Miami.

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

RE: CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

"The following day, before the plane left, [redacted] came to [redacted] and [redacted] and told him that the personnel at the base were taking a seditious position because [redacted] and [redacted] had left the base so suddenly, but both men knew that their position was due to the fact that very day, [redacted] had read a letter to them asking the personnel to back [redacted] and other members of the Command there in not recognizing the existence of the EMC. Certain unit heads and their men threatened to resign if such a thing came to pass. These units refused to continue training until the members of the FRD and EMC showed up. Some of the American Staff promised them that their request would be granted and all except about 50 resumed training, but these 50, who held out, have been isolated from the others and are still waiting for the leaders of the FRD and the members of the EMC to appear.

b7C

"On approximately the 8th of February, [redacted] returned to camp and stated that all those (S) who did not accept the command of [redacted] would be arrested. He also informed them that the fight in Cuba was drawing near and that in this fight, they (the Americans) did not expect to consider the FRD or the EMC since they felt that their sole function was recruiting and not commanding at that Base.

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b7C

"The writer says that he has received information from reliable sources that 20 or 22 men have disappeared from the camp since January 31st because they refused to go along with [redacted]. The writer says that he is enclosing 2 photostatic copies of letters which are proof that [redacted] read the letter requesting the nonrecognition of the FRD.

b7C

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RE: CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

He accuses the authorities there of censoring letters leaving [redacted] so that news concerning irregularities there does not get out.

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"The writer also describes an incident which showed unfairness on the part of [redacted] in regard to some pilots at the base. One of the pilots denounced [redacted] and [redacted] for their arbitrary conduct but was persuaded to tear up his denunciation. Men who rebel are placed in unhealthy and uncomfortable quarters.

b7C

"This report give a general idea of the discipline and command which exist at [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

"Miami, Feb. 15, 1961."

(Author unidentified)

\* \* \*

(Summary translation)

"SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT SENT TO [redacted]  
THE SITUATION WHICH PREVAILS IN [redacted] (S)"

[redacted] (S)

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"The report preceding this one revealed the situation prevailing at [redacted] due to irregularities (S) in the command and the actions of members of the leadership of the Attack Brigade, with the support and approval of the Chief and other members of the Mission of American Advisors.

b1  
b3

"The discipline has been getting worse ever since [redacted] read a letter on January 30, directed to the Co-ordinator General of the FDR, which protested against the action taken by the Staff of the RFD in the case of the Head of the Navy of that Front. The letter

b7C

RE: CUBAN SITUATION

**SECRET**

claimed that the leaders and the troops supported the protest. Personnel from two battalions immediately objected to being included in the denunciation, saying that this was done without their consent, and they demanded that the Executives of the Front present themselves to explain the situation.

"The discipline was getting so bad that [redacted] who was acting as [redacted] [redacted] presented his resignation, which was not accepted by the personnel of the American Staff.

b1  
b3  
b7C

"In the camps, persons who do not co-operate unconditionally with the established command, are punished and in some cases imprisoned....

"In addition to the names listed, in prison also is [redacted] (if he has not been released yet). [redacted], was one of those who fled several days ago. They are both sons of [redacted] [redacted], who at present has a responsible position in the new Enlisting Office at 1045 SW 27th Avenue.

b7C

"Some persons disappear from the camp and if any one dares to ask about them, he is imprisoned or has to flee....

"Members at the camp are afraid that some of the elements from the BATISTA regime will be sent to take command in the camp, and it is rumored that [redacted] [redacted] is going to be in charge of the campaign which is drawing close.

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b3  
b7C

"The visit of the Co-ordinator General of the FRD was received with mixed reactions, for according to some persons who were able to get near the Co-ordinator, he told them that he did not know just when a photograph might have been taken of him as he spoke to the troops.

**SECRET**

RE: CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

"It should be mentioned that when [redacted] came to the Base [redacted], he told the (S) personnel there that the Joint Staffs had resigned, but the resignation had not been accepted and that the problem would be resolved satisfactorily. But the following day, at the Base itself, he said that the Joint Staffs had been dissolved and that the commands of the Camps had been approved by him.

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b7C

"The personnel have commented that at no time during his visit to the camps was [redacted] left alone so that he could talk freely to the men there, and that he did not know what was really going on.

b7C

"It was learned also that [redacted] wanted to talk to the prisoners but none of them were brought to him so that he could learn from them what was going on.

b7C

"It must be known to the superiors that recently a committee of five members from the camp, accompanied by an American [redacted] (S) came for the purpose of opening an office for recruiting persons to be sent to the camp later. This office was opened at 1045 SW 27th Avenue, Miami. To this office came all the Cubans who were not accepted at the other office which the Frente has for recruiting because the latter office has been very careful about the character of the people it accepted.

b1  
b3

"It was later learned that [redacted]

*Cuba  
Gulf*  
[redacted] and many others who would best be forgotten and who had to leave on December 31, 1958, because they were repudiated in Cuba by the soldiers, themselves, and by honest and decent citizens, were enlisted there.

b7C

~~SECRET~~

RE: CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

"The afore-mentioned Committee had meetings with groups of persons from different sectors, and at one meeting which they had with those who belonged to the same tendency as [redacted]

[redacted], at which [redacted]

and [redacted]

b7C

were present as delegates of the Mission, one of the persons present asked if that new recruiting office was set up with the knowledge and support of the Frente, and if so, then the leader should be [redacted]. This, however, was not the case.

"As a result of the activities of the afore-mentioned Committee, there were two shipments of personnel, and another which was not sent by the Joint Staffs, either but by the Navy, and which was called [redacted] which (S) was handled very mysteriously...."

b1  
b3

(Author Unidentified)

\* \* \*

(Summary translation)

Florida

[redacted] and [redacted] presented a statement in Miami on April 24, 1961, informing the general public that they, as members of the Staff of the Army of Liberation of the PRD, duly appointed by the Executive Committee of the PRD, support the action of [redacted] [redacted], who resigned as [redacted] of the Liberation Forces, because of the substantial change in the aims and purposes of the Staffs.

b7C

"As Cubans and patriots they desire the fall of the Communist regime in Cuba."

- 14 -

~~SECRET~~

RE: CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

"They continue to remain members of the FRD because they believe that it is the most suitable instrument in existence for putting an end to the terrible situation in Cuba and they are ready to co-operate with the Front in overthrowing the CASTRO regime.

"They express their gratitude for the confidence placed in them by the Executive Committee of the FRD during the time they acted as members of the Staff of the Army of Liberation of the FRD."

(Author unidentified)

\* \* \*

"SECOND ADDITION TO REPORT TO [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] CONCERNING [REDACTED] AND OTHER DETAILS.

b1  
b3

(S) (S)  
"In my original report I brought out conditions at the [REDACTED] among both American and Cuban (S) leaders, as well as the lack of discipline, and the fact that the leaders lacked military ability.

b1  
b3

"I also mentioned in my first addition to the original report that persons were imprisoned for the mere fact that they disagreed with the 'pastoral letter' of [REDACTED], issued on January 30, 1961. Now, on March 20, we still do not know the whereabouts of 14 comrades who disappeared from the camp. Later, over 20% of the people on the Base fled, because conditions were so bad.

b7c

"I should also like to mention that the prisoners were lodged in a small wooden house, with a zinc roof and dirt floors. This had a capacity for six persons, and at times there were more than twelve persons held there. Also at this time, many of the prisoners were taken out of the house early in the morning and water was thrown on them. At meal times, very often, they were not permitted to eat, or they were taken to the kitchen so late they had to eat leftovers. Each prisoner

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RE: CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

received a close haircut, and the letter 'P' was painted on the back of his shirt in red. All these were the ideas of [redacted], who was educated in Czechoslovakia and other countries behind the Iron Curtain. He also had the consent of [redacted], and [redacted].

b7C

"I mentioned to you that the General Staff and the directors of the Revolutionary Democratic Front do not decide upon whether or not to accept applicants, since they have to wait for a report from the Committee on Information and Intelligence of the FRD. After the individual has applied, it is the head of [redacted], (people who know him find him a most unpleasant person), who makes this decision.

b7C

[redacted] is a negative element who has made very clear his desire to avoid recruiting people whom he considered to be 'bad.'

b7C

"(A man whom I called ' [redacted] ' was sent on the embarkation of February 10th). When [redacted] sends in his unfavorable reports on people who apply, he ruins the morale of the directors of the movement, since it appears that they, and not he are blackballing Cubans who want to take up arms for their country.

b7C

"In my judgment, this man has greatly handicapped our future triumph in liberating Cuba.  
March 20, 1961."

\* \* \*

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/13/61

FROM : SAC, BUFFALO (109-11)

ENC/

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]  
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS  
(CUBAN ALIEN REFUGEE)

CC TO: [REDACTED] Buffalo  
REQ. REC'D. 5-11-64

MAY 26 1964

ANS.

BY: [REDACTED]

b7c

W/S  
Enclosed are nine copies of a Letterhead Memorandum pertaining to captioned individual.

Information from IIMS, Buffalo, N.Y., 3/29/61, was received by letter.

The interview with subject on 6/2/61 was conducted by SA [REDACTED] said he would immediately contact the FBI if any pertinent information comes to his attention.

b7c

Further investigation does not appear necessary concerning subject at this time.

② - Bureau (Encls. 9) (RM)  
1 - Buffalo  
RMP:krd  
(3)

OSIA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/20/04 BY b7c/AUC/PCE/At/obj

Copy to: CIA/State [REDACTED]  
ONI/OSI/G2  
by routing slip for info  
Date 6/1/61 by [REDACTED]

9 ENCLOSURE

REC-36

ab  
109-12-210-3105

25 JUN 16 1961

EX-108

[Signature]  
NAT. DIR. C.

20050 42nd BH 21

ESTIMATED DATE MAY 1961

BEC.D

55 JUN 16 1961

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
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Section 552

- (b)(1)
- (b)(2)
- (b)(3)
- \_\_\_\_\_
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- (b)(4)
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- (b)(7)(A)
- (b)(7)(B)
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- (b)(7)(E)
- (b)(7)(F)
- (b)(8)
- (b)(9)

- (d)(5)
- (j)(2)
- (k)(1)
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- (k)(7)

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- Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

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109 - 140 - 12 - 210 - 3105, enclosure page 1

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[REDACTED] b7C

[REDACTED] b7C

[REDACTED] b7C

[REDACTED] b7C

[REDACTED] b7C

[REDACTED] b7C

[REDACTED] said he had formerly been opposed to BATISTA and one day about two years ago was approached by a friend, who said he was operating with the underground for CASTRO in Cuba. At that person's request for financial aid, [REDACTED] contributed \$300 per month to the underground for supplies.

b7C

[REDACTED] said it was his idea that when CASTRO came to power, he, [REDACTED], was full of hope for Cuba. He said no man was better qualified to straighten out Cuba. He said CASTRO had all the markings of the finest leader since the Spanish American War, but that CASTRO mistook the way. He said CASTRO misread history and forgot that the Cubans had fought "teeth and nail" to rid themselves of tyranny before.

b7C

It is [REDACTED] conviction that in a country where democracy is not strongly rooted, a dictatorship of the right, such as BATISTA's, is almost inevitably followed by a revolution leading to a dictatorship of the left. He finds comfort in American policy towards Cuba and South America, but feels that recognition of dictatorships in the past has not helped.

b7C

[REDACTED] b7C

[REDACTED] said he came face to face with Communism in Cuba, when his business was nationalized at the start of the last war. For six months he protested to the government, and for one week during July, 1960, they returned his business to him. They then took it away from him again and jailed him for three days.

[REDACTED] stated that in September, 1960, he accumulated several thousand dollars on the black market and thereby financed his trip to Miami. His wife and two daughters followed.

[REDACTED] voiced a strong hatred toward CASTRO and his type of government, and offered to assist the United States in any way possible. He remarked that he is tired of the danger and insecurity of Cuba and believes he may petition for citizenship in the United States.

This is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

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Section 552

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 (b)(7)(F)  
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 (b)(9)

Section 552a

- (d)(5)  
 (j)(2)  
 (k)(1)  
 (k)(2)  
 (k)(3)  
 (k)(4)  
 (k)(5)  
 (k)(6)  
 (k)(7)

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109-140-12-210 - unrecorded document dated 6/21/1961

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: 6/19/61

FROM : SAC, WFO (97-1017)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/22/01 BY [signature]

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS = CUBA

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 9 copies of a letterhead memo with associated evaluation memo.

The information in the enclosure was furnished by [REDACTED] to SA [REDACTED] on 6/12/61. b7C D

The person who received the original Spanish letter, mentioned in the enclosure, was named by the informant as [REDACTED]

Spain

[REDACTED] . The writer of the letter was [REDACTED]

b7D

[REDACTED], who wrote [REDACTED] from exile in [REDACTED] has indicated that his translation of [REDACTED] letter has been furnished by him to the U.S. State Department and to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The names of [REDACTED] have not been revealed in the enclosure in order to protect their families in Cuba from possible reprisal. b7D

②-Bureau (Enc.-9)

2-WFO

(1-[REDACTED])

HPW:mew

(4)

P b2  
b7D

Copy to: CIA/State/PAB

OSI/A REC-5

ONI/OSI/G2

by routing slip for info

Date 6/21/61 by [REDACTED]

14 JUN 22 1961

EX-113

18 ENCLOSURE

56 JUN 22 1961

NAT. INT. SEC'S

b7C



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 19, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/20/04 BY 60290AUG05/AS/ldj

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

On June 12, 1961, a confidential informant furnished, in translation from its original Spanish, a letter dated May 28, 1961, which was received in the United States from [redacted] who had fled on [redacted] from the Castro regime in Cuba. 57D

The writer of the letter related that on the day of the unsuccessful invasion of Cuba (April 17, 1961) he was one of those arrested by the Castro authorities in their roundup of the anti-Castro underground in Cuba. The writer said that the underground received no advance notice of the invasion. He wrote that he was held without charges for some eleven days in the moat of Morro Castle in Cuba.

"Anything I may tell you about the suffering undergone is inadequate. Imagine, we - a total of more than 7000 men - were kept outdoors, and had to withstand during the day a scorching sun, and during the night, thanks to a late hour northern gale, an unbearable cold. As the prisoners relatives did not know the place of detention, especially in the first days, no one had available even a miserable blanket with which to cover himself. Physiological needs had to be performed in front of others like animals. We spent a day without water, and when water was finally provided it was by way of installing a hose hanging down the side of the moat wall, and from which the entire camp had to obtain its supply. You can readily imagine the scenes that took place to obtain the first swallow of water in over a day. We were kept without food for two days. When food was provided, the rations were so small and ridiculous--they came in

109-12-210-3106

ENCLOSURE

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

"little boxes--that I renounced mine. Food was organized on a little better basis later, but even then you had to stand in line more than 4 hours to obtain the miserable pittance. On the second night of our internment there, the most fantastic scene of collective panic that I have ever witnessed in my life took place. At about 8:30 that night, word spread through the internees that the sentries were going to stage a false alarm announcing the overthrow of Fidel to provoke a reaction of joy among the prisoners and massacre them. I want to tell you that the place where we found ourselves was an open ditch so that no one upon entering there could dispel from his mind the idea that the location was the most appropriate one for a massacre that could be asked for. As you may readily gather, the stage was perfect. As it developed, at 9:00 at night, tracer bullets were fired over the open ditch, accompanied by machine gun burst together with commands from the sentries ordering us not to move or we would be cut down. As I told you, panic was indescribable. I know cases of men that urinated and defecated; others, seeking refuge, threw themselves into a corner more or less protected that the people had converted into a provisional latrine and wallowed in the feces of the whole camp. The shaking of knees could be materially heard, and everywhere could be heard voices begging for mercy. In short, something dantesque. To summarize it, I can say that in the course of the 11 days that I was detained, 6 persons became insane, several had heart trouble, and a typhoid epidemic started.

"Cuba is today a police state; one lives by terror and in terror. Subject to be denounced by any civic (minded) citizen (informer) member of the famous committees. I think I can thus summarize the state of our unfortunate country."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

Washington 25, D.C.  
June 19, 1961

Title                   **FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA**

Character              **INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA**

Reference             **Memorandum dated and captioned  
as above**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced  
communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-20-04 BY b2/b7d b7c A6/cb

109-12-210-3106

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property  
of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside  
your agency.

**ENCLOSURE**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

PA  
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: 6-14-61

FROM : LEGAT, RIO DE JANEIRO (109-110)

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBA

Enclosed herewith in quintuplicate are a letterhead memorandum and an evaluation memorandum for the source mentioned in the letterhead memorandum, both bearing the same date as instant letter and the same caption.

is [redacted] referred to in the enclosed letterhead memorandum (S)

b1  
b2  
b7D

Copies of the letterhead and evaluation memoranda have been made available to [redacted]

b1

The letterhead memorandum has been classified "Confidential" inasmuch as it reflects information received from source on a confidential basis, and unauthorized disclosure could seriously affect the operations of the Rio de Janeiro Office to the detriment of the United States Government.

P

- ② - Bureau (Encls. - 10)  
4 - Rio de Janeiro (1 - 109-110)  
{ 1 - 109-107  
{ 1 - 100-600  
(1 - [redacted] (S)

4/22/61  
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted] 2A46  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 140722Z029

b1

JEG:LM  
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

100 - State, [redacted]  
Rm/ST 06/61 REC 36  
2051 15 JUN 1961

109-12-210-3107 b1

REBONWICH MURKIN  
REC. EX-130

NAT. INTL SEC.

b1

ENCLOSURE  
62 JUN 27 1961

~~SECRET~~

b7C

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
XXXXXX

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
**DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**

1 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

- (b)(1)  
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 (b)(3)  


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- (b)(7)(A)  
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- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.  
 Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

       Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

       Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

       Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

       Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):  


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
  


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The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:  
109-140-12-210-3107, enclosure

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XXXXXX



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 14, 1961

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Reference is made to the letterhead memorandum dated June 14, 1961, in captioned matter.

[redacted] referred to in referenced memorandum has furnished reliable information in the past.

b2  
b7D

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/22/04 BY [Signature]

109-12-210-3107  
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**Memorandum****SECRET**TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN *See*

DATE: June 15, 1961

FROM : [REDACTED]

cc Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Donahee  
Mr. Cotter

SUBJECT: X [REDACTED] (S) INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sullivan *✓*  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b1  
b7C*Dickens**M*b1  
b7C

that Supervisor [REDACTED] WFO, advised at 9:50 AM, 6-15-61,

[REDACTED] (S)

b1

[REDACTED] (S)

**ACTION:**

For information. The above was immediately furnished to [REDACTED] of the State Department by Liaison Agent [REDACTED]

b7C

DEM:td (6)

*See*  
 ✓  
 Radio carried  
 their Q

*REC-52 109-12-210-308*

*111-12-210-20 JUN 20 1961*

*109-*

*RCC  
Cotter*

*4/12/04  
CLASSIFIED BY NSI/AS/66-60267AAG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X, 12/12/2029*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

*63 JUN 26 1961*

**SECRET**

F B I

REC [initials]

Date: 6/16/61

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-45672)

SUBJECT: CUBAN SITUATION

IS - CUBA / POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Enclosed are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum reflecting information furnished by [REDACTED] obtained on his trip to Canada.

b2  
b7D

[REDACTED] is [REDACTED].

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 6/16/04 BY [REDACTED] Autodeclassified

b7C

- 3  
C/C to [REDACTED]  
11/16/61 11/16/61  
MHL:mfw (312)  
(9)
- Bureau (109-12-210) (Encls. 11) (RM)
  - Miami (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
  - WFO (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
  - New York [REDACTED] (INV)
  - New York (109-81) (JULY 26 MOVEMENT)
  - New York (105-45672)

EX-11

REC-7

Copy to: CIA/State [REDACTED]  
ONI/OSI/G-2  
by routing slip for info.  
Date 6/19/61 by [REDACTED]

109-12-210-3109

JUN 17 1961

b2  
b7D

b7C


II ENCLOSURE

C. W. Approved:

56 JUN 22 1961 Agent in Charge

Sent

M. A. P. per



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

New York, New York  
June 16, 1961

Re: Cuban Situation

[redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on June 15, 1961, that [redacted] of the July 26 Movement for North America, [redacted] told [redacted] July 26 Movement, New York, [redacted] that he should attempt without making it too obvious to keep Cubans in New York City from going to Cuba. [redacted] explained that there is no work in Cuba for them, and these Cubans might become disillusioned with the Castro Government. [redacted] said that the Cuban Government spends approximately 20 million pesos to support 3,000 Cubans and that the Cuban Government cannot go on supporting these Cubans.

b2  
b7c  
D

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/22/04 BY 6250 Anon/MS/HB/jy

ENCLOSURE

109-12-210-3109

**SECRET**

F B I

~~TOP SECRET~~ 6/15/61Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via **AIRTEL** \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLeach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)  
 FROM: SAC, WFO (97-1017)  
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
 IS - CUBA

*b7c*  
 CLASSIFIED BY NIS/ACB/6227AAG  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 4/20/25  
*#392226*

Enclosed to the Bureau are nine copies of a letterhead memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

The informant mentioned in the enclosed letterhead memorandum is [REDACTED] (S) *b1*

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" due to the sensitive nature of [REDACTED]. In the event this information is later downgraded, it should receive the classification of "Confidential" *b1*

[REDACTED] because the information reported could (S) reasonably result in the identification of a confidential informant of continuing value and compromise his future effectiveness. *CNN*

9 ENCLOSURE  
 ② Bureau (Enc-9)  
 2-WFO  
 (1 - 105-39771)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EX-113

REC-18

JES:ljd  
(5)

Copy to: CIA/State/[REDACTED]  
 ONI/OSI/G-2/NSA/USA (liaison)  
 by routing slip for info.  
 Date [REDACTED] by [REDACTED]

**AIRTEL**

109-12-210-3110

JUN 19 1961

N 2 DEBT OF POLICE  
E 8 1

700 12 15 50 AM, E1

C. C. WICK

**SECRET**

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

56 JUN 22 1961 Special Agent in Charge

b7c

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
**DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**

2 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

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Section 552

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 (k)(7)

- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.  
 Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

\_\_\_\_ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

\_\_\_\_ Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

\_\_\_\_ Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

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UNITED STATES GOV'T AGENT

# Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9/27/04 BY [REDACTED]

DATE: 6-12-61

1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - [REDACTED]

b7C

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: THE CUBAN SITUATION

## Political matters - Cuba

Miami Office has analysed Cuban situation and possible steps which could be taken against Cuba based on experiences and opinions of Special Agents handling Cuban work. It concludes with opinion that only solution is immediate and direct military intervention by the U.S. with support of anti-Castro Cubans even at risk of touching off World War III. It did not intend its analysis for dissemination and since it is solely an opinion based on Miami Office's conclusions and estimates we do not propose to disseminate the analysis or advocate direct U.S. military attack on Cuba.

Miami Office airtel 6-8-61 forwarded 15-page analysis of Cuban situation. Analysis represents joint observations and views of 7 Special Agents who have been handling Cuban work and for the initial 6 pages the analysis retraces the history of the Cuban situation, points out the communist entrenchment in and the strength of the Castro regime at this time and emphasizes the threat to the United States posed by the Cuban Government.

The Miami Office also analyses possible solutions to the Cuban situation. It opposes a "wait and see" policy and expresses doubt as to whether an economic embargo or blockade would succeed, basing this doubt primarily on its belief that Soviet bloc would not let it succeed. In this regard the Bureau in its letter to the Attorney General 4-28-61 (following the National Security Council meeting of 4-27-61) suggested a total economic embargo as one of several steps which could be taken. We suggested it should be implemented by all Western Hemisphere countries and our allies throughout the world. We feel this is a sound proposal and reported shortages in Cuba as well as Castro's increased efforts to sustain his economy through trade agreements point to strain which it places on Castro regime. Miami's belief that the Soviet bloc would not let an embargo succeed does not appear to take into account the fact that such an embargo would force the Soviet bloc into vastly extended supply lines and costly operations similar to those that have been imposed on the U.S. by Soviet actions in Laos.

The Miami Office feels that intervention by the Organization of American States (OAS) would theoretically be ideal

SBD:dmd

(6)

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

REC-18 109-12-210-312

JUN 19 1961

62

6-5-6  
6-5-6  
SBD-113

b7C

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan  
Re: THE CUBAN SITUATION

solution but does not feel OAS will ever intervene. The idea of military action by anti-Castro Cubans without outside assistance is discarded as militarily not feasible.

The Miami Office feels there is some merit to an invasion by anti-Castro Cubans with greater U.S. support, including re-organization of the underground to step up sabotage, creation of a much larger invasion force with a modern air force and first class transport, liquidation of Castro and his henchmen and a stepped-up propaganda operation. In this regard Miami feels U.S. propaganda efforts are inadequate. (Bureau in its 4-28-61 letter to Attorney General suggested increased beaming of propaganda to Cuba and Latin America to get across U.S. position, rally support for it and stimulate anti-Castro sentiment in Cuba.) Miami Office concludes that U.S. supported invasion and other steps suggested would require too much time and organization. Similarly it feels any plan for the U.S. to create a "Volunteer Army of Liberation" would require too much time and organization.

In the final analysis Miami Office advocates direct military intervention in Cuba by the U.S., preceded by preparatory steps, and, if necessary, maneuvering Castro into committing some armed action which would constitute provocation and excuse for U.S. military action. It feels that with sufficient force the U.S. could militarily defeat the Castro regime within 24 hours. Miami recognizes such action could touch off World War III but feels risk of Soviet military intervention is less now than it will be as time goes on. It feels such a show of strength by U.S. is essential at this time.


*We should thank Miami* ← ↗  
In the main this analysis, while it shows considerable thought by the Miami Office, represents little if anything that has not been publicly or privately espoused or advocated regarding Cuba. Miami did not intend its analysis for dissemination and since it represents solely opinion it would be extremely dangerous to disseminate it or to advocate direct U.S. military intervention in Cuba. Such advocacy is not an FBI function. We will bear this analysis in mind if called upon again to express views on the Cuban situation.

ACTION:

For information.

EMR  
own  
JWCB  
JWCB

# ***FILE DESCRIPTION***



**SUBJECT**

CUBA

**FILE NO.**

109-HQ-12-210

**VOLUME NO.**

62

F B I

Date: June 8, 1961

Mr. Tolson  
 Mr. Belmont  
 Mr. Mohr  
 Mr. Callahan  
 Mr. Conrad  
 Mr. DeLoach  
 Mr. Evans  
 Mr. Malone  
 Mr. Rosen  
 Mr. Sullivan  
 Mr. Tavel  
 Mr. Trotter  
 Tele. Room  
 Mr. Ingram  
 Miss Gandy

Transmit the following in

**PLAIN TEXT**

(Type in plain text or code)

Via

**AIRTEL****AIR MAIL**

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-3902)

RE: CUBAN SITUATION  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/29/04 BY [redacted]  
#392226

b7C

Political matters -

The failure of the April 17, 1961 attempt to liberate Cuba from the Communist regime of FIDEL CASTRO has produced in Miami a general atmosphere of gloom. National publications indicate that this reaction is nation-wide.

This office, in captioned case and other cases, has reported to the Bureau the reactions, suggestions, and circumstances which have resulted from this situation. Local newspapers are deeply concerned. Many private citizens have written letters to the editors of Miami newspapers, expressing their views and offering their suggestions. The anti-CASTRO Cuban exiles have loudly bewailed this defeat.

5 file

It would be safe to say that the general tone of all of these expressions is that the United States suffered a tremendous loss of prestige, and that CASTRO's victory is regarded as a Soviet success.

P. *all CC's destroyed file b7b/b7c* Do NOT Disseminate  
 3 - Bureau (Encl. - 5) (AM - PM)  
 2 - Miami  
 GED/ems 5 ENCLOSURE ) memo to Asst. C. I. Agent  
 (5) ) from Donahue  
*REC-18 109-12-210-3*

6-12-61  
 REC-18 109-12-210-3  
 JUN 19 1961

b7C

Approved: *[Signature]* Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

62 JUN 22 1961  
 Special Agent in Charge

ME 105-3902


As the Bureau is aware, this office has been investigating Cuban activities continuously, without interruption, since March, 1952, when the PRI government was overthrown by BATISTA. Many of the agents assigned to this work have been investigating Cuban matters exclusively for a number of years, some of them both inside and outside of Cuba.

These agents have been in close daily contact with this situation, interviewing literally thousands of Cubans, representing every political faction, economic group, and social class; maintaining close liaison with other local and federal agencies interested in the Cuban situation; and conducting investigations of all sorts of cases involving Cuban activities.

It is felt that the Bureau might desire the benefit of the collective observations and recommendations of these agents concerning the Cuban situation. Consequently, attached is a memorandum dated June 8, 1961, entitled "Cuban Situation," which has been prepared by Special Agents [REDACTED]

b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
This memorandum is not intended for dissemination outside the Bureau, as it represents only the joint views of the above agents. Its purpose is for the general information of the Bureau and whatever use may seem appropriate by the Bureau.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No. 105-3902

Miami, Florida  
June 8, 1961

Re: Cuban Situation  
(Analysis)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4-29-04 BY 222PAWNE/Asphy

H373826

I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

- A. The United States, leader of the free world, is locked in a struggle of survival with the Soviet Union, leader of the Communist world. The goal of the Soviet Union is to establish international Communism.
- B. Communism is on the offensive; the free world is on the defensive. Since World War II, international Communism has been making tremendous strides by waging a "cold war," using subversion, deceit, and double-dealing to reach their objectives. Without declaring a single war, they have marched through Eastern Asia and Eastern Europe, sweeping into their tide populations totalling between 800,000,000 and one billion people.
- C. Since January 1, 1959, international Communism has won another tremendous victory: in Cuba. They have now established a full-fledged Soviet satellite in this hemisphere.
- D. Since the Monroe Doctrine was announced in 1823, the United States has been regarded by all nations, and by the countries of Latin America in particular, as the protector of this hemisphere against outside aggression.

Do Not Disseminate

109-12-210-3111  
ENCLOSURE

Re: Cuban Situation

- E. Freedom-loving people throughout the world look to the United States for leadership, direction, and protection against the Soviet Union and its satellites.
- F. History reveals that in not one single country subjugated to Communism have the freedom-loving democratic people of that country been able to cast off the yoke of their oppressors by their own efforts alone.
- G. The Cuban situation is no longer merely a problem of the Cuban people. It is a problem of the free world, and especially of the United States.
- H. Time is of the essence. The disease of Communism, erupting from the Castro regime, has already spread like a cancer throughout Latin America. Castro-undermined governments may begin to topple in the near future, unless immediate action is taken to eradicate the source of the trouble in Cuba.

## II. INSIDE CUBA

The Communist regime of Fidel Castro has become firmly entrenched in Cuba, because:

- A. He has received, and is still receiving, instructions, advice, direction, technical aid, arms, military equipment and supplies, and economic assistance from the Soviet Union, Communist China, and their satellites. It is reasonable to suppose that all of this aid will be accelerated in anticipation of another attempt to overthrow Castro. Ironie as it may be, Castro still receives economic aid directly from the United States in the form of food and medicines, and he obtains United States dollars from tobacco and other products still being shipped from Cuba to the United States.

Re: Cuban Situation

B. Castro has throttled organized resistance by:

1. Mass arrests, imprisonments, and executions of his opponents, and by forcing many thousands more to flee Cuba.
2. Creation of a reign of terror by suspending due process of law, and creation of a "block" informer system.
3. Cancellation of all elections.
4. Abolishing all political parties, except the Communist Party.
5. Abolishing freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly.
6. Creation of a government by man, rather than by law, so that the individual has no protection against the state.
7. Persecution of the Church.

C. Castro has established a typically Communist system of thought control over the masses, by:

1. Rigid control of the press, television, radio, and other media of information and communication.
2. Regimentation of the youth and adults, and strict control and regulation of all education. It is reported that hundreds of young Cubans are being sent to Russia and Czechoslovakia for special training and indoctrination. These people will represent a Communist threat for years to come.

Re: Cuban Situation

3. Outlawing any criticism of his regime or of Communism as counter-revolutionary activity, punishable by the state.
  4. Creation of a potent Communist indoctrination program which spouts the Communist Party line twenty-four hours a day to all classes of people.
- D. Castro has established firm control over his armed forces by:
1. Establishing a People's Militia, patterned along the same lines successfully used by international Communism in other parts of the world. Minimum estimates are that this militia exceeds 300,000.
  2. Purging the ranks of the regular army, navy, and air force of suspected anti-Communists. He has reduced the regular armed forces to impotence.
  3. Utilizing the services of skilled Soviet and satellite military and technical advisers, experienced in operations of this sort.
  4. Castro's success in defeating the April 17, 1961 liberation attempt served as a "shot in the arm" for Castro and increased his reputation and prestige tremendously. Many Cubans who were "on the fence" have now undoubtedly jumped to Castro's side, believing that his lead boasts of military superiority were well grounded.
- E. When the April 17, 1961 liberation attempt was launched, the Castro regime did not panic, due to:

Re: Cuban Situation

1. Government control over radio, television, press, communications, and travel.
2. Immediate mass arrests of known and suspected anti-Communists through operation of the "block" informer system.
3. Failure of the anti-Castro underground to go into operation. (The underground was reportedly prepared, but never received the signal to start.)
4. Early failure of the invasion attempt.
5. Absence of any anti-Castro propaganda coordinated with the liberation attempt.

### III. THREAT TO UNITED STATES SECURITY

- A. Nikita Khrushchev has boasted that the Soviet Union will "bury the United States" and that our children will live to be Communists.
- B. Cuba, now a full-fledged Soviet satellite, is but 90 miles from the United States Naval Base at Key West, and less than 200 miles south of the Strategic Air Command base at Homestead, Florida.
- C. If not halted, Cuba will undoubtedly serve as the wedge for Communist penetration of all the countries of this hemisphere. Already, Castro forces have made attempts to overthrow the governments of Panama, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic; and his Communist agents have reportedly set up operations to undermine the established governments of other Latin American countries.
- D. Castro's propaganda machine is daily grinding out a "hate America" campaign built upon lies, deceit, distortions, and half-truths. He is attempting

**Re: Cuban Situation**

to ridicule democracy, destroy the Church, and undermine the prestige of the United States. This propaganda is fed to every country of this hemisphere, including the United States, twenty-four hours a day, by radio, television, the Communist press, leaflets, pamphlets, and by word of mouth.

- E.** United States publicity and propaganda to counteract Castro's propaganda are usefully lacking and inadequate. Pre-United States Cuban exiles and other Latins in the Miami area are constantly amazed that the United States, which has the greatest publicity know-how and potential of any country in the world, fails so miserably in publicizing our own virtues and in exposing the evils of Communism. They complain that most United States propaganda, such as it is, does not reach the masses; nor is it geared to the Latin mind.

**IV. EXAMINATION OF SOME SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS**

**A. "Wait and See" Policy**

This is the equivalent of a "do nothing" policy of one who is afraid to face up to the problem. It offers no positive solution. As time is on the side of Castro, this policy permits his regime to become more and more firmly entrenched. It permits the evil of Communism to spread throughout the Americas. It causes the rest of Latin America to lose confidence in the United States. They would then, for reasons of self-preservation, either continue neutral, or give outright support to Communism.

**B. Economic Embargo or Blockade**

The Soviet Union and its satellites would never permit an economic embargo to defeat Castro's regime. Communism thrives on poverty, and Castro's propaganda machine would blame this poverty upon

Re: Cuban Situation

the United States. Further, Cuba has tremendous resources, which make it difficult for an embargo to succeed.

A United States blockade of Cuba would be a long and expensive procedure, which would produce doubtful results. The United States could not prevent Soviet vessels or planes from aiding Cuba. To use force against them could easily precipitate World War III.

C. Solution by Intervention of Organization of American States

Theoretically, this would be the ideal solution, but it is unrealistic to believe that the Organization of American States will ever intervene. Brazil, leader of a powerful bloc in the Organization of American States, has already come out against intervention by the Organization of American States. Most of the member countries of the Organization of American States will oppose intervention in Cuba for the following reasons:

1. They fear that such action will spark uprisings in their own countries by Communists and other pro-Castro elements.
2. Even though the established governments of most Latin American countries are anti-Communist, they are amused to see the powerful "Yankees" humiliated by Castro.
3. Most Latin American countries benefit economically by the break in relations between the United States and Cuba, and they are in no hurry to alter that condition.
4. By long tradition, they expect the United States to solve its own problems, as the United States has always been regarded as the leader and most

Re: Cuban Situation

powerful nation in this hemisphere.

5. Most Latin American countries possess a "manana" attitude, with no desire for action. Practically all of the exiled Cubans believe that the Organization of American States can not be relied upon to resolve the Cuban situation.

**D. Solution by Anti-Castro Cubans Without Outside Help**

By no reasonable calculation can the anti-Castro Cubans, without outside help, ever overthrow his Communist regime. Castro has an almost unlimited supply of modern military weapons and technical aid from the Soviet Union and its satellites. Castro has grown stronger than ever by virtue of his April 17, 1961 victory over the liberation forces. The anti-Castro underground admittedly suffered a setback, due to mass arrests at the time of the liberation attempt. Castro can be expected to profit by his victory. He will steadily tighten his grip on the people; and he will attempt to crush every vestige of resistance. His Communist indoctrination program will continue to influence more and more people as time goes on. Skilled Soviet agents will see to it that Castro does not relax his vigilance.

**E. A Second Liberation Attempt by Anti-Castro Cuban Exiles, with Created United States Support**

Even though Castro is stronger now than ever, it is still possible for a second liberation attempt to succeed, provided it receives sufficient support from the United States. The margin between success and failure was very slim on April 17th, according to all reliable reports. Factors which would increase the possibilities of success are:

Re: Cuban Situation

1. To immediately put into operation a powerful and effective propaganda program on a twenty-four hour a day schedule. It should be geared to reach especially the masses, the youth, the workers, and the militia. Its theme should be Christianity versus Communism. Castro should be portrayed as he really is: a Communist, murderer, dictator, cheat, liar, thief, fool, and enemy of the Church. This program should constantly remind the good people of Cuba to prepare to cast off their Communist oppressors when they receive notice that the Day of Liberation has arrived. This program should also offer hope, education, peace, freedom, and security to the people under a democratic government of their own.
2. The anti-Castro underground should be reorganized and revitalized. Sabotage should be stepped up to keep Castro off balance, and to serve as a continual reminder that organized resistance is alive. Activities of the underground should be coordinated with the invasion on Liberation Day. Propaganda, communications, transportation and power facilities should be destroyed at the outset.
3. Creation of a vastly larger liberating army than was previously used. Only about 1,400 liberators reportedly landed at the Bay of Pigs. Castro's militia alone reportedly exceeds 300,000 men.
4. The liberation army should be aided by an adequate air force, consisting of modern fighter planes, as well as bombers and transport planes. (Complete lack of fighter coverage has been blamed for the April 17th failure.)

**Re: Cuban Situation**

5. Creation of a fast fleet of properly manned transport boats in first class condition, with gunboat and antiaircraft gun protection.
6. Liquidation of Fidel Castro and as many of his key henchmen as possible, such as Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and Raul Castro. Castro has repeatedly demonstrated his talents as a leader of the masses. Many knowledgeable Cuban exiles believe that Castro's regime would disintegrate, were it not for his personal powers of leadership. Certainly, without Castro, the task of destroying his regime would be much easier, for no other Cuban has his ability to control the Cubans.
7. Immediate action. Time is still on the side of Castro, and it can be safely assumed that he is preparing for a new and larger attack. The greater the delay in formulating a new program, the greater will be the disunity of the Cuban exiles who are now drifting around, not knowing what to do.

The principal weakness of this plan is that it would require a considerable amount of time to reorganize the various components of the plan, and the outcome would again be uncertain. It can safely be assumed that even now, Castro is preparing for such an attack by increased training, indoctrination and propaganda, by strengthening his defenses, and by rebuilding his air force with effective fighter planes and bombers.

**F. Formation of a Volunteer Army of Liberation**

This would be composed of anti-Communist Cuban exiles, and anti-Communist volunteers from any or all freedom-loving countries, including the United States.

**Re: Cuban Situation**

In order to make this possible, the United States would have to:

1. Suspend enforcement of the Neutrality Act.
2. Make available the necessary arms, military equipment, planes, boats, and supplies.
3. Make available suitable training camps in the United States, or arrange for some in some friendly nearby foreign country, such as Nicaragua.

It is believed that thousands of well trained and experienced veterans of the Korean War and men subsequently released from our peace time armed forces would be quick to enlist, along with many volunteers from Latin America. This would give the force the flavor of an International Liberation Army.

The same features described under IV, E above should be incorporated into this solution.

The principal weakness in this plan is that it would require a considerable amount of time to organize and train such a force, and the outcome would be uncertain.

**V. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION**

Direct military intervention by the United States, with the cooperation and assistance of anti-Castro Cuban exiles.

In order to set the stage for military intervention, the United States should:

- A. Immediately initiate a powerful propaganda program such as described in IV, E, 1, above. The United States should be portrayed as the liberator of the oppressed.

Re: Cuban Situation

- B. Set up a crash enlistment program for able bodied Cuban exiles, especially directed at those who have already received training preparatory to the April 17th liberation attempt. Incorporate these men temporarily into the United States armed forces, distributing them among the various attack forces. Their knowledge of the Spanish language, Cuban terrain, history, customs, and Cuban politics can be fully exploited. They would also be valuable components of any military government units organized to begin operations in the wake of the invasion.
- C. As in IV, E, 2, above, reorganize the revitalized anti-Castro underground, and coordinate its activities with invasion plans.
- D. Create a favorable atmosphere by encouraging Cuban exiles, especially their leaders, to appeal to the United States for military intervention in the name of freedom and Christianity. Encourage friendly foreign countries to do likewise.
- E. It is felt that Castro long ago gave the United States ample justification for military intervention by his confiscation of United States property without compensation, arresting United States citizens and imprisoning them without due process of law, making false accusations against the United States, establishment of a Communist government, and by violation of practically all the laws of civilized men.

However, since the United States has not seem fit to regard any of these acts as just provocation to date, it is obvious that the United States must have still further provocation before intervening. Consequently, the United States should maneuver Castro into committing some act, such as:

- 1. Firing upon a United States vessel in international waters.

Re: Cuban Situation

2. Attacking some United States plane unlawfully.
  3. Firing upon Guantanamo Naval Base.
  4. Attacking some neighboring country, such as Haiti, or the Dominican Republic.
- F. The United States should then immediately attack Cuba with sufficient force to defeat the Castro regime within a twenty-four hour period. Reasons for such rapid action are:
1. The speedier the action, the less likely would be the chances of triggering a third world war.
  2. Cubans arrested and released after the April 17th liberation attempt said that their militia guards told them they would have been liquidated en masse, had it appeared the revolt were going to succeed. Hence, fast action would minimize the opportunities for mass executions.
  3. Numerous reports indicate that Castro men have orders to destroy buildings, factories, and other facilities, if it appears they are going to fall into the hands of the invaders.
  4. Speedy action would also tend to keep this operation within its proper perspective: that is, a police action to protect freedom-loving peoples from their Communist oppressors. It would put Castro in his proper place as a blustering, incompetent buffoon.

After the defeat of the Castro regime, military law should be established, with the aid of the anti-Communist Cuban exiles who participate in this action. The Cuban Constitution of 1940 should be reestablished, political parties revived (except the Communist Party), and a definite

**Re: Cuban Situation**

date set for free elections to be held under observation of a team of representatives from the Organization of American States.

It is believed that this is the only certain way to do the job, and it is certainly the quickest way.

Two years ago, the possibility of Soviet military intervention in the event of United States invasion was practically nil. A year ago, the Soviets began to hint of military intervention. Now, Castro brags openly of having Soviet support, should the United States attack. Today, the risk of sparking a third world war by United States military intervention in Cuba is less than it will be next month, next October, or next year. The Soviet Union is daily increasing its stake in Cuba, and it can be anticipated that they will soon have treaties, bases, or other commitments with Cuba, from which they can not retreat. The possibilities of the Soviets' establishing missile, air, and submarine bases in Cuba are no longer remote.

It is believed that the entire freedom-loving world would secretly welcome United States liberation of Cuba. The free world has been plagued with fear of creeping Communism, as they have witnessed one country after another fall to Communism, while we engage in endless negotiations with the Soviet Union and her satellites. While we talk, their subversion continues.

The peoples of the world, and especially of Latin America, respect power. They have contempt for weakness. The United States has always been looked upon as the champion of democracy. We are the last hope of freedom against Communism.

Swift, decisive military action by the United States would solve the Cuban problem; it would deal a serious setback to Communist encroachment in this hemisphere; and it would go far toward restoring United States prestige. We would be criticized by our Communist foes; and we would be praised by our friends. We would strike a blow for freedom.

**Re:**           Cuban Situation

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b7C

REC- 18  
105  
FBI, Miami (100-3963)

June 18, 1961

BALTIMORE, MD (100-12-210) - 312

EX- 10

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JUN 15 1961  
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A. P. DEPT. OF POLICE  
JUN 15 1961 H. B.  
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Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
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Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Report \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. \_\_\_\_\_

2 JUN 22 1961  TELETYPE UNIT

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National Security  
Act of 1947 and the  
CIA Act of 1949

 (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(F) (b)(8) (b)(9)Section 552a (d)(5) (j)(2) (k)(1) (k)(2) (k)(3) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7)

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POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

6/14/61

W  
PLAIN TEXT

AIRTEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 5/7/09 BY 6229D/MAC/MS/CLG

To : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-211)  
From : SAC, NEW YORK (109-107)  
Subject: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  
INTERNAL SECURITY - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Transmitted herewith are nine copies of a letterhead memorandum pertaining to the captioned matter as well as nine copies of an informant evaluation memorandum.

[REDACTED] obtained the information set forth in the dissemination memorandum in a letter from [REDACTED] and made the information available to SA [REDACTED]. She requested that neither her nor [REDACTED] identities be revealed and stated that although [REDACTED] did not disclose his sources in the letter, she knows that [REDACTED] maintains friendly relations with a number of Dominican diplomats in Europe whom he knows from the time he was [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that these diplomats have secretly maintained their loyalty to [REDACTED] even after [REDACTED] had fallen into disgrace in the DR. She said that [REDACTED] in order to protect these individuals, from persecution by the TRUJILLO regime, has not and will not disclose their identities to anyone, including herself.

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b7D  
b7C

4 - Bureau (109-12-211) (Encls.18) (RM)  
1 - 109-12-210) (FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA)  
1 - NY (109-118) (FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA) (Att.2)  
1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - NY (109-107) (Att.2)

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HVM:mkr  
(8)

✓ENCLOSURE

6-2 JUN 26 1961

109-12-210-  
NOT RECORDED  
15 JUN 1961

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NY 109-107

b7C/D

As the Bureau knows, [REDACTED] has, in the past, been in frequent contact with the NYO during occasional visits to the US; has furnished a great deal of information regarding Dominican matters. This information has always proved to be reliable.



## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

New York, New York  
June 14, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 5/7/07 BY 69290/WB/DC/A6/cf

Re: Foreign Political Matters -  
Dominican Republic

The following information was received on June 12, 1961 from [REDACTED] a naturalized American citizen of Dominican extraction who maintains personal contacts with Dominican exiles in the United States and in Europe.

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b7D

On June 9, 1961, [REDACTED] learned from a Dominican source, which the informant considers absolutely reliable, that this source had recently been in touch with a Dominican Government official in Europe from whom he obtained the following information.

As of August, 1960, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, Jr., who was then residing in Europe, began a systematic campaign to effect the establishment of personal and social relations between Dominican and Iron Curtain diplomats in Europe. Rafael Trujillo, Jr., better known as Ramfis, at that time, occupied the position of Inspector General of Dominican Embassies and Consulates with the official rank of "Chief of Ambassadors." In this capacity, Ramfis instructed Dominican Ambassadors in Europe during the summer of 1960 to accept invitations to diplomatic receptions in iron curtain embassies in the various West European capitals. Ramfis furthermore had Dominican Ambassador to Iran, Island Rosenberg, sound out the Soviet Ambassador in Teheran, Iran, on the possibility of inviting Ramfis to visit the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government

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
109-12-210

Re: Foreign Political Matters - Dominican Republic

refused to issue such an invitation indicating, however, that if Ramfis wanted to visit the Soviet Union on his own initiative, he would be treated with all respect due to an important foreign visitor.

[REDACTED] was further advised by his source that, according to information received from a reliable Dominican source, the late Generalissimo Trujillo, sometime in the Fall of 1960, concluded a secret understanding with Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of Cuba. This understanding was in the nature of a mutually binding promise that the Dominican and Cuban Governments would desist from all propaganda and subversive activity directed against each other and would desist from facilitating or undertaking an invasion of each other's territory. Negotiations leading to the conclusion of this agreement were carried on with Lazaro Cardenas, former President of Mexico, acting as intermediary. The actual signing of the agreement occurred in Cuba and was handled for the Dominican side by John Abbes Garcia (de facto chief of the Dominican Military Intelligence Service) and General Arturo Espaillat, former Dominican Consul in New York City.

b2  
b7D



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

New York, New York  
June 14, 1961

Re: Foreign Political Matters -  
Dominican Republic

Reference is made to the memorandum, dated  
and captioned as above, at New York.

[REDACTED] has furnished reliable information  
in the past.

b2  
b7D

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109-12-210

*ST*  
W. C. FULLER

4700/62

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DATE 9/2/04 BY [redacted]

91-2885-4L N GENE TURNER

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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CUBA

109-12-210-

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**Section 552a**

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: 6/15/61

*Legat*  
FROM : SAC, MIAMI (105-1747)

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL  
MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 4/2/04 BY legat/mw/AB/klj

Re Bureau cablegram to Legat, Madrid, 6/3/61,  
concerning information received from INS, Washington, D. C.,  
that an air freight crew had seen FIDEL CASTRO in the Azores  
on June 1, 1961.

On June 8, 1961, [REDACTED] b7C  
in charge of investigations, INS, Miami, advised that his office had no knowledge  
that FIDEL CASTRO had been seen in the Azores; that the  
information did not originate from the Miami INS Office,  
and INS, Miami, did not know the origin of such information.

[REDACTED] b7C  
explained that two flights a week originate  
in Havana, Cuba, by Cubana Airlines, which go to Prague,  
Czechoslovakia, via the Azores, and that reports have been  
received that Cubans have been visiting Prague and Czechoslo-  
vakians have traveled to Havana. However, Cubana Airlines  
no longer flies into Miami.

Miami sources contacted negatively concerning this  
matter.

For the information of the New York Office, referenced  
Bureau cablegram stated that INS, Washington, D. C., had  
advised that an air freight crew stated they had seen FIDEL  
CASTRO in the Azores on June 1, 1961. He was accompanied by  
a woman, a group of Cubans and a number of Russians. Allegedly,  
the Portuguese Immigration officer in the Azores verified to  
the crew the fact CASTRO actually was on the islands. Bureau  
requested sources be contacted for corroboration of CASTRO's  
visit and obtain available information concerning itinerary.

REC-1 105-12-210-3116

New York is requested to contact sources and INS to  
either verify or disprove this information. NY JUN 19 1961

BEC.D

2 - Bureau (RM)  
3 - New York (RM)  
4 - Miami

RJD:mgw

(6)  
50 JUN 23 1961

EII-X3

NAT.

SEC. 1  
SEC. 2  
SEC. 3

1 - Liaison  
1 - [REDACTED]

b7C

EX-116

REC-37 109-12-210-3117

RA

Date: June 19, 1961  
To: Office of Security  
Department of State  
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Subject: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

On June 12, 1961, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past learned that rumors are circulating in Havana, Cuba, diplomatic and political circles, to the effect that the Cuban Government will issue a decree on July 26, 1961, which will forbid Cubans leaving Cuba thereafter without special permission.

1 - Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

DECLASSIFIED BY RECEIVED IN FILE/AS/df  
ON 5/11/04

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army

Attention: Chief, Security Division

1 - Director of Naval Intelligence

1 - Office of Special Investigations  
Air Force

Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence Division

RAM:barf/sr  
(9)

NOTE: Classified "Confidential" since information originated with U. S. [REDACTED] b6 b7C b7D

b2  
b7C  
b7D

Dek SJS b6 b7C

REC'D MAY 21 1961  
B  
SJS b6 b7C

REC'D MAY 21 1961  
B  
SJS b6 b7C

5 JUN 23 1961

TELETYPE UNIT

CONFIDENTIAL

**DECODED COPY** Airgram Cablegram

Tolson ✓  
 Belmont ✓  
 Callahan  
 Conrad  
 DeLoach  
 Evans  
 Malone  
 Rosen  
 Sullivan ✓  
 Tavel  
 Trotter  
 Tele. Room  
 Ingram  
 Gandy

DEFERRED

6-12-61

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LEGAT, MEXICO CITY NO. 842

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-CUBA, IS-CUBA. [REDACTED] ADVISED TODAY b7D  
 THAT MEXICO GOVERNMENT RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM ITS EMBASSY  
 IN HAVANA, CUBA, THAT THERE ARE RUMORS IN DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL  
 CIRCLES THAT CUBAN GOVERNMENT WILL ISSUE A DECREE JULY 26 NEXT  
 TO EFFECT THAT NO CUBAN WILL HENCEFORTH LEAVE CUBA WITHOUT SPECIAL  
 PERMISSION. NO LOCAL DISSEMINATION MADE TO PROTECT SECURITY OF  
 INFORMANT.

JOHN F. DESMOND

RECEIVED:

6-14-61

12:31 PM

BLH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 5/1/04 BY 62790/AMC/AB/ek

DISSEMINATION TO STATE, CIA AND MILITARY

EX-116

REC-32

109-12-210-

JUN 20 1961

311

b7C

GRD CC-MR. L'ALLIER

cc State

1- Cia 1- Cia

1- D-2 1- Cia

6-19-61 PAM:far

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

XXXXXX  
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XXXXXX

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
**DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**

2 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available release to you.

**Section 552** (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3)

National Security  
Act of 1947 and the  
CTA Act of 1949

 (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(F) (b)(8) (b)(9)**Section 552a** (d)(5) (j)(2) (k)(1) (k)(2) (k)(3) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7)

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
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**Section 552**

- |                                 |   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(1) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C) |
| _____                           | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D)            |
| _____                           | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E)            |
| _____                           | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(6) |   |

**Section 552a**

- |                                 |
|---------------------------------|
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| <input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2) |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7) |

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\_\_\_\_ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): \_\_\_\_\_

The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

109 - HQ - 12 - 210 - Third Party search slip dated 6/10/01

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
The American Embassy  
Rome, Italy

RA

Dte: June 14, 1961  
To: Director, FBI  
OaC: Legat, Rome (105-573)  
Subject: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBA

Re Legat, Mexico airmail dated 5/25/61 indicating that Cuban Foreign Minister RAUL ROA, accompanied by his wife and two other individuals, would depart Amsterdam, Holland, for Rome, Italy, on June 2 and would depart Rome for Cairo, Egypt, on 6/3/61. Cuba Neth.

[REDACTED] on 6/13/61 advised that he had received information to the effect that RAUL ROA and his party had flown directly from Amsterdam to Cairo and had not made any stop in Rome.

b7C  
b7D

RUC  
2 - Bureau  
1 - Rome  
AAC:vw  
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/21/04 BY SP4/AM/SP4/JL

REC-10 109-12-210-3119

EX ✓ JUN 20 1961

NAT'L SEC.

62 JUN 27 1961

**SECRET**

REC 22

Date: 6/21/61

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, WFO (97-1017) WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBA

Enclosed for the Bureau are nine copies of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above.

The informant mentioned in the enclosed letterhead memo is [REDACTED] (S)

The enclosed letterhead memo is classified "Secret" due to the sensitive nature of [REDACTED] (S) In the event this info is later downgraded, it should receive the classification of "Confidential".

[REDACTED] and because the information reported (S) could reasonably result in the identification of a confidential informant of continuing value and compromise his future effectiveness.

4/26/04  
CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] 4/26/2016  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25Y [REDACTED] 4/26/2029

- 3 - Bureau (Enc. 9)  
4 - WFO  
(1 - 105-1850)  
(1 - [REDACTED] (S))  
(1 - [REDACTED])

JES:jmp  
(7)

EX-102

JUN 21 1961

AIRTEL

Copy to: CIA/State/  
ONI/OSI/G-2  
by routing slip for info.  
Date 6/22/61 by [REDACTED]

Approved: 50 JUN 20 1961 F-210 Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

D. Wick

50 JUN 20 1961  
Special Agent in Charge**SECRET**

b7C

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
**FOIPA**  
**DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**

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- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available release to you.

Section 552 (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(F) (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(8) (b)(9)Section 552a (d)(5) (j)(2) (k)(1) (k)(2) (k)(3) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7)

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Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): \_\_\_\_\_



The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:  
109 - 40 - 12 - 210 - 3120 Enclosure

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: 6-21-61

FROM : LEGAT, RIO DE JANEIRO (109-110)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] 105' 89084-13  
FPM - CUBA b7C

ReRiocab 7/29/60 captioned "FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA", which reflected that subject, a Cuban diplomatic representative in Rio, had been expelled from Brazil on 7/26/60 for Communist agitation among students and labor unions.

On 6/15/61, PCS [REDACTED] furnished to Legat the enclosed photograph of [REDACTED]. The photograph is being forwarded to the Bureau inasmuch as this individual is no longer in Rio de Janeiro but may be of interest to the Bureau at this time or sometime in the future in other areas. No copy of the photograph has been retained in the Rio de Janeiro Office.

(2) - Bureau (Enclosure)  
2 - Rio de Janeiro [REDACTED] - 109-110

b7C  
b7Db2  
b7D

ESS:LM  
(4)

Am

EX-116

REC-4

109-12-210-3121

5 JUN 26 1961

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

JUN 26 1961

FBI - RIO DE JANEIRO

ATTACH SEC.

55 JUL 5 1961 G 369

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS ENVELOPE  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/1/01 BY [unclear]


Rio File 109-110  
Bufile 109-12-210

RE: [REDACTED]  
FPM - CUBA

ENCLOSURE TO BUREAU WITH  
RIOLET 6/21/61: b7C

1 photograph of [REDACTED] not  
to be returned to Rio

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/6/04 BY [REDACTED]



1 liaison  
1

b7C

REC-9

6/16 E-116 109-12-210 - 3122

Date: June 26, 1961  
To: Office of Security  
Department of State  
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Subject: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/10/04 BY [signature]

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum dated June 15,  
1961, at San Juan, Puerto Rico, concerning the captioned  
matter.

[redacted] who is identified in the memorandum,  
advised our San Juan Office that he plans to visit  
Washington, D. C., in the near future to confer with Department  
of State officials concerning Cuba and to offer his assistance.  
He indicated that he cooperated with the United States Council  
at Santiago, Cuba, in the past. He indicated he can be  
reached at [redacted]  
in care of his mother, [redacted]. b7C

Enclosure

RAM:bar  
(5)

SD/JR

NOTE: [redacted] is native of Puerto Rico who spent six years  
in Cuba prior to his return to Puerto Rico on 6/6/61. He  
furnished his observations concerning the failure of the recent  
invasion of Cuba and indicated there is much dissatisfaction  
with Castro there. He said Cubans are anxiously awaiting  
U. S. assistance and intervention and that economic conditions  
in Cuba continue to deteriorate. [redacted] also indicated that  
he cooperated with former Secretary Avignone in Haiti during  
World War II. While [redacted] is not identifiable in Bufiles,  
Avignone was in Haiti on special assignment during early  
World War II. Copy of San Juan Memorandum 6/15/61 has been  
furnished separately to CIA, the military agencies and  
Bureau of Foreign Commerce. b7C

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ingraham \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

62 JUN 29 1961

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

2/ [initials]  
[initials]

9/ [initials]  
[initials]

gpa  
[initials]

F B I

Date: 6/15/61

~~REC-9~~Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT  
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)  
 FROM: SAC, SAN JUAN (109-27)  
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
 IS - CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 5/16/02 BY [signature]

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are nine copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

No local dissemination is being made as it does not concern the operations of local agencies.

[redacted] advised that he intends to visit Washington, D. C. in the near future to confer with State Department officials concerning Cuban policy and to offer his assistance. He stated he cooperated with the U. S. Consul in Santiago de Cuba and also cooperated with SA ARTHUR AVIGNONE in Haiti during World War II. [redacted] can be reached in care of his mother [redacted]

b7C

1d  
 Cls<sup>g</sup> Mem. to  
 J-2, onl,  
 CIA, BFC,  
 OSI, n/s, 6/12/61  
 b7C for 109-12-210-3129  
 REC-9 37 JUN 27 1961

EX-116

b7C  
 109-12-210-3129  
 REC-9  
 SA SEC.

cc: WICK


let state (enc.)

6-26-61  
RAM:bar

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Sent: \_\_\_\_\_ M Per: \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

b7C



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Pest Office Box 4312  
San Juan 21, Puerto Rico  
June 15, 1961

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

b7c

[REDACTED] a native of Puerto Rico, who has been residing in Cuba for the last six years, returned to Puerto Rico from Cuba on June 6, 1961. He advised that he [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that, in his opinion, the people of Cuba are more pro-American than ever before. He stated that they were in no position to cooperate with the exile invasion forces on April 17, 1961 as they had no arms. He stated that the invading forces were smashed by heavy artillery fire which barrage was handled by Russian and Czechoslovakian experts. The people are greatly dissatisfied with the regime of CASTRO and are anxiously awaiting United States help and intervention. [REDACTED] estimated that 90% of the people are now opposed to the regime of CASTRO but are unable to effectively oppose this regime as the remaining 10% have control of the arms.

[REDACTED] stated that he heard shortly before leaving Cuba from sources within the Cuban Militia who were in a position to know, that 300 technicians from the Soviet Union and its satellites recently arrived in Cuba. They are awaiting the arrival of heavy duty treaded tractors so that they can arm them for use as tanks.

[REDACTED] stated that in recent weeks he has noted a lessening in anti-United States propaganda in Cuba. He attributed this to the fact that the CASTRO regime has now solidified itself politically and militarily and need not now arouse the people with anti-American propaganda in order to control them.

[REDACTED] stated that economic conditions in Cuba are continuing to deteriorate rapidly and there is a scarcity of

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/1/04 BY [Signature]

109-12-210-3123

ENCLOSURE

**FOREIGN POLITICAL  
MATTERS - CUBA**

beer, soap, many foodstuffs, tires and industrial parts. The lower economic class are particularly feeling this scarcity as they do not have the necessary funds to trade in the "black market."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
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Section 552 (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3)

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Act of 1947 and the  
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 (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(F) (b)(8) (b)(9)Section 552a (d)(5) (j)(2) (k)(1) (k)(2) (k)(3) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7)

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**Section 552**

- (b)(1)  
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 (b)(7)(A)  
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 (b)(7)(C)  
 (b)(7)(D)  
  
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 (b)(5)  
 (b)(6)

**Section 552a**

- (d)(5)  
 (j)(2)  
 (k)(1)  
 (k)(2)  
  
 (k)(3)  
 (k)(4)  
 (k)(5)  
 (k)(6)  
 (k)(7)

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\_\_\_\_ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): \_\_\_\_\_



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109 - 40 - 12 - 210 Search slip dated 6/20/61

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National Security  
Act of 1947 and the  
CIA Act of 1949

 (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(F) (b)(8) (b)(9)Section 552a (d)(5) (j)(2) (k)(1) (k)(2) (k)(3) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7)

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[REDACTED] b7C  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Room 7651  
Department of Justice Building  
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear [REDACTED]

June 21, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/6/01 BY [REDACTED]

Political matters - Cusd

As we arranged by telephone this morning, I am sending you herewith the letter which my 19 year old eldest son, [REDACTED], received on Sunday, June 18th. Presumably the letter arrived at our house on June 16th, 16th, or 17th, while our family was out of town. (60-171942) b7C

Conn, [REDACTED] who is taking Spanish at Yale in anticipation of a business D.C. career in Latin America, was able to translate enough of the text to indicate that this chain letter is a scheme to persuade patriotic Anti-Communist Anti-Castro Americans to spend fifty dollars to line the pockets of some rogues.

My son can offer only one suggestion as to how his name might have been acquired by the letter sender. He is a subscriber to the Spanish-language edition of the Pan-American Union's magazine Americas, which is mailed from somewhere in Latin America; so conceivably the chain letter schemers may have managed to get a copy of the magazine's subscription list.

(60-171942) b7C  
Sincerely yours,

(CLOSURE) b7C  
REC 92

109-12-210-3125

EX-113 10 JUN 26 1961

No acknowledgement necessary  
JUN [REDACTED] b7C  
m-a 6/26/76

b7C  
RE: translation ree  
chain letter (possibly ree)  
brought to Attn of State CIA  
etc., no dissemination ree  
file 8/26/76 b7C

50  
USS 50  
50

NEW FRONTIER (NEW ERA)  
ALIANZA PARA EL PROGRESO  
New alliance for progress-JPK-

MOVIMIENTO INTERAMERICANO DE COMBATE AL COMUNISMO

Cadena de USS 50 para ayudar a los luchadores contra el comunismo en Cuba y en las demás repúblicas americanas.-  
ALARMA CONTRIBUYA Ud. a su seguridad personal y a la de sus seres queridos. Combata el comunismo, ayudando a aquellos que luchan contra el sanguinario imperialismo del oso rojo, Fidel Castro, y a los agentes moscovitas que se encuentran actuando en América y U. S. A.

Esta cadena fue iniciada en Washington, D. C. por ADOLF A. BERLE, y los Embajadores de las repúblicas latinoamericanas. Para ayudar a los exiliados cubanos en U. S. A. y para combatir a Fidel Castro, asesino de americanos. -Con los auspicios del President KENNEDY, Secretary of State, y la protección y vigilancia del F.B.I. -Central Intelligence Agency-FBI

CUMPLA ESTRICAMENTE CON ESTAS INSTRUCCIONES

-Envie al № 1, USS 50 dollars, por AIR MAIL REGISTERED, en forma de check, giro, travelers check--Coloque al № 2 en el primer lugar; al № 3 en el segundo lugar, al № 4 en el tercer lugar, al № 5 en el cuarto lugar--Inscriba su nombre y dirección en el quinto lugar--Haga 10 ó más copias similares a esta y distribuyalas entre personalidades e instituciones anticomunistas de las Américas.-

Cuando Ud. ocupe el primer lugar recibirá miles de dollars, de los cuales deberá entregar el 10 % (diez por ciento) al Secretary of State, F. B. I., o en la Embajada de U. S. A. de su país--para el fondo de ayuda a los exiliados anticastristas y de combate a los comunistas--taxes exempt in U. S. A. and territories--controlado por el U. S. SECRET SERVICE

- Nº1) Dr. Rubén J. Luraschi  
Lavalleja 225-Salto  
URUGUAY-South America
- Nº2) José Aguirrezaabal  
Pres. Comité CUBA DEMOCRATICA  
Casilla, P. O. BOX 152-Salto-URUGUAY-
- Nº3) Orlando Bosch  
Oficinas del MIRR  
4138, n. 16 Terrace  
Miami, Florida, U. S. A.
- Nº4) Jose A. Mora Otero  
Secretary of OAS  
Washington 6-D. C. U. S. A.
- Nº5) Francis A. Cook  
U. S. Information Service  
Paraguay 1321-Montevideo  
URUGUAY-South America

FAVOR: Exigido por el U. S. SECRET SERVICE: NO ROMPA LA CADENA  
ENVIE USS 50 dollars al № 1-CUMPLA ESTRICAMENTE LAS INSTRUCCIONES  
SEA UD. UN BUEN AMERICANO: AYUDESES UD. MISMO; PRONTO PODRÁ MUERTE DINERO  
Y PODRÁ AYUDAR A LOS EXILIADOS Y A LOS QUE COMBATEN Y DERRAMAN SU SANGRE  
POR NUESTRA SEGURIDAD Y PAZ, COMBATIENDO AL SANGUINARIO COMUNISMO  
Piense en el futuro-en Ud. su familia, sus hijos-CONTINUE ESTA CADENA

ONLY FOR VERY IMPORTANT PEOPLE, ANTI COMMUNIST SOCIETIES, BUSINESSMEN, ETC.  
AUSPICIAN PRESIDENT KENNEDY, SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

PERIODISTS, COORDINATORS  
DIVULGAR: U. S. INFORMATION SERVICE  
PROGRESSIVE

XXXXXX  
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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
**DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**

3 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available release to you.

**Section 552** (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3)

National Security  
Act of 1947 and the  
CTA Act of 1949

 (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(F) (b)(8) (b)(9)**Section 552a** (d)(5) (j)(2) (k)(1) (k)(2) (k)(3) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7)

- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.
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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
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8

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- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available release to you.

**Section 552**

- (b)(1)                     (b)(7)(A)  
 (b)(2)                     (b)(7)(B)  
 (b)(3)                     (b)(7)(C)  


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 (b)(7)(D)  


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 (b)(7)(E)  


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 (b)(7)(F)  


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 (b)(4)                     (b)(8)  
 (b)(5)                     (b)(9)  
 (b)(6)

**Section 552a**

- (d)(5)  
 (j)(2)  
 (k)(1)  
 (k)(2)  
 (k)(3)  
 (k)(4)  
 (k)(5)  
 (k)(6)  
 (k)(7)

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109 - HQ - 12 - 210 Third Party Search slips dated 6/30/61

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
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**Section 552** (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3)

National Security  
Act of 1947 and the  
CTA Act of 1949

 (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(F) (b)(8) (b)(9)**Section 552a** (d)(5) (j)(2) (k)(1) (k)(2) (k)(3) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7)

- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.
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Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

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- The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

19 June 1961

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Callahan  
Mr. Conrad  
Mr. DeLoach  
Mr. Evans  
Mr. Greene  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Tavel  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Ingram  
Miss Gandy

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Secretary McNamara has received your letter of June 12, 1961, concerning conversations between an official of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, an anti-Castro organization, and certain officers of the United States Air Force with respect to the Cuban situation.

Mr. McNamara has asked me to thank you for making this information available to him and to inform you that he is taking appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Political  
Matters -  
Cuba

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

109-12-210-3138

REC-92

JUN 28 1961

REC-92

JUN 20 1961

b7C retained  
in 1529  
wew

f13

50 JUN 30 1961 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

109-2200

**SECRET**

Date:

6/21/61

REC

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

(Type in plain text or code)

AIRTELREGISTERED MAIL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-45672)

SUBJECT: CUBAN SITUATION  
IS - CUBA

Enclosed herewith for the information of the Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum setting forth the results of an interview conducted with [REDACTED] who recently returned from Havana, Cuba.

The memorandum of [REDACTED] which appears on pages 6 through 10 in enclosed letterhead memorandum, was furnished by [REDACTED] on 5/13/61

Copy to: CIA/State/RAB/USA  
ONI/OSI/G-2/J-2

by routing slip for info.

Date 6/23/61 by [REDACTED]

(3) Bureau (109-12-210) (Encls. 11) (RM)  
 1 - Miami (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)  
 1 - WFO (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)  
 1 - NY [REDACTED]  
 1 - NY 105-45672

FJO'B:mfw (312)

(8)

[REDACTED] Wm.

Approved:

Special Agent in Charge

**SECRET**

66 JUN 30 1961

JUN 28 1961 Per

XEROX

6/21/61

6/21/61

6/21/61

UNRECORDED COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN 6/13-7-210-3131

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 21, 1961

Re: Cuban Situation

[REDACTED] who recently returned from Cuba, advised on May 19, 1961, that he presently resides at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that he had been assigned to Cuba from July 10, 1959, until May 7, 1961, and during this period was stationed at the University of Villanueva, Marianao, Havana, Cuba. [REDACTED] advised that Villanueva is a Catholic University run by the Augustinian Fathers. [REDACTED] furnished information concerning the current situation in Cuba as follows:

b7C

Cuban Intelligence

[REDACTED] advised that to his knowledge, the intelligence branch of the Castro Government operates as a State Police and its tactics are very gestapo-like. [REDACTED] advised that he knows nothing about Cuban intelligence operations in the United States and he knows of no Americans in the United States who are pro-Castro, although he believes that an American now in Cuba is a Communist. [REDACTED] identified this American as [REDACTED] a newspaperman from the United States.

b7C

11

[REDACTED] further advised that the Cuban G-2 interrogates prisoners and, in fact, interrogated the group of Augustinian Fathers from Villanueva University who were "detained" from April 17, 1961 until May 7, 1961.

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/11/04 BY 66270/AMC/AF/olj

109-12-210-3131  
ENCLOSURE

Re: Cuban Situation

Military Operations

[REDACTED] stated that he observed while in Havana that all personnel attached to the Cuban Government were now in the possession of new automatic weapons which included Czechoslovak machine guns. [REDACTED] said that on May 1, 1961, during the May Day parade, he personally observed 13 tanks on display which had been made in the Soviet Union.

b7C

[REDACTED] stated that upon his return to the United States he described these tanks to his brother and his brother had informed him that these were the same type of tanks which had been used in Korea by the North Koreans.

[REDACTED] advised that in the vicinity of Villa-nueva University, Havana, Cuba, there were at least ten military billets and the only one which he personally recalled was located at the north corner of Fifth Avenue and 84th Street, Havana, Cuba.

b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he had no personal knowledge of the location of any ammunition dumps in the Havana area. [REDACTED] said that during the attempted invasion of Cuba on April 17, 1961, there had been an explosion in Camp Libertad which had occurred for about one hour after an air raid on the military base. [REDACTED] stated that later, Cuban newspapers admitted that there had been an ammunition explosion at Camp Libertad, and therefore, he drew the logical conclusion that there must have been ammunition dumps in Camp Libertad.

b7C

[REDACTED] advised that in regard to the militia, anyone working for the Cuban Government or Cuban Government sponsored companies, must participate in militia training or suffer the loss of their jobs. [REDACTED] advised that it is

b7C

Re: Cuban Situation

impossible to state whether or not the Cuban people voluntarily serve Prime Minister Fidel Castro's Government because of the complete reign of terror which exists in Cuba at the present time. [redacted] stated that the reign of terror prevents the possibility of forming any worthwhile opposition to the regime. [redacted] advised that the militia is well trained and as organized "as Cuban people can be". [redacted] said that, in his opinion, the people of Cuba will go along with Fidel Castro as long as he is on top, but at the first sign of failure, will take a course which will best serve their own individual interests.

b7C

Internal .. Governmental Affairs

[redacted] stated that in his own mind he is positive that Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Minister of Industry, is actually running the present Cuban Government. [redacted] said that he believes "Che" Guevara is issuing orders to Fidel Castro, who is merely a figurehead in whom the Cuban people have placed their hopes. [redacted] also stated that he believes that friction does exist between Guevara and Fidel Castro. The Cuban people, according to [redacted] hate Raul Castro, Minister of the Armed Forces and tolerate him only because of Prime Minister Fidel Castro. [redacted] stated that Fidel Castro is a demagogue of the highest order and the Cuban women actually idolize him.

b7C

Economic Conditions

[redacted] advised that economic conditions in Cuba cannot become much worse. He stated that Cuba has no raw materials, absolutely no soap, no heavy industry and that rice and beans, the main diet of the Cubans, runs out every once in a while. [redacted] stated that it is actually a crime in Cuba today to possess soap. [redacted]

b7C

Re: Cuban Situations

[redacted] also stated that there is no lack of gasoline or oil in Cuba, and that oil is the basis of combustion for the heat and power of the country. b7C

[redacted] said that there was a great deal of housing development going on in the outlying districts of Havana, and that there are also cooperative farms and centralized homes for farmers. [redacted] advised that just outside Havana, there are at least five new fifteen-story apartment houses which cannot be used and are vacant. He said that in the construction of these apartment houses, no plans were made for elevators, water or toilet facilities. b7C

[redacted] stated that he had learned that all of the 1961 and 1962 sugar crop is to be bartered by Cuba for arms. He further advised that food stuffs, such as meat, jelly and jams, are gotten from Poland and Russia. [redacted] also supplies some of the needed meat. [redacted] said that many vessels are arriving daily in the port of Havana, but he has actually only seen one ship flying the Soviet flag.

[redacted] said that there is not much evaporated milk in Cuba and that when word is spread about that food stuffs have arrived, long lines are formed at food stores. [redacted]

[redacted] also stated that there is a quasi - voluntary rationing in operation at the present time. b7C

[redacted] also stated that the lower echelon of workers, such as chauffeurs, maids and gardeners, are completely unemployed and there is no form of economic relief for them from the government. b7C

#### Press and Communications

[redacted] advised that there are two television stations presently in operation in Cuba, Stations CMQ and CMBG, both state controlled. He advised that these television b7C

Re: Cuban Situations

stations carry nothing but propaganda and comedy programs.

[redacted] advised that the only newspapers in Havana at the present time are "Revolucion", "El Mundo", "Combate" and "El Calle", which are all government controlled.

[redacted] stated that "Prensa Latina" is a government controlled news agency similar to Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI), and that "Prensa Latina" sends out propaganda which is practically verbatim stories which are appearing in the above-named newspapers. b7C

[redacted] advised that in regard to the school system in Cuba today, Fidel Castro is building schools and increasing the number of high schools. He said that television is being used in the classrooms mostly for Communist indoctrination. [redacted] advised that prior to Castro's taking power in Cuba, on January 1, 1959, the public school system in Cuba was generally poor. He advised that at that time, Havana had one public high school and Marianao also had one high school. [redacted] stated that as a result, people who could afford to pay, sent their children to private schools which were a combination of grammar and high schools. b7C

[redacted] stated that there were approximately 2,000 private schools in Cuba, and their reputation in general was very good. [redacted] advised that Cuba, prior to Castro's seizure of power, had three universities, Havana University, University of Las Villas and the University of Oriente, which were state supported and one private university, Villanueva.

[redacted] advised that there is a desperate need for teachers in Cuba to staff the state controlled schools. In regard to the new schools created by Fidel Castro, [redacted] said that there were no formal classes planned for these schools and the big question in his mind was what would b7C

Re: Cuban Situation

be the source of the additional teachers needed for this educational system.

[REDACTED] also advised that as an example of the brutality of the Castro regime, [REDACTED] [REDACTED], was with Major [REDACTED] Morgan, an American who had helped Castro during the revolution, at the time of his death. [REDACTED] stated that Morgan, who had been with Castro for a long time, was finally accused and convicted as a traitor by Castro's military courts and was sentenced to death by firing squad. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] advised him that he had witnessed the execution of Major Morgan by firing squad and then was forced to witness the coup de grace. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] had informed him that the coup de grace had been administered by the head of the firing squad and that five shots from a .45 automatic were fired into the face of William Morgan, completely obliterating Morgan's face. [REDACTED] stated that such actions by Cubans today did not appear to them to be unusual.

[REDACTED] furnished a copy of a memorandum regarding the events which took place at the time of the Cuban invasion and his memorandum reads as follows:

On April 17, 1961, at 3:55 P.M. in the city of Marianao, Havana, Cuba, some ten or twelve militia men armed with machine guns and automatic rifles entered the Monastery of the Catholic University of Villanueva. (The Monastery was the residence of the Augustinian Fathers who owned and operated the University and taught in it). Present in the Monastery at the time of this armed invasion were the following American Augustinian Fathers: [REDACTED]

and [REDACTED]

Re: Cuban Situation

(Two Spanish Augustinians were not present. It was later learned that they were held prisoners by the G. 2. The two priests in question were [REDACTED] who is still in jail and [REDACTED] who was released one week later). b7C

Under armed guard the Fathers were removed from the Monastery and forced to wait for three hours while a group of militia men searched the Monastery and the other six buildings of the University.

When the search was completed the Fathers were permitted to return to the Monastery but were told that their movements would be restricted until further notice, to the interior of the Monastery building. Armed guards were stationed at the exits of the building to insure compliance with the order.

No explanation of this armed intervention was offered to the Fathers. For the next 48 hours, the Fathers were restricted to their Monastery.

At the end of that period, however, G. 2 representatives arrived, ordered the Fathers, again under armed guards, to proceed to the auditorium of Tarafa Building (one of the University's buildings).

Once inside the auditorium, the leader of the G. 2 group announced that, as of that moment, the Fathers were considered "detenidos". This Spanish word as used in Cuba means persons who are held by police authorities while investigations are being carried out. A person who is "detenido" is technically under arrest for an alleged crime. ✓ d

Re: Cuban Situation

The group detained in the auditorium included all the Fathers mentioned above, about four or five male students and ex-students of the University, two lay professors of the University, and one woman, the mother of one of the detained students. No effort was made to separate the Fathers from the others. There was a complete lack of privacy. All lived and slept in the auditorium in full sight of the others.

During this incarceration all those present in the auditorium, with but two or three exceptions, were questioned by the G. 2 operatives. Some of the interrogations lasted as long as three hours. There was free access to toilet facilities and shower room, but always under armed guard. The Fathers said Mass daily, under armed guard, in the University Church, and ate, under armed guard, three times a day in the Monastery dining room. The other prisoners and the militia men who were occupying the University (some 25-30 in number) ate in a small cafeteria adjoining the Fathers dining room.

This, in very brief outline, is the form of living imposed on all those held in the auditorium until April 28, 1961, at 2:29 P.M. At that precise moment, the armed guard at the door of the auditorium announced simply that he and all the militia men were leaving the University. Twenty minutes later a truck carrying the militia men left from the front gate of the University and the Fathers were free.

Upon returning to the Monastery the Fathers found the entire building in complete disorder. Personal papers, books, and clothing of the Fathers were strewn about on floors, along with garbage, cigarette and cigar butts in profusion, mattresses, photographs and sacred vessels. Radios, fountain pens and cameras were stolen by the militia men who had lived in the Monastery while the Fathers occupied the auditorium. Two of the three University automobiles had not been returned.

Re: Cuban Situation

During the week beginning April 29, the Fathers were alternately subjected to periods of house arrest and freedom of movement with the permission of two armed guards at the door of the Monastery. The "freedom of movement" just mentioned meant freedom to leave and enter the Monastery only. All other buildings of the University were off limits. This situation continued until Sunday, May 7, 1961, when the present writer left Cuba on Pan American flight 422 to Miami, Florida.

It was learned that on that very Sunday, at approximately 4 P.M. armed militia men expelled the remaining Fathers from the Monastery.

As of the moment of this writing (Saturday, May 14, 1961) the following Augustinian Fathers from the University have arrived in the United States via Miami. On Sunday May 7, 1961,

[REDACTED] on Monday, May 8, 1961, [REDACTED] on Wednesday, May 10, 1961, [REDACTED]

b7C

Presently living in the Swiss Embassy (the former American Embassy) in Cuba are, the following Augustinian Fathers from the University: [REDACTED]

b7C

[REDACTED] Spanish, is presently staying at the Santa Rita Church Rectory on Quinta Avenida, Miramar. Father Dario Casado is still, according to present information, in the G. 2 jail, Quinta Avenida, Miramar.

b7C

[REDACTED] American passport is in the hands of the G.2 people who refuse to return it until they satisfy themselves as to why the passport states that he may travel to Hungary (p. 5 of passport). Apparently they take this permission to be an indication of an American agent.

b7C

Re: Cuban Situation

The Universidad Catholica de Santo Tomas de Villanueva (the official name of the University) was owned and operated by a corporation [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], Villanova, Pennsylvania. His interests were protected by the Executive Committee composed of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] all of the same Order of St. Augustine and all residents at the University in Cuba. The University and all its properties, then, pertain to American citizens. The seizure and nationalization of the University and its properties is unjust and constitutes the crime of robbery.

b7C

The detention of the Fathers of the University and their being held incomunicado without due process of law was blatantly unjust and the indignities to which they were subjected during the incarceration were due in part to the fact that the University was considered by highly placed Cuban government officials (such as the Prime Minister, Fidel Castro) an "American" institution.

[REDACTED] at the University, was arrested by G.2, jailed, and is at the present moment incarcerated in "La Cabana" prison in Havana.

b7C

This writer has one suggestion of immediate urgency; that every effort be expanded as soon as possible to facilitate the removal of all American citizens from the island of Cuba.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memo

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: JUN 26 1961

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-3902)

SUBJECT: Political Matters - CuBa 110036  
CUBAN SITUATION  
IS - CUBA

Enclosed are 9 copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

The translation of material provided by [REDACTED] was made by [REDACTED] Translator. b7c

For the information of the Bureau, reference is made to Miami letter dated 6/15/61, to the Bureau in this case in which [REDACTED] provided considerable additional information concerning internal affairs of the F.R.D. and the attempt to organize a successful Liberation Army.

[REDACTED] gives the impression of being a stable intelligent and very pro-United States Cuban Officer.

② - Bureau (Encl. 9)(RM)  
2 - Miami  
GED:bam  
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 6/15/2014 BY [REDACTED]

EX-14

REC-66

109-12-210-332

JUN 29 1961


Copy to: CIA/State/RAB  
ONI/OSI/G2  
by routing slip for info  
Date 6-30-61 by ERH/SF

TM 30 10 15 01 01

NAA/AT SEC

341

62 JUL 3 1961



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

105-3902

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 2/12/94 BY [signature]

Miami, Florida

JUN 26 1961

Re: Cuban Situation

On June 12, 1961, [REDACTED]  
furnished the following information relating to the  
Cuban situation.

b7c

At the outset [REDACTED] identified himself

as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that immediately after the  
overthrow of the Batista Government, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], Castro appointed Camilo Cienfuegos to a  
high military position and it became obvious to  
[REDACTED] that Cuba was going communist. He said  
he then began working in the military underground against  
Castro.

In June, 1960, upon the request of the Frente  
Revolucionario Democratico (F.R.D.) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] served on the Military Staff of the F.R.D., [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On February 6,

MM 105-3902

1961, [REDACTED], along with other members of the Military Staff of F.R.D., renounced their positions due to an internal political situation which had developed within the organization.

[REDACTED] stated he had prepared a plan of action, which he felt might be useful to the United States Government, in connection with a solution of the Cuban problem. At the same time he had drawn up an analysis of the errors which he felt had been committed during preparations for the April, 1961 liberation attempt against Fidel Castro. He said he was offering this information in good faith in hopes of expediting the overthrow of the communist regime of Fidel Castro. He also said he would like to offer his personal services to the United States Government in any endeavor against the Castro regime.

The plan and analysis submitted by [REDACTED] have been translated from Spanish into English as follows:

AMEND — 2 — submitted 1  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

AMEND — 2 — submitted 1  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

MM 105-3902

GKD/cms

ERRORS COMMITTED

(WITH REGARD TO THE APRIL 17, 1961, LIBERATION ATTEMPT)

1. They organized a military camp of political elements who disagreed with each other, and they did not set up military headquarters, even provisional ones.
2. The F.R.D. was organized of people most of whom hoped to hold power in the political movement and among the resistance in Cuba.
3. Each of the organizations in the F.R.D. was separately directed, and there was no coordination whatsoever with the military apparatus of the F.R.D. or the resistance movement. They paid no attention to the men who had been named to the General Staff of the Liberating Army.
4. At no time did the Council of the F.R.D. consult with the officials of the General Staff of the Liberating Army.
5. At no time did they consult with the officers of the General Staff for instructions, plans, etc.

The officials of the General Staff were chosen by the F.R.D., keeping in mind the following:

- a. Officials without political connections or activities during their military careers.
- b. Officials with experience in military problems and keeping public order in Cuba.

c. Officials who had prestige in the Army and were well known to the people of Cuba.

In spite of all this, they were never consulted.

6. The Army, the Navy and the Air Force worked independently; there was no coordination.

7. The resistance movement within Cuba was not coordinated, and supplies were badly distributed. Each one was trying to better his own group.

8. The resistance movement in Cuba had no plans for development, and was not coordinated with the military organization in exile.

9. Each group had its own couriers and communications system. For this reason the resistance movement in Cuba was very expensive, and very disorganized.

10. There being no unification of the resistance groups in the F.R.D., information received from Cuba was incorrect, some groups claiming more membership than they actually had.

11. The heads of the resistance groups in Cuba did not give promotions on the basis of merit, but on the basis of unconditional political subordination. This gave rise to much discontent among the resistance groups.

12. At no time did the military headquarters of the F.R.D. receive information from the resistance movement in Cuba.

13. There was a group within the F.R.D. which kept in close contact with the people who distributed funds and war materiel, and these people directed clandestine operations within Cuba, without co-ordination with the F.R.D. or the military branch thereof.
14. The people trained for infiltration groups were not chosen on a basis of their previous experience in such work or their knowledge of the personnel working in Cuba; all they needed was to speak English.
15. The Investigative Branch of the F.R.D. was independent and supplied with plentiful funds. They never cooperated with the military staff of the F.R.D.
16. There was no liberty for the men at the camp; they had to await orders. There was no propaganda activity.
17. The officials at the camp never said they would set up an army with proper ranks.
18. The propaganda was bad, mostly untrue, and at times indiscreet.
19. There were conspiracies and uprisings in the camps, mostly because of lack of discipline and lack of respect for the officers. They lacked officers who were mature, experienced and had some prestige. Their officials were young and inexperienced, in spite of the fact that they were imbued with the spirit of sacrifice and had great hopes for the future.

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20. There was no esprit de corps in the camps, and the officers gave no support to their subordinates.
21. The fighters did not know where they were going; they were given no instructions; they did not know what they were fighting for.
22. On February 6, 1961, the General Staff of the Liberating Army resigned, because they were not agreement with the way things were being handled.
23. When they disembarked in Cuba, ninety per cent of the infiltration groups were in Miami.
24. The resistance groups in Cuba were not informed of the arrival of the Liberating Army.

MM 105-3902  
GKD/ems

GENERAL PLAN OF ACTION TO LIBERATE CUBA

Before setting out this plan, we must make a political analysis of the present situation in Cuba.

The coming to power of Dr. FIDEL CASTRO meant to the Cuban people not only the overthrow of a dictatorship which was incompatible with their ideals, and a return to democratic institutions of government, but also the arrival of a new stage in the republic which would put an end to corruption and catering to the interests of small groups. The previous corruption had roused the people to hope for social justice.

This social justice was to be based on law and order, in accordance with the Constitution of 1940, which represented the guarantee of our democratic system. The cause of democratic social justice gained the support of the majority of Cubans in the fight against Mr. FULGENCIO BATISTA, fundamentally because it was represented by new men, with a plan of action and sacrifice which demonstrated their firm ideals, who were not connected with the old corrupt regime which was hated by the people. Dr. FIDEL CASTRO and the men of the July 26th Movement became the leaders of the national fight. Thus, when these men gained power in 1959, they had the trust and admiration of the greatest majority of Cubans in the history of our country. Later, these leaders showed their true intentions, and it became evident

to the Cubans that they had been tricked. The new government betrayed the true cause of democracy and social justice for which the Cubans had fought, and imposed a new dictatorship, the worst of all, since it controlled all aspects of human life, the "Communist Dictatorship."

Dr. CASTRO lost most of his popular support, but due to the repressive activities of the police, demonstrations of civic protest have been reduced to a minimum, and it is not possible for the outside observer to make a true judgment concerning national opinions.

The people, the majority of Cubans, go on hoping, in spite of having been betrayed, for democracy and social justice. It was their hope for social justice which moved them to repudiate BATISTA and fight against him. The healthiest forces in the country have been at war with the new dictatorship for some time.

The objectives are the same: to overthrow the present Communist dictatorship and restore democracy to Cuba; to reestablish social justice and protect the rights of the people in an atmosphere of respect for the institutions and the laws of the country. It must be remembered, if one wishes to analyze the situation correctly, that our people do not wish to return to the past. In this way, possibly one can understand better the key to the problem: our need to find men who, by their past activities and present sacrifices, are capable of inspiring confidence, of giving hope to the fighters and the people as a whole. This does not mean that men who

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have had political experience with our past governments and whose conduct was good, should not be used; on the contrary, their cooperation would be very valuable.

This need is present, today more than ever, in view of our first failure, in the minds of all Cubans, inside and outside of Cuba.

There are, of course, small groups who would like to see things go on as they are, but we should not confuse such groups with the vast majority of the Cuban people. Such an error would be fatal.

MM 105-3902  
CED/ems

GENERAL PLAN OF ACTION TO LIBERATE CUBA

The plan should have three phases, as follows:

- I. Before initiating military operations in Cuba.
- II. With the initiation of operations in Cuba.
- III. Finishing the Campaign.

Phase I. During this phase, the following activities should be carried out:

A. Propaganda

All possible means should be used to carry out intensive propaganda to undermine the morale of the enemy, so that they will cease fighting; to gain new adherents for the cause of the liberation of Cuba; to improve morale among the resistance in Cuba. This propaganda work should be carried out as follows:

1. Concerning the enemy

We must constantly play up the errors and negative aspects of the Communist Government of CASTRO. We may be able to persuade some to work against the Government because of its Communistic, anti-Cuban plans, because of the injustice of their cause, or because they do not want to go down in history as accomplices of a Communist Government. The following points should be brought out:

- a. Occupation of important positions by foreign Communists.
- b. Importation of Russians and Chinese who are specialists in torture to kill Cubans who oppose the Communist regime.
- c. Importation of Czech pilots and artillery experts to kill the Cuban people en masse, should they decide to resist the Communist regime.
- d. Daily desertions by members of the Rebel Army who refuse to help turn Cuba over to the Soviets.
- e. Daily desertions of Cubans from the ranks of the Communist Government, and the daily exodus of Cubans who are leaving their country because they are against the Communist regime.
- f. Daily killings and torture going on in Cuba.
- g. Sale of national sovereignty to the Soviets, who really run Cuba today.
- h. Humiliation, unjust confiscation of property, and violations of the rights of all Cubans, even those who fought against the tyranny of BATISTA.

- i. Shipment of our funds and our gold to Communist countries.
  - j. Funds spent on various missions to foreign countries for the purpose of stirring up trouble in democratic countries on behalf of the Soviets.
  - k. Reduction of salaries of all the Cuban workers and suppression of their syndical rights.
  - l. FIDEL CASTRO's unusual way of administering public funds, without any control whatsoever.
2. Concerning the people
- a. Their obligation to aid in the fight for Cuba's independence, and to set up a democratic regime. Cuba today is beginning her third war for independence.
  - b. The imperative necessity of carrying out the work of gaining adherents to the cause of democracy. This work should be carried out through families and friends. The errors of the CASTRO system should be constantly emphasized.
  - c. For the sake of the country, do not send your children to schools controlled by the Government, so that they will not be indoctrinated as Communists. Do not permit them to join the youth patrols.

- d. Abstain from all social and recreational activity.
- e. Go to church as often as possible. If you are a Mason, go to your lodge. Work on conspiracy in these places.
- f. Do not buy from businesses which are controlled by I.N.R.A.
- g. Stay away from theaters and movies where pro-Communist productions are shown.

B. Psychological Warfare

It is very important to carry out psychological warfare during this phase, to make the government and its staff feel that they are constantly watched by the people, and to prepare the people to cooperate with the armed forces. This psychological warfare should be aimed at the entire population of Cuba, to get their cooperation in:

- 1. Constant observation of the movements and activities of all the Communists, particularly the foreign Communists and national leaders.
- 2. Organization of and participation in the revolutionary cells which function in each neighborhood, in order to take their places at the proper moment.

3. Collection and transmission of information concerning the movements and activities of the enemy, particularly military information. Concerning this type of information, the Cuban patriots should be prepared to give information concerning:
  - a. Troops and their location
  - b. Movement of troops within Cuba
  - c. Principal access routes to the camps or to the positions of the enemy
  - d. Various types of arms in the possession of the enemy, and their characteristics and location
  - e. Advise concerning the arrival of new arms in Cuba.
  - f. Study the best way to carry out sabotage of military installations, fuel depots, etc.

The Cubans should make a habit of these types of cooperation. It should be remembered that the success of the propaganda and psychological warfare carried out by the Communists rests upon constant repetition. We, too, should use this principle of constant repetition.

The General Staff of the Army of Liberation should work out with the propaganda organization all points which they feel would help the military operations.

The various points of propaganda and psychological warfare should be emphasized daily, through all means of communication.

C. Organization of the Resistance Groups in Cuba

We should be fully convinced that the success of the operation to liberate Cuba rests upon perfect organization of the resistance movement within Cuba in coordination with the Army of Liberation. The resistance movement within Cuba constitutes almost our entire human potential in the fight against the Communist Government, and as such, it is our channel for:

1. Organizing necessary sources of information to plan our operations in Cuba.
2. Spreading our propaganda in Cuba, and aiding us in psychological warfare.
3. Setting up pockets of resistance to annoy the enemy. These pockets can be reinforced by the liberation forces when they disembark in Cuba.
4. Forming sabotage groups.

5. Organizing assault of military installations in accordance with instructions received by the movement concerning this matter.
6. Organizing the departure from Cuba of the necessary men to make up the embarkation forces.
7. Setting up security (police) forces for the towns as they are occupied by the liberation forces. These plans should be made during Phase I, so that they may be put into operation as soon as operations begin.
8. Arrest Communist leaders and public officials.

We should remember that if the resistance movement in Cuba is not organized and coordinated with the General Staff of the Army of Liberation, their effectiveness will be nil, which is what happened in the invasion of April 17th.

**D. General Organization for the Occupation**

The General Staff should make plans for:

1. Occupation, maintenance of order and protection of property in all Cuban territory, including the preparation of speeches, organization of the police, and adoption of security measures.

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2. Organization of the armed forces, including the national police. Individuals should be picked to make up these forces, keeping in mind those who took part in the fighting and old members of these forces whose conduct was good.
3. Propaganda and information concerning psychological warfare should be disseminated as operations begin.

Phase II. Beginning of Operations. During this phase, the following activities should be carried out:

- A. Execution of the operation plans at the proper moment. The General Staff should have various plans of operation. The final plan will have to be decided upon at the last moment, when the situation in Cuba is known, and for this reason, the plans must be flexible.

The operation plans should be based on the situation in Cuba at the last moment, the troops at our disposal, and on:

1. Points or demonstrations.
2. Surprise.
3. Occupation or destruction of key points.
4. Cut communications and supply lines.
5. Decision.

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6. Firing power.
  7. Channllizing the enemy attack toward a previously established line, to take advantage of the economy of forces offered by being on the defensive.
  8. Mobility.
  9. Flexibility among the attacking units.
  10. Insurance against
    - a. Air attacks
    - b. Mechanized attacks
    - c. Infiltration
  11. Control of
    - a. The organization
    - b. The civilian population
- B. Execution of:
1. Previously established plans for propaganda and psychological warfare applicable to this second phase.
  2. Occupation plans previously worked out, which should include:

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- a. Organization of the occupation forces.
- b. Measures to keep order and protect property.
- c. Rapid reestablishment of public services.
- d. Assignment of functions to the police force.
- e. Immediate sanctions against the Communist leaders.

Phase III. Finishing the Campaign. During this phase, each of the following points should be handled:

- A. Reorganization of the Armed Forces of the nation.
- B. Restoration of the administrative systems of the Armed Forces.
- C. Adoption of measures to wipe out Communism in Cuba.
- D. Elimination of all types of secret police and repressive forces in Cuba. There should be one corps for Scientific Investigation.

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**Section 552a**

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URGENT 6-28-61 2:44 AM EDST WPM

TO DIRECTOR AND SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM SAC, NEWARK 280505 REC-16

FOREIGN MILITARY MATTERS-CUBA. REMYTEL JUNE 24 LAST, NO COPY INFO. ██████████ A CUBAN NATIONAL INTERVIEWED BY BHARAT AT ATLANTIC CITY, N. J., JUNE 24 LAST AND FURNISHED INFORMATION REGARDING MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS IN CUBA. ██████████ TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED ATLANTIC CITY RA TONIGHT AND ADVISED EN ROUTE FROM NYC TO WASHINGTON, DC, AND PLANNED TO SAY AT HOTEL HARRINGTON, JUNE INSTANT. STATED HE HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING CUBAN MILITARY OPERATIONS. ██████████ WILL CONTACT WFO MORNING JUNE 28 INSTANT.

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W. JAMES BROWN

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
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**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

Newark, New Jersey  
June 23, 1961

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Callahan  
Mr. Conrad  
Mr. DeLoach  
Mr. Evans  
Mr. Malone  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Sullivan  
Mr. Tavares  
Mr. Trotter  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Ingram  
Miss Gandy

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

*SECRET INFORMATION AND ADVICE*

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100-57704

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## **FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA**

On June 22, 1961, [REDACTED], who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

**N.Y.-CURA**

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070

A rumor which is circulating among pro-Castro Cubans who are members of the July 26th Movement is to the effect that ~~François~~ Fidel Castro of Cuba will shortly replace ~~Castro~~ ~~Garcia~~ ~~Aguero~~ as President of Cuba and will replace him with ~~Castro~~ ~~Garcia~~ ~~Aguero~~. Garcia Aguero is a leading figure in the Partido Socialista Popular (Communist Party of Cuba). He has been long known as a Communist and in 1940, was a Senator from Havana. Even at that time he was General Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba.

~~MEMBER.C.P. OF CUBA~~  
Federico Aguirre is a Negro and this will help build  
the Party. Castro has made clear the Negro in Cuba is playing  
an important part in Cuban affairs.

Another rumor among members of the July 26th Movement that is even more widespread is to the effect that Fidel Castro, in his speech on July 26, 1961, will issue a proclamation announcing the establishment of a new "socialist constitution" for Cuba. He will also reveal the establishment of a new currency replacing the present Cuban peso.

However, each individual will only be allowed to turn in for redemption approximately 300 to 400 pesos. It is said that there is a feeling in the Cuban government that some people have hoarded too much money.

Also it is being said that after July 26, 1961,  
no one under 40 years of age will be allowed to emigrate from  
Cuba.

On June 21, 1961, [REDACTED] was given information concerning his past association with the Communist Party USA and the Cuban Movement with whom he is connected. It was further learned from [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was not allowed to leave Cuba.

**ENCLOSURE**

~~RECEIVED APRIL 1946~~

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

[redacted] also reported that simultaneous demonstrations were scheduled to be held in New York City and Havana, Cuba, on Monday, June 19, 1961. These demonstrations were scheduled to demand freedom for [redacted]. However, the demonstration in New York was cancelled. [redacted] did not know the reason for the cancellation. Further, [redacted] has not heard of any demonstration held in Havana on that day, nor has he seen any publicity stating that it was held.

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

THE 26TH OF JULY REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

This movement is so named from the date, July 26, 1953. On this date, FIDEL CASTRO led an unsuccessful attack against the Cuban Army at Moncado Barracks, Santiago de Cuba, Oriente Province, Cuba. Subsequently, CASTRO with 82 followers departed Mexico aboard the yacht "Gramma" and landed in Oriente Province about December 2, 1956, and from there waged guerrilla warfare against the Government of FULGENCIO BATISTA, then President of Cuba. On January 1, 1959, BATISTA fled Cuba and sought asylum in the Dominican Republic. FIDEL CASTRO ascended to power and is now Prime Minister of Cuba.

APPENDIX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 6/26/61

Sources furnishing information herein are in close contact with members and officers of the pre-Castro July 26th Movement in New Jersey and New York City. The information they furnish regarding forthcoming internal changes in Cuba has been partially reported in the press. The sources have no access to official Cuban circles and the data reported is as stated, "rumor among pre-Castro Cubans." Dissemination has been made to Dept. of State, Central Intelligence Agency, United States Information Agency, and the military.

END

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6/23/61

AIRTEL

Registered Mail

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-610)  
FROM: SAC, NEWARK (97-817)  
SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBA

Enclosed herewith are nine copies of a letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination. A copy is also being furnished to New York for information in view of the information contained herein of interest to New York.

[REDACTED] is [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] is [REDACTED] (S)

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b1

b2  
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The letterhead name is classified confidential because of information furnished by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] which could reasonably result in the identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness thereof.

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•~~Writing out of practice on this~~  as requested.

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Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

“**What are you doing now? Why don’t you come to see us?**” he asked again.

Page 61 of 61 "Using the approach to identify the key drivers

*...and the rest of the world is a mirror of us.*

मात्रा द्वारा नियन्त्रित करने की विधि

over comprending ons. Surpassing that

Some people believe that the best way to approach our responsibilities as citizens

и съществуват и съществуваха до 2000-те години

1. We have used

② POLITICAL MASTERS CUBA

PELLE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: June 28, 1961

Reb: SAC, NEWARK (97-217)

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau and offices having interests in Cuban matters are copies of letterhead memorandum relating to the POLICIA NACIONAL REVOLUCIONARIA (Cuban National Revolutionary Police) (PNR) and officials in charge of various departments during 1960.

[REDACTED] is [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was furnished during [REDACTED] approved interview of [REDACTED] (Confidential), Newark [REDACTED]. Separate report will be submitted to the Bureau concerning this subject.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/7/04 BY 60250/AM/C/AS/obj

JM  
REB: Bureau (109-12-210) (Enc. 8)  
1-New York (109-112) (Enc. 1) (Info)  
1-Miami (Info) (Enc. 1)  
1-San Juan (Info) (Enc. 1)  
2-Newark (97-217)  
(1-  
NYD:MHC  
(7)


REC-10 109-72-210-3137

EX 104 JUN 29 1961

filed of old & memo  
45-63987-210  
(Intell matter Cuba)  
NAT. INF. SEC.

F2 Copy to: CIA/State/RAB  
ONI/OSI/G-2  
by routing slip for info.  
Date [REDACTED] by [REDACTED]

56 JUL 11 1961



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Newark, New Jersey

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/7/04 BY 6020 MULRONEY/AB/cb

June 28, 1961

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

On June 7, 1961, [REDACTED] whose reliability is unknown but [REDACTED] furnished the following information with regard to the reorganization of the police in Cuba by revolutionary forces of Fidel Castro following his successful ouster of former Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista on January 1, 1959:

Source advised that the reorganizational setup consisted of the Policia Nacional Revolucionaria (Cuban National Revolutionary Police) (PNR) under which there was a Departamento Tecnico Investigaciones (DTI). Within the DTI were various sections for robberies, homicides, passport matters, etc.

From January 1, 1959, until January 7, 1959, when Castro's forces arrived in Havana, the PNR was organized and headed by Aldo Vera Serafin, a former bank employee who had been a principal figure in the July 26th Revolutionary Movement. Various members of the July 26th Revolutionary Movement in Havana at that time were picked by him to be members of the force and to be responsible for maintaining control and order in the capital until Castro's rebel forces arrived.

After the arrival of Castro's forces in Havana Efigenio Almeijeras was placed in charge of the PNR and Vera Serafin put in charge of the DTI.

About June of 1959 Vera Serafin had some sort of trouble with Almeijeras and was replaced as head of the DTI of the PNR by Samuel Bodiles Planas, a close friend of Raul Castro, who fought with Raul at Sierra Cristal. According to source he, Bodiles Planas, had strong inclinations towards complete socialism and was considered by most of the officers as a Communist. After a short time as head of the DTI, Bodiles became second in command to Almeijeras in the PNR.

Replacing Bodiles as head of the DTI was Pedro Diaz Arguelles, [REDACTED] Source described both as strongly socialist. It is claimed [REDACTED] COMMUNIST

WPA 109-12-210-3137  
ENCLOSURE

b1  
b6  
b7D

WPA b7C

**FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA**

also that Diaz, who came from a wealthy family, [REDACTED] b7C

[REDACTED] furnished additional names and comments as follows concerning various officials of the PNR and DTI during 1959. Source is unaware of later changes in the organizational staff except where so indicated in comments concerning individuals.

b2  
b7D

**Policia Nacional Revolucionaria (PNR)**

Comandantes - Aldo Vera Serafin replaced by Efigenio Almeida Diaz.

CIA  
b7C

**Departamento Tecnicos Investigacion (DTI) of the PNR.**

Comandantes - Aldo Vera Serafin replaced by Samuel Rodriguez Planas in turn replaced by Raoul Molina Arzua.

Heads of various departments under the DTI were as follows:

b7C

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

CUBA

b7C

[REDACTED] was a member of the July 26th Revolutionary Movement in New York City prior to the revolution. He supposedly was a friend of Fidel Castro and allegedly once dealt in drug traffic and prostitution in New York. He later became head of the Tourist Section of the PNR.

b7C

Samuel Rodiles Planas was promoted from head of the DTI to become second in command of the PNR under Almeijeiras. He was described as being generally regarded as a Communist.

Raul Diaz Arguelles who then took over the DTI was described as coming from a fairly well to do family in Cuba which was rumored to have made much of their money in drug traffic. He was commander of a rebel group known as Directorio Revolucionario 13 de Marzo.

b7C

[REDACTED] who was regarded by everyone as a Communist. [REDACTED] of the DTI from September to October, 1959, when Diaz Arguelles took a trip to Europe on government business, purpose unknown.

[REDACTED] from Santiago, Cuba, was a close friend of one [REDACTED] an organizer of the July 26th Revolutionary Movement in Oriente Province who was said to have much influence with both Fidel and Raul Castro.

b7C

b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: 6/28/61

FROM: *MW* SAC, WFO (97-1017)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 5/7/04 BY 60290AUCBCE/AG/dj

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBA  
(OO:MM)

Enclosed are nine copies to Bureau and one each to Miami and New York of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above, together with an equal number of copies of an informant evaluation memorandum.

The source mentioned in enclosed letterhead memorandum is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (protected due to position), who furnished information to SA [REDACTED] telephonically on 6/23/61. He stated all available space on Pan American flights out of Havana, Cuba, has been reserved from approximately July 26, to December 28, 1961. The estimate of 14,000 persons who plan to depart Cuba, mentioned in enclosed letterhead memorandum, is based on ten Pan American flights each week from Havana, Cuba, to Miami, Florida, carrying seventy persons per flight for a period of twenty weeks. [REDACTED] stated the list of persons holding reservations for these flights is maintained by Pan American's Miami, Florida, Office. He stated he felt a representative of Pan American in Miami would be glad to furnish the FBI additional information concerning persons holding these reservations if the FBI needed this information.

b7C  
b7D

Enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "Confidential" to protect identity of [REDACTED] source mentioned therein, who is furnishing information of continuing value in internal security matters.

b7C  
b7D

RUC

② Bureau (Enc. 9)

1-Miami (105-177) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)

1-New York (109-112) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)

1-WFO

DRG:ecr  
(5)2 memo: <sup>105</sup>  
Copy to: CIA/State/~~NSC~~  
ONI/OSI/G-2by routing slip for info.  
Date 6/6/61 by *dcby*

cc: 16

109-12-210-3138

16 JUN 29 1961

EX-113

NAT: *ADM SEC*25)  
ENCLOSURE

62 JUL 6 1961

**WFO 97-1017**

**Miami and New York furnished copies for information  
due to their mutual interest in Cuban matters.**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
June 28, 1961

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

On June 23, 1961, a source advised information had come to his attention that one of the major United States airlines expected to transport approximately 14,000 persons out of Cuba between the latter part of July, 1961, and the latter part of December, 1961. Source stated it was estimated that approximately 12,000 of these persons would be Cubans and 2,000 would be Americans.

This source advised whether all of these 14,000 persons would be allowed to leave Cuba was another question. He stated there was no way of knowing if Cuba's Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, would permit all of the 12,000 Cubans to depart in view of the changing conditions there.


DECLASSIFIED BY DDA/AM/BS/MS/6/04  
ON 5/1/04

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

109-12-210-3138

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Washington 25, D. C.  
June 28, 1961

Title

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Character

INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Reference

Memorandum dated and  
captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced  
communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/17/04 BY SP190/ACTS/AJS

109-12-210-3138

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property  
of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside  
your agency.

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: 6/28/61

~~FROM:~~ SAC, MIAMI (105-3902)  
~~Political Activities~~  
 SUBJECT: CUBAN SITUATION  
 IS - CUBA

5/10/04  
 CLASSIFIED BY DS/ACB/60261 PERNAT  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6/17/29  
 Classified per OGA/AL dated 5/10/04

Re Miami airtel to the Bureau dated 5/6/61,  
 furnishing information provided by [REDACTED] b7C  
 [REDACTED] b7D  
 PSI, and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
 the April 17, 1961, liberation attempt against  
 the FIDEL CASTRO regime.

[REDACTED]  
 (S)  
 [REDACTED]  
 (S)  
 [REDACTED]  
 (S)  
 [REDACTED]  
 (S)  
 [REDACTED]  
 (CIA)

b1

b3

(CIA)

(S)

19 2 - Bureau (RM)  
 3 - Miami  
 { 2 - 105-3902  
 { 1 - 62-3573  
 GED:bam  
 (5) ~~(S)~~ (S)

56 JUL 14 1961

EX-116  
 78 e 532 BH .8 REC-18  
 FEB 1961 BY 1000  
 BEF

~~SECRET~~

M  
 109-12-210-3139  
 JUN 30 1961  
 NAT. SEC.  
 5/10/04

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

105-3902

b1 (CIA)  
b3 b7C  
2, 3, b7D

b1 b3 (CIA)  
b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED] said he feels very intensely about the seriousness of the world situation and especially with regard to the communist take-over in Cuba, and he had decided to devote his life to fighting communism wherever he can.

[REDACTED] said that he is engaged to be married [REDACTED] who lives in Miami. He said he expects to return to Miami from time to time and that he hoped to maintain some contact with the FBI.

b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED] said he wanted this office to know about all of the above described facts as he has great confidence in the FBI. No effort was made to direct the activities of [REDACTED]

b7C  
b7D

This information is furnished strictly for the Bureau's confidential information and any further pertinent information furnished by [REDACTED] will be furnished to the Bureau promptly.

- 2\* -

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

PA  
BT  
skew  
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210) DATE: JUNE 30, 1961

FROM : SAC, NEW ORLEANS (105-1474)

SUBJECT: CUBAN SITUATION IS - CUBA      Political Matters - Cuba

Re New Orleans letter to the Bureau dated 4/25/61.

The material referred to in referenced New Orleans letter has been handled in accordance with the last paragraph of Page 2 and first paragraph of Page 3 of referenced New Orleans letter.

The above is for the information of the Bureau.

② Bureau (RM)  
1 - New Orleans

WCD/mjw  
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/16/04 BY [Signature] (Ably)

[Signature]

REC-8

109-12-210-3140

JUL 3 1961

EX-113

NAT'L SEC.

0251  
F6

57 JUL 7 1961

~~SECRET~~  
FBI

Date: 6/28/61

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)  
 FROM: SAC, WFO (97-1017)  
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-CUBA  
IS-CUBA

5604  
 CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] 6/26/61 b7C  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X [REDACTED] 5/6/2029

ReWFOairtel and letterhead memo dated 6/27/61.

[REDACTED] mentioned in enclosed letterhead memo  
 is [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED] is LOUIS BUDENZ who furnished  
 information attributed to him to SA [REDACTED]  
 of the NYO on 6/26/50. This information is located in  
 WFO file 100-27597, serial 8.

b2  
b7C  
b1

The enclosed letterhead memo is classified  
 "Confidential" inasmuch as the information reported  
 therein could reasonably result in the identification  
 of a confidential informant of continuing value and  
 compromise his future effectiveness.

③-Bureau (Enc. 9) *at*  
 2-WFO *at*  
 (1- [REDACTED] (S) *at*  
 JES:pat  
 (5)

AIRTEL

ENCLOSURE  
*109-12-210-3141*  
 REC 21 109 12-210-3141  
 12 JUN 30 1961  
 C. C. Wick  
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Copy to: CIA/State/  
 ONI/OSI/G-2  
 by routing slip for info.  
 Date 6/30/61 by [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

251  
 63 JUL 6 1961  
 Approved by [REDACTED] Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

b7C

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
XXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available release to you.

Section 552

- (b)(1)  
 (b)(2)  
 (b)(3)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
 (b)(4)  
 (b)(5)  
 (b)(6)

- (b)(7)(A)  
 (b)(7)(B)  
 (b)(7)(C)  
 (b)(7)(D)  
 (b)(7)(E)  
 (b)(7)(F)  
 (b)(8)  
 (b)(9)

- (d)(5)  
 (j)(2)  
 (k)(1)  
 (k)(2)  
 (k)(3)  
 (k)(4)  
 (k)(5)  
 (k)(6)  
 (k)(7)

- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.  
 Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):  
\_\_\_\_\_

- The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:


109 - HQ - 12 - 210 - 3141 Enclosure page 1

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X for this page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
XXXXXX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Re: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA



b1

(c)

Prensa Latina is a Latin American news service with headquarters in Havana, Cuba.

~~CARLOS M. LOCHUGA~~

~~LURE, O.C.D.~~

The "Organization of American States Directory of Delegations," dated April, 1961, reflects His Excellency Senor Don Carlos M. ~~Lochuga~~ as Cuban Ambassador and Representative to the Organization of American States.

The "Telephone Directory", published by the USDS, dated June, 1961, reflects Lincoln White as Director, Office of News, Bureau of Public Affairs, USDS.

In regard to Isidor F. Stone, mentioned above, it is noted that on June 26, 1950, [REDACTED] who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that he had been acquainted with Stone for 15 or 20 years. According to the informant, Stone had not been a member of the Communist Party (CP), when he first met him; however, during the mid-1930's Stone did become a member of the CP. The informant advised that he received information substantiating Stone's membership in the CP not only from CP functionaries such as Israel Antler and Jack Stachel, but also from [REDACTED]



b2  
b7C

The informant had also been advised that Stone assisted the CP by aiding in the preparation of attacks on enemies of the CP.

The Communist Party, United States of America, has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
XXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
**FOIPA**  
**DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**

Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available release to you.

Section 552

- (b)(1)  
 (b)(2)  
 (b)(3)  


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 (b)(7)(A)  
 (b)(7)(B)  
 (b)(7)(C)  


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 (b)(7)(D)  


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 (b)(7)(E)  


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 (b)(7)(F)  


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 (b)(4)  
 (b)(5)  
 (b)(6)

- (d)(5)  
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 (k)(6)  


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 (k)(7)

- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.  
 Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

109 - 40 - 12 - 210 - 3141 Enclosure page 3

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
 X Deleted Page(s) X  
 X No Duplication Fee X  
 X for this page X  
 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
XXXXXX

F B I

Date: 6/28/61

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

**PLAIN TEXT**

(Type in plain text or code)

Via **AIRTEL**

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b7C

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

FROM: SAC, NEWARK (109-5)

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Enclosed are nine copies of a self-explanatory letterhead memorandum.

Source referred to is [REDACTED] concealed by request, who is subject of Bufile [REDACTED] and who is under development as a confidential source. He was interviewed on 6/23/61 by SA [REDACTED].

b7C  
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/17/04 BY 602107MULBEC/jch/jlplace cc and S and  
in 109-99200

3 - Bureau (cc's. RAB)  
2 - Newark (RAB)  
(1 - [REDACTED])  
ABH:cds  
(5)

ENCL

Copy to: CIA/State/RAB  
ONI/OSI/G2  
by routing slip for info.  
Date 6/29/61 by VHN/st

REC-21

EX-123

109-12-210-3142

JUN 29 1961

NAT. INT. SEC.

251


Approved:

55 JUL 1 1961

Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

MRREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED 109-99200



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

**Newark, New Jersey**  
**June 20, 1961**

**THE BOSTON HERALD** - 20

On June 27, 1948, a source, whose reliability has not been established due to insufficient corroborative evidence, suggested that the recent pronouncements given to the "newspaper" by the "newspaper" were not reliable.

b7C  
b7D

卷之三

**With** [redacted] he is in the opinion that, since the United States would be compelled to take that their new members would eventually end up in Germany.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/10 BY GJR/AM

109-12-210-3142

**ENCLOSURE**

**UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

## *Memorandum*

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: JUN 29 1961

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (105-3902)

SUBJECT: CUBAN SITUATION  
IS - CURA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/7/09 BY [signature]

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. One copy is being furnished to the New York Office as [redacted] designated as [redacted] in the letterhead memorandum, is en route to New York, New York, where he will work at [redacted]

**is** **temporarily** **living** **at** **10** **West** **18th** **Street** **New** **York.**

2  
70

b2  
b7c  
b7d

[REDACTED] brought to the Miami Office by [REDACTED] Atlanta, Georgia, businessmen, who stays in Miami a great deal where he is in contact with Cuban exiles. [REDACTED] expressed confidence

b7c  
b7d

(4) - Parcera (mels. 2000)

(1 - 113-7-210)  
(1 - 116-4-200)

**1 - New York (Fac. 1) (pm)**

3 - W.Land

(1)

REC-6

$$\underline{109} - \underline{12} = \underline{\underline{210}} - 314$$

JUN 30 1961

Copy to: CIA/State/  
ONI/OSI/C-2

UNI/OSI/G-2  
by routing slip for info

by calling slip for info.  
Date 7/17/68 Name John

Date 16/16 by E. H. F. Jr.

~~NAT. SEC.~~

56 JUL 11 1961 Data 10/10/61 by Elliott

MM 105-3902

[REDACTED] appeared to be a very conscientious anti-Communist Cuban with a good knowledge of the English language.

b7c/b

It is felt that the New York Office may desire to consider the possibility of developing [REDACTED] as a PSI, it being noted that he will be employed  
[REDACTED]



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

105-3902

**Miami, Florida**

JUN 29 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3/7/04 BY [Signature] SOURCE [Signature]

**RE: CUBAN SITUATION**

On June 16, 1961, [redacted] who has furnished insufficient information to enable his reliability to be evaluated, advised that he had arrived in Miami, Florida, the previous Wednesday, from Havana, Cuba, and desired to furnish the following information, which he thought might be of value to the United States.

b2  
b7D

b2  
b7D

## MILITARY AIR NAVAL MATTERS

Colombia, [redacted] the bombing attack which took place against Camp Colombia on April 15, 1961, at about 6:00 A.M. He said this attack appeared to be very effective and that three or four planes on the field were destroyed. However, as of that time, everyone in Havana knew that most of the planes of the Castro regime had been moved to San Julian (now known as Gramma Field), which was not bombed by the liberation forces. He said although he himself has not seen any Russian MIGS, it is commonly said in Havana that the Castro regime now has plenty of these planes.

b2  
b7D

[redacted] said that within the past few weeks, [redacted] observed thousands of Czechoslovakian army trucks, jeeps and tractors being unloaded from boats in Havana Harbor. He said that an individual known to him as a Communist, employed in the Banco Nacional, told him these trucks would be used by Fidel Castro in exporting Communism to Latin America.

[redacted] said the Fosea Apartment Building, one of the largest in Havana, is occupied solely by Czechoslovakians, who now number in the thousands. He said there are also a great many Russians and Chinese in Cuba, but that the Czechoslovakians seem to predominate in number.

b2  
b7D

Four barreled anti-aircraft guns are located everywhere in Havana. Cuba gives the impression of being an armed camp. The Militia and their military equipment are not concentrated in any specific area, but are scattered everywhere. He estimated the Militia now totals about 400,000. Of this number, between 30 and 35 per cent are believed to be against Fidel Castro; however, they are afraid to make known their feelings because of fear of reprisals and because they are unorganized as a group.

[redacted] estimated that there are a total of about 500,000 "Chivates" or "steel pigeons" operating in five man units on a block system throughout Cuba. He said practically all of the educated people of Cuba, with the exception of those who had been unsuccessful prior to the time of Castro, are against Castro, but they are unorganized and afraid to express themselves because of fear that the block informer system will disclose them to the Castro regime. In the more expensive neighborhoods there are generally few informers, but in the poorer neighborhoods, practically everyone is a "Chivate".

b2  
b7D

The Militia is predominately loyal to Fidel Castro except as noted above. The army has almost been dissolved. Recently, according to [redacted], a friend of his, who is a Captain in the Cuban Police, told him that the Militia was about to take over all of the military and police functions in Cuba. This Captain of Police disclosed to [redacted] that Efigenio Ameijeiras, Chief of the Cuban Revolucion Police, told the Captain to prepare to go into the hills to fight against Castro in the event the Militia should take over the police.

b2  
b7D

Communist indoctrination experts visit all banks, stores, factories and cooperatives once or twice every week to fill the employees of these establishments with anti-United States propaganda. They also attack

MM 105-3902

the church. At every factory or large size business establishment, the employees are required to volunteer for night guard duty once every twelve days. The purpose of this routine is to prevent sabotage.

On about May 15, 1961, employees of the Banco Nacional were served notice by the Castro Government that everyone would have to enlist in the Militia or go to jail. This notification had been directed to all business establishments and aroused such widespread discord that the idea was temporarily pigeonholed.

[redacted] said that the Cuban people in Havana who did not believe in the Castro regime, were greatly disappointed when the April 17 invasion failed. He said that all of these people looked to the United States as their last hope against Communism. He expressed the opinion that if the United States does not intervene militarily, Fidel Castro's Communist regime will never be overthrown. He said that all of the anti-Communist people in Cuba, including many of the Militia, would welcome United States intervention.

b2  
b7D

ECONOMIC MATTERS

[redacted] said the value of the Cuban peso has continued to decline to the point where it is now worth about fifteen or twenty cents. The Cuban Government has been printing paper money in tremendous quantities without gold or silver backing. Both sugar and tobacco production are far below normal. The tourist industry is practically nil. The Cuban economy is therefore suffering tremendously for lack of American dollars. However, the Cuban people are accepting the many shortages in consumer products such as soap, beer, staples, clothing, etc., as Castro places the blame upon the United States.

b2  
b7D

[redacted] said that contrary to Castro's propaganda, there is not one single Government cooperative in Cuba operating at a profit.

b2  
b7D

Property of the FBI - This memorandum is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

(See Max. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date: 6/28/61

Transmit the following in

PLAIN TEXT

(Type in plain text or code)

AIRTEL

REGISTERED MAIL

Via

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)  
FROM: SAC, NEWARK (109-5)  
SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/1/04 BY 622904963C/ghfj

Re Newark teletype to the Bureau and Chicago dated  
6/24/61.

Enclosed for the Bureau are nine copies of a self  
complimentary letterhead memorandum. Three copies are enclosed  
for the Chicago Office.

On 6/23/61, [REDACTED] a PCI of the Chicago  
Office, telephonically contacted that office and advised he  
was attending the International Convention of Lions Clubs  
[REDACTED] held in Atlantic City, New Jersey. He stated that one  
[REDACTED] of Havana, Cuba, was also in attendance  
at that convention. He stated he was personally acquainted  
with [REDACTED] who had advised him he had information  
regarding rocket installations being made in Cuba and that  
he desired to advise the FBI of these installations.

[REDACTED] was contacted by agents of the Newark Office  
and arrangements were made to interview [REDACTED]

On 6/24/61, [REDACTED] was interviewed by SAC [REDACTED]  
and [REDACTED] and information furnished by him  
[REDACTED] nothing set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum.  
[REDACTED] name and his identity be withheld and according  
[REDACTED] the information reported in [REDACTED] confidential informant  
in the [REDACTED] letterhead memorandum.

b7C/D

b7C/D

b7C/D

b7D

b2/b7D

NK 109-5

b7c/D

[REDACTED] stated the information furnished by him was obtained both through his personal observations and information furnished to him confidentially by [REDACTED], a businessman in Bayamo, Oriente, Cuba.

Subsequent to the interview of [REDACTED] also a delegate to the Lions International Convention, contacted SAS [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and requested an interview. The information furnished by [REDACTED] is also set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum. [REDACTED] requested that his identity be concealed and accordingly, he is being designated as [REDACTED] Confidential Informant in the enclosed letterhead memorandum.

b7c/D  
b2

Subsequent to the interview of [REDACTED] contacted SAS [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and requested an interview. The information furnished by [REDACTED] is also set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum. [REDACTED] requested that his identity be concealed and accordingly, he is being designated as [REDACTED] Confidential Informant in the enclosed letterhead memorandum.

b7c/D  
b2

In addition to the information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED], who is remaining in Cuba and continuing the operation of [REDACTED]

b7c/D

[REDACTED] and as such, has collected photographs of military installations and movements in Cuba which he has reduced to micro-film. [REDACTED] stated he desired to make these micro-films available to the FBI and further, that he desired to make arrangements to turn over additional micro-films as he obtained them from his son.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] have free access to take photographs throughout Cuba, and as a result, have no difficulty in obtaining photographs of military establishments and movements.

b7c/D

NK 109-5

[REDACTED] was advised the FBI would accept such micro-film, and he stated he would communicate with [REDACTED] and have him forward the micro-films he now has to him in Chicago, Illinois, and would also advise [REDACTED] to forward additional films as they are obtained.

b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED] and is intimately acquainted with the rural and industrial areas of Cuba. He expressed willingness to assist the FBI in any manner that he could and specifically pointed out his engineering background and experience could be utilized in the preparation and review of cartographic material.

[REDACTED] stated he was forced to flee Cuba because of his activity in the underground. He stated the group to which he belonged [REDACTED] and consisted of physicians, lawyers, engineers, and members of the Lions Clubs and other service clubs in Cuba.

[REDACTED] stated he had not been contacted by any members of the U. S. intelligence organizations and he stated he desired to furnish his information exclusively to the FBI.

[REDACTED]

The following is a physical description of [REDACTED] as obtained through observation and interview:

Name  
Race  
Sex  
Age  
DOB  
POB

[REDACTED]  
White //  
Male  
36  
[REDACTED]

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
XXXXXX

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**

3

Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available release to you.

**Section 552**

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**Section 552a**

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- The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

109 - 40 - 12 - 210 - 3/44 pages 4-6

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Newark, New Jersey  
June 28, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/11/07 BY [Signature]

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

On June 24, 1961, ██████████ Confidential Informant ██████████, with whom contact has been insufficient to determine reliability, advised he is a resident of Cuba and self employed. ██████████

██████████ advised that at the city of Bayamo, Oriente, Cuba, there is located a military headquarters which quarters six hundred men. This army headquarters is located just off of the main street of Bayamo. In addition, there are 8,000 members of the militia stationed at Bayamo and on active, full time duty.

b2  
b7D

He stated that at a point near the junction of the Main Street of Bayamo and the National Highway, also called the Central Road of Cuba, and to the south of the National Highway, there are located the principal warehouses for Government material, civil and military, for Oriente Province.

He stated that proceeding east on the National Highway and at a point seven kilometers from the junction of the Main Street of Bayamo and the National Highway, there is a road leading south to Guisa, Oriente, Cuba. Between the National Highway and the town of Guisa on this road, there is a hill known locally as "Loma Piedra". From "Loma Piedra", looking on a south easterly direction can be seen, without binoculars, large excavations on the nearest mountain. About 2,000 workers are employed in these excavations and are housed in an enclosed and guarded housing area on the site. These workers, who are Cuban nationals, are not permitted to leave the site and visitors are not permitted to approach it. The excavations continue on a twenty-four hour basis and the area is completely lighted at night.

He stated he did not know the purposes for which these excavations are intended, but, he said, it is reported they are to be used for either rocket platforms or the storage of munitions.

109-12-210-3144  
ENCLOSURE

**FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA**

He stated he did not know the depth of the excavations but he said he has been advised the excavations contain a concrete building which is covered by fifteen meters of soil, and the buildings are being constructed with a roof of concrete two meters in thickness with walls of concrete one meter in thickness.

He stated that the mountain in which these excavations are being made is a part of the Sierra Maestra chain.

He stated that in addition to the excavations near Guisa, there are also excavations of the same type in the Sierra Maestra mountains in the vicinity of La Plata, Purial de Jibacoa and Minas de Frio, Oriente, Cuba, and in addition, in the vicinity of these latter towns, natural caves are being enlarged as underground fortifications.

He stated also that underground installations are being constructed in the vicinities of Santiago de Cuba and San Antonio de los Baños.

[REDACTED] stated that several rocket platforms have been observed being unloaded at the port of Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province.

[REDACTED] also stated that within the past several months a number of cargo vessels have arrived at the ports of Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province, and Matanzas, Matanzas Province, and unloaded munitions and arms. These vessels, he said, were under the Russian flag.

b2  
b7D

[REDACTED] stated that over 100 Russian MIG jet fighter planes are now in Cuba and are located at air bases in San Antonio de las Banos and Santiago de Cuba. He stated these jets are being flown by Chinese pilots.

**FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA**

[redacted] stated that Cuban industry is being supervised by technicians from Czechoslovakia, who reside at the Havana Riviera and Rosito Hornedo Hotels in Havana, Cuba. A number of Russian and Chinese technicians also stay at these two hotels.

b2  
b7D

[redacted] stated that in the Province of Pinar del Rio, a tunnel has been constructed between the town of Punta de Muralla and Bahia Honda. The purpose of this tunnel is not known, he said, but a large amount of shipping is being conducted from the harbor at the Bay of Honda. [redacted] stated this tunnel bisects the Sierra de los Organos. He stated that the northern entrance of this tunnel is roughly on a line with Miami, Florida.

On June 24, 1961, [redacted] Confidential Informant [redacted] with whom contact has been insufficient to determine reliability, advised he is a resident of Cuba and self employed.

b2  
b7D

[redacted] stated that opposition to the Castro regime is very pronounced in the Province of Camagüey. He stated the faculty of the University of Camagüey, Camagüey, Cuba, was almost entirely in opposition to Castro and as a result of this opposition, the University has been closed and all of the faculty members dismissed.

b2

[redacted] stated that the bulk of the ranches and sugar plantations in Camagüey Province have been seized by the Castro Government and landlords who owned more than one plantation or ranch have been permitted to keep only their smallest holding and then only if they reside on the property.

b1D

[redacted] stated that within the past several months about seventy Russian technicians have been assigned to the Province of Camagüey to teach agriculture to the peasants. He stated these technicians have not been successful because of the indifference and ignorance of the peasants. He stated the Castro Government has undertaken

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

an ambitious program in Camagüey Province to overcome the high percentage of illiteracy among the peasants. He stated most of the teachers assigned to that area are teenagers with limited education, and the program has not been successful.

[redacted] stated that prior to the Castro regime the Province of Camagüey had produced enough beef to supply the needs of Cuba and also to have a surplus for export. b2 b7D

[redacted] stated that beef production has fallen off so much that Cuba now faces a shortage of beef and by late summer, Cuba will have to import beef to meet its domestic needs.

On June 24, 1961, [redacted] Confidential Informant [redacted] with whom contact has been insufficient to determine reliability, advised he is a native of Cuba. [redacted]

[redacted] stated that in the month of May, 1961, he observed a Russian freighter being unloaded in the Port of Mariel, Pinar del Rio. He stated he observed a number of rocket platforms being unloaded. He stated he observed over eighty large trailer trucks being unloaded with cases of ammunition of all calibers, including 75 mm. He said each truck carried over two hundred large cases of ammunition. He stated he observed these trucks being convoyed to a military base located at San Julian, Pinar del Rio, which base was used during World War II. He stated he observed that these ammunition cases contained the letters, "U.S.S.R."

 b2 b7D

[redacted] stated that on June 11, 1961, he observed two Russian destroyers, carrying the Cuban flag, convoying three large Russian freighters into the Bay of Matanzas, Havana Province. b2 b7D

[redacted] stated that on the south side of Matanzas Bay, a new road has been constructed leading off the Central Road (National Highway) to Punta de Sabanilla. He

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

stated this road terminates at Punta de Sabilla and back some distance from the bay is a check point on the road which is heavily guarded. Vehicles are required to stop at this point and the drivers have to leave the vehicles and drivers come out from a large structure which has recently been constructed at this point. The vehicles are then driven by these drivers to this structure and loaded.

[redacted] stated there is heavy construction, of a military nature, being carried out at Mayari and NiCaro, both in Oriente Province.

[redacted] stated that in April, 1961, [redacted] the NiCaro Nickel plant being dismantled. He stated this plant was shipped to Russia [redacted] the material being loaded for shipment.

[redacted] stated that over 60,000 militia men are now stationed on the southern end of the Isle of Pines. He stated the only activity he knows of on the Isle of Pines is the operation of a number of prisons. However, he said, these prisons do not require that many militia men.

[redacted] stated that all food is in short supply and the bulk of Cuba's food production is being exported.

[redacted] stated that during the forepart of June, 1961, a shipment of olive oil arrived at the Port of Matanzas from Spain. He stated this cargo was unloaded directly into a Russian tanker berthed across the dock from the ship from Spain and the entire cargo trans-shipped to Russia. [redacted] stated olive oil is in very short supply throughout Cuba and practically unobtainable in Havana.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: June 29, 1961

TO : Director, FBI (109-12-210)

FROM : Legat, Tokyo (109-16)

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBA

CLASSIFIED BY ANALYST  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 15/10/69

Reference is made to [REDACTED]

b1

In a series of reports beginning April 10, 1961, District Office #46 (DO), Office of Special Investigations, (OSI), has been conducting an investigation predicated on information that one [REDACTED]

b7C

> cuban  
> sat

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Military records disclosed the following:

Name: [REDACTED]

Date of Birth: [REDACTED]

Place of Birth: [REDACTED]

Race: Caucasian [REDACTED]

Height: 65" [REDACTED]

Weight: 177 lbs [REDACTED]

Hair: Black [REDACTED]

Eyes: Brown [REDACTED]

Education: High School Graduate [REDACTED]

Date and Term of Enlistment: [REDACTED]

-N.J.

b7C N.Y.

GREEN Land

Japan

Place of Enlistment: Miami, Florida

Prior Service: [REDACTED]

Permanent Address: [REDACTED]

Marital Status: Married [REDACTED]

Naturalized: [REDACTED]

Civilian Occupation: [REDACTED]

RUC

4 - Bureau (2 - Miami)

1 - Tokyo

RBH: 1J

(5)

cc: MM, NY, Newark (letter)

REC'D 109-12-210-314

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
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**Section 552**

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~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI  
Re: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
Bafile 109-12-210

June 29, 1961

b1

(c)

The above information is being set forth in detail in the belief that [REDACTED] may possibly be developed and utilized by the Miami Office.

~~It is noted that information concerning [REDACTED] have received appropriate dissemination by originating source.~~ b7C

In the event additional information of interest is received relating to Cuban matters the Bureau will be promptly advised.

L

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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**SECRET**

F B I

Date: 6/29/61

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via **AIRTEL**  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (109-112)

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBA

5/7/64  
CLASSIFIED BY DIS/Arch/60242 AAG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 115/7/225

Enclosed are the original and 8 copies of a letterhead memorandum setting forth information furnished by [REDACTED] on 6/28/61.

[REDACTED] is a highly confidential and sensitive source who has furnished reliable information in the past. b1

Information in enclosed letterhead memorandum pertains to [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "Confidential" in view of the sensitive nature of the source, whose identity if known would tend to compromise the future effectiveness and use of the source. b2

Information from this source if used in a report must be most carefully paraphrased in order to protect the source. Under no circumstances should any unauthorized persons become aware we have knowledge of the above information.

3 - Bureau (109-12-210) (Encl. 9) (RM)  
1 - New York (109-112)

LAB:RAG

(5)

G. WICK

ENCLOSURE

REC-106

cc: [REDACTED] to M.C. Copy to: CIA/State/  
(alt) [REDACTED] ONI/CEI/G-2  
[REDACTED] alert source & furnish info  
any info in form cylinder for by routing slip for info  
by [REDACTED] by [REDACTED]  
Date [REDACTED] 7-3-61

109-12-210-3146

12 JUN 30 1961

NAT/SEC SEC

b7C

Approved: ERH [REDACTED] Sent M Per \_\_\_\_\_

62 JUL 10 1961 Social Agent in Charge

**SECRET**

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F B I

Date: June 29, 1961

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT  
(Type in plain text or code)REC'D  
07/29/61Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)  
 FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (105-4603)  
 SUBJECT: CUBAN SITUATION  
 IS - CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 12-10-04 BY SP-210 PH

b7C

Political Matters Cuba

Enclosed herewith are nine copies of a letterhead memorandum pertaining to captioned subject.

AKA Greenie

[REDACTED] Confidential Informant [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]  
 who defected in January, 1961, details concerning whom are contained in Bureau File [REDACTED]

Cuba  
DC

The letterhead memorandum is classified confidential since it contains information that could conceivably result in the identification of [REDACTED] who will possibly continue to be of assistance in Cuban matters.

b2  
b7C  
b1D

[REDACTED] said that he learned the information contained in letterhead memorandum from [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]  
 a letter about May 1, 1961.

[REDACTED] two other mines, one a magnesian which is located about ten miles beyond Esmeralda and a copper mine in a town between Florida and Camaguey named La Vallita. [REDACTED] said he has no information concerning these two latter mines.

EX-110 REC-20

109-12-210-3147

③ - Bureau (Enclosures 9) (REGISTERED MAIL)  
 ② - Baltimore (1 - [105-4918])

BPN: df m  
(5)  
7/3/61

Copy to: CIA/State [REDACTED] b7C  
ONI/OSI/G-2

by routing slip for info.  
Date 7/3/61 by [REDACTED]

20 JUL 1 1961

ENCLOSURE

Approved:

\$70 [REDACTED] XEROX  
 Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED]

NAT. LIB. SEC.  
M Per

62 JUL 10 1961

25/

b7C

EA 105-4603

[REDACTED] related that he receives mail at his address [REDACTED] addressed to [REDACTED]. In these letters [REDACTED] will refer to an individual by the name of [REDACTED] which, when she does so refer, [REDACTED] knows that [REDACTED] she is referring to him.

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] has no regular writing habits but should he receive any further information which might be pertinent in captioned matters, he will immediately advise the Baltimore Office.

b7C  
b7D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
June 29, 1961

CUBAN SITUATION

████████████████████ Confidential Informant █████ who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on June 28, 1961, that he had learned from a source inside Cuba that nine Russians directing Cuban laborers are exploiting an iron mine in the Florida-Esmeralda area, Camaguey Province, Cuba. This mine is located just off the highway approximately twenty miles from Florida towards Esmeralda. The mine has been known in the past by the name of Felipito and the Russians who are operating it are residing in █████, the residence of the former administrator of the Florida Sugar Mill, in Florida, Cuba, who was an American by the name of █████. █████ was managing this sugar mill as a subsidiary of an American sugar company which has now been taken over by the Cuban Government.

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████████████████████ said that the iron mine, he understands, is producing iron ore but he cannot advise of the amount of production nor of its potential capacity.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFIED BY 50290MRC/ALW  
ON 5/1/04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

109-12-210-3147

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

DATE: JUN 29 1961

10  
10A  
SUBJECT:

SAC, MIAMI (105-3902).

CUBAN SITUATION  
IS - CURA

Political matters

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Enclosed herewith are nine copies of a letterhead memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

[REDACTED], mentioned in letterhead memorandum, is [REDACTED], who was contacted by SA [REDACTED] on 6/15/61.

b2  
b7D  
b7C

This memorandum is being classified "confidential" since data reported from [REDACTED] could reasonably result in the identification of a confidential informant of continuing value and compromise the future effectiveness thereof.

b2  
b7D

Two copies of this memorandum are being furnished CIA, Miami, in accordance with request of [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
(CIA)

It is suggested that copies of this memorandum, among other agencies, be furnished to CIA and the U. S. Information Agency.

b1  
b3  
(CIA)

P Bureau (Encls. 9)(RM)  
3 - Miami (2 - 105-3902)

(1 - [REDACTED])  
LLS:bna  
(5)

EX-100  
REC-8

109-12-210-3148

b2  
b7D

ENCLOSURE

77-14431-31-00-01  
CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] 6/21/29 DERIVATIVE  
DECLASSIFY ON: 7/15/1984  
Classification: [REDACTED] 5/16/04

37 JUL 5 1961

MAT [REDACTED]  
REC.

Copy to: CIA/State [REDACTED] INSA [REDACTED]  
ONI/OSI/G-2/USIA/90  
by routing slip for info.  
Date [REDACTED] by [REDACTED]

50 JUL 12 1961

TER 382  
SECRET



UNITED STATES ~~DEPARTMENT~~ OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

MM 105-3902

Miami, Florida

JUN 29 1961

CUBAN SITUATION

On June 15, 1961, [REDACTED] an individual engaged in the electronics profession, who has some knowledge of both pro and anti-CASTRO activities, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information:

The Colegio Nacional de Radio Mecanices (National College of Radio Mechanics), which is in effect a union of radio technicians in Cuba, has recently received instructions from the Cuban Government of FIDEL CASTRO to alter the radios of Cuban citizens at such time as they are brought in for repairs, so that the short wave reception band with which they had been previously equipped, would be rendered inoperative. [REDACTED] pointed out that eventually only programs transmitted on the standard broadcast bands would be able to be heard by individuals in Cuba unless such individuals received short wave transmissions clandestinely.

[REDACTED] reported that radio programs on short wave and standard broadcast band frequencies emanating from Swan Island, are being received poorly in Cuba, according to his sources. He said it appears that these stations are not located strategically to direct strong radio signals into Cuba.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

109-12-210-3148  
ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CUBAN SITUATION

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[redacted] also observed Radio Station WGBS, Miami, Florida, transmits a Spanish language program from 11:30 P.M. to 12:30 A.M. nightly. During the week of June 8 to June 15, 1961, [redacted] informed that the transmitting frequency for this station, which is 710 kilocycles, had been "jammed". In other words, an electronic device transmitting a signal had been put on the air in an effort to make the transmissions of Radio Station WGBS unintelligible to listeners in Cuba. [redacted] also noted that Radio Station WGBS transmits a Spanish language program from 5:00 A.M. to 6:00 A.M. daily, and that this "jamming device" is again turned on to render these transmissions unintelligible.

Radio Station WKWF, located at Key West, Florida, transmits Spanish language programs during the evening and morning hours on a frequency of 1,600 kilocycles. During the week of June 8 to 15, 1961, [redacted] had observed that a "jamming" device had been placed on WKWF's frequency in order to render these signals unintelligible.

It was [redacted] belief that the jamming device on the frequencies of the two stations identified above are actually located in Cuba.

[redacted], who has traveled extensively in Cuba, informed that during the evening and early morning hours certain stations transmitting programs from the United States are heard very clearly throughout the Island of Cuba because of their clear channels and the fact that they utilize high-powered transmitters. [redacted] identified these stations with their appropriate call letters: WBT, Charlotte, North Carolina; WWVA, Wheeling, West Virginia; WWL, New Orleans, Louisiana; WHAS, Louisville, Kentucky; WLAC, Nashville, Tennessee; WCKY, Cincinnati, Ohio.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CUBAN SITUATION**

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[redacted] pointed out WCBS at Miami transmits with a power of 50,000 watts during the daytime hours at Miami; however, it lowers its power during the evening and morning hours to 10,000 watts in order that it not interfere with transmissions of Radio Station WOR, New York, New York.

[redacted] is of the opinion and belief that because of action by the Cuban Government to prevent information being received on short-wave frequencies within Cuba, the United States Government will be limited in transmitting programs to reach the Cuban people. He noted it also appears that the CASTRO Government has undertaken a program to prevent programs emanating from the United States on standard broadcast frequencies from reaching the Cuban people. Therefore, [redacted] made the following suggestion: The United States Government should give consideration to the simultaneous broadcasting of Spanish language programs beamed to the Cuban people from the radio transmitters of the above described stations. [redacted] is of the opinion that the most opportune time for these transmissions would be between 12:00 midnight and 2:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time. Transmissions should be made again from 5:00 to 6:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time in order to reach the Cuban people.

It was [redacted] observation that if simultaneous transmissions are made from these clear channel stations in the United States, the CASTRO Government would not have sufficient jamming equipment to prevent these programs from reaching the Cuban people. It was his belief that if the CASTRO Government did attempt to jam one or two of these programs, the Cuban people would eventually learn that these programs were being broadcast simultaneously and within a matter of seconds would be able to change their receiving frequencies.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CUBAN SITUATION

[REDACTED] also observed that it had been his experience that a jamming device located in Havana, Cuba, would only blanket out the reception of radio signals in the Havana area, but that these transmissions would be able to be received favorably in other parts of the Island where the strength of the jamming device would be diminished.

b2  
b7D

PROPERTY OF FBI - This memorandum is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents should be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

-4\*-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Tolson  
 Mr. Belmont  
 Mr. Mohr  
 Mr. Callahan  
 Mr. Conrad  
 Mr. DeLoach  
 Mr. Evans  
 Mr. Malone  
 Mr. Rosen  
 Mr. Sullivan  
 Mr. Tavel  
 Mr. Ingram  
 Miss Gandy

F B I

Date: 6/27/61

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Type in plain text or code)  
 Via AIRTEL  
 (Priority or Method of Mailing)

ALL INFORMATION  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
 OTHERWISE  
CONFIRMED

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)  
 FROM: [REDACTED] SAC, WFO (97-1017)  
 FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
 IS - CUBA

D-9-2640  
 Classified by 53 SC  
 Declassify on: OADR 475  
 FOIA # 293984

Enclosed to the Bureau are 9 copies of a letter-head memorandum dated and captioned as above.

The informant mentioned in the enclosed letter-head memorandum is [REDACTED] (S)

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified "Confidential"

[REDACTED] because (S)  
 the information recorded could reasonably result in identification of a confidential informant of continuing value, and compromise his future effectiveness. (S)(u)

C  
 ③ - Bureau (Enc. 9) ENCLOSURE 9  
 2 - WFO  
 [REDACTED] (S)

JES:mfm  
 (5)

Copy to: CIA/State /  
 ONI/OSI/G-2  
 by routing slip for info.  
 Date 6/30/61 by [REDACTED]

S104  
 CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] 57-2029  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 14 REC-6

109-12-210-3149  
 25 JUL 5 1961

C. C. Wink

~~SECRET~~

Approved: 56 JUL 13 1961  
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent \_\_\_\_\_ M Per \_\_\_\_\_

XXXXXX  
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
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- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available release to you.

Section 552

- (b)(1)  
 (b)(2)  
 (b)(3)

- (b)(7)(A)  
 (b)(7)(B)  
 (b)(7)(C)  
 (b)(7)(D)  
 (b)(7)(E)  
 (b)(7)(F)  
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 (b)(9)

- (d)(5)  
 (j)(2)  
 (k)(1)  
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 (k)(4)  
 (k)(5)  
 (k)(6)  
 (k)(7)

- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.  
 Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

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 Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

\_\_\_\_\_  
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109 - 40 - 12 - 210 - 3149 Enclosure

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
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- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available release to you.

**Section 552** (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3)

National Security  
Act of 1947 and the  
CTA Act of 1949

 (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(F) (b)(8) (b)(9)**Section 552a** (d)(5) (j)(2) (k)(1) (k)(2) (k)(3) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7)

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**Section 552**

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| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C) |
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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D) |                                    |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)    |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)               |                                    |

**Section 552a**

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| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7) |

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 Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.


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 109 - 40 - 12 - 210 - 3152 page 2

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## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

105-1747

Miami, Florida

June 30, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/7/04 BY 60240/AMW/MJM

## FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Resignation of Castro Supporters From  
Other Latin-American Countries.

U.S.A., CUBA  
Mexico, Cuba  
CUPH

On June 22, 1961, [REDACTED] who has just returned from Cuba and who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] married to a Cuban. [REDACTED]

b2  
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After CASTRO took over in Cuba, [REDACTED]

In recent months, a Russian technician has been appointed to look over his shoulder, apparently in order to learn enough to be able to take over the work of [REDACTED]. This hurt his feelings or wounded his "Mexican dignity," because he resigned about June tenth or fifteenth, and either has or will come to the United States in the very near future. Source does not know if [REDACTED] is a communist but advised he must at least be an ultra-liberal.

b7C  
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[REDACTED], with whom insufficient contact has been had to evaluate his reliability, but who is familiar with many persons in the Petroleum industry in Cuba and some Cuban Cabinet members, advised that the Mexican, [REDACTED] is known by the nickname of [REDACTED]

b2  
b7D  
b7C

109-12-210-3152  
ENCLOSURE

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS

[REDACTED]

He is presently [REDACTED] but definite-  
ly not a communist. He stated he had heard that [REDACTED] had  
had some kind of a bitter disagreement with a Russian superior  
or technician and had resigned and would soon be leaving  
Cuba either for the United States or Mexico.

CJBA

b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

b2  
b7D  
b7C

[REDACTED] He also resigned last week but the Cuban Government  
refused to accept it in less than 90 days. This man is a  
[REDACTED] and is disgusted with the Cuban-communist  
system. Source stated he is well acquainted with [REDACTED]  
and believes he is a liberal but not a communist.

MEXICO CJBP

[REDACTED], also a Mexican, and a communist,  
was employed in [REDACTED]

b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED] because he had not been consulted before they  
were actually made; [REDACTED] was also promptly moved from a  
very expensive home to considerably smaller and cheaper  
quarters. Source stated subject greatly resented having  
his ego deflated and felt personally insulted. He resigned,  
although he is a Communist Party member, according to his  
own admission, and he definitely talks the party line.

Continued Fear by Castro Leaders of Revolt or  
Invasion.

[REDACTED] further informed that RAUL CASTRO stays in  
Santiago de Cuba and the Province of Oriente because the  
government still fears there may be an open revolt due to

b2  
b7D

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS

hunger and the extreme scarcity of many necessities in that Province. The government keeps the people agitated and occupied with propaganda, indicating that they expect an invasion by the U.S. or by mercenaries paid by the U.S. RAUL CASTRO is the brother of FIDEL CASTRO, Minister of Defense and, in fact, head of CASTRO's armed forces.

[redacted] continued that [redacted] seems to have completely disappeared from Cuban public life since the latter part of February or early March, 1961.

CUBA

b2  
b7D  
b7C

[redacted] Source stated that while it might be one of the popular "Cuban rumors," it is nevertheless common gossip in Cuba that [redacted] was not a communist and when she became fully aware that the CASTRO regime was communist, and she had to be subjected to communist domination and control, she refused to have anything to do with [redacted]

Additional Informer Coverage

[redacted] stated that the campaign to develop broader and more intensified coverage of the people residing in Cuba has been undertaken and put into effect by the Cuban Government. Source stated that there is a G-2 informant in each block and each block also has numerous sub-informants who report to the block chief. Large apartment buildings are covered in the same fashion; there is a floor chief [redacted]

b2  
b7D

[redacted]. Each floor chief in an apartment reports to an over-all apartment building informant. The informants are supposed to be alert to anyone unfavorably discussing the government, any of its government leaders, or any of the government's dealings with Soviet-Bloc countries, or criticizing failure to deal with the U.S. and capitalist nations. A number of the large churches are not used and have been converted into workers' centers known as "Circulo de Obreros." One outstanding example is

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS

that of the church of San Jose de Las Lajas, which is a well-known church in Cuba, which has been converted into a workers' center.

Additional coverage has been undertaken through the Cuban militia. [redacted] stated that by no means are all employees forced to be militia men; however, his company has 26 militia men out of 100 employees. b2 b7D

Special Training for Certain Militia Members

[redacted] advised that the Communist Party has been operating a special school known as the Comisario Politico, (Political Commissary). uSF

[redacted] She is a CP member; speaks and writes excellent English, has an American visa in her Cuban passport and is a good friend of [redacted]. b2 b7D b7C

[redacted] along with these subsequently to be graduated, will form groups and who, in the future, will judge those accused of political crimes. CUBP

Political Disturbances in Oriente

CUBP

b2  
b7D  
b7C

[redacted] stated that [redacted] very outspoken against communism and although [redacted] was a good personal friend of FIDEL CASTRO, he was not at all subtle and was very outspoken against communism, after [redacted] had convinced him of the dangers of communism.

On About Tuesday, June 13, 1961, there was a large disturbance and demonstration in the town of Manzanillo, Oriente, Cuba. A large delegation of the city's population marched down the main street to the city hall. They carried several large placards, divided principally into three groups: One group of placards read: "Long Live our Socialist Revolution."; a second group, "Long Live the Maximum Leader FIDEL CASTRO"; and the third group read, "We are hungry; we want to eat." 4

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS

As soon as sufficient militiamen could be rallied, the signs were torn away from the crowds and they were dispersed. [redacted] stated it was the largest public scandal and demonstration of discontent with the present Cuban regime that he had witnessed in a considerable period of time.

The same thing, but on a smaller scale, happened in the Oriente towns of Holguin and Palma Soriano. The government sent in truck loads of pumpkins, malanga and boniato. Malanga is a starchy root similar to a potato, and boniato is also a root vegetable similar to the sweet potato. [redacted] stated the people were grabbing the boniato from the trucks and biting into them, as though they had had no food at all for a considerable time. b2 b7D

He stated this condition of extreme hunger which existed widely outside the Province and city of Havana is causing the CASTRO Government to be passing through a very critical political stage.

[redacted] stated that he did not foresee any outright uprising against the CASTRO Government since, with or without food, the majority of the common people of Cuba would be subjected to the now ruthless communist control. However, he noted that this situation is damaging to the CASTRO revolution, since it has served to greatly reduce and, in some instances, totally eliminate enthusiasm on the part of the people and respect for many of CASTRO's popular proposals, such as that of asking everyone to help cut the sugar cane.

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**SECRET**

F.B.I.

Date: 6/29/61

Mr. Tolson  
 Mr. Belmont  
 Mr. Mohr  
 Mr. Callahan  
 Mr. Conrad  
 Mr. DeLoach  
 Mr. Evans  
 Mr. Malone  
 Mr. Rosen  
 Mr. Sullivan  
 Mr. Tavel  
 Mr. Trotter  
 Tele. Room  
 Mr. Ingram  
 Miss Gandy

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

FROM: SAC, WFO (97-1017)

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBA51104  
CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] ADDL 60267 AMG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1-5-72 [REDACTED]

Enclosed to the Bureau are nine copies of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above.

The informant mentioned in the enclosed letterhead memo is [REDACTED] (S)

The enclosed letterhead memo is classified "Secret" due to the sensitive nature of the source, [REDACTED] In the (S) event this info is later downgraded, it should receive a classification of "Confidential"

[REDACTED] because the info reported could (S) reasonably result in the identification of a confidential informant of continuing value and compromise the future effectiveness thereof.

Bureau (Enc-9) ENCLOSURE 9

2-WFO

(1) [REDACTED] (S)

REG-16

JES:MJB

(5)

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.AIRTEL

C. C. Wick

ED-1-10216

REC-10-101-474

7/14/61 2:30 PM, P1

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XXXXXX

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
**DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**

1  
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- Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available release to you.

**Section 552**

- (b)(1)  
 (b)(2)  
 (b)(3)

**Section 552a**

- (b)(7)(A)  
 (b)(7)(B)  
 (b)(7)(C)

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 Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

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\_\_\_\_\_  
 Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

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 Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):  
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109 - 40 - 12 - 210 - 3153 Enclosure

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X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan *Wash*  
 FROM : [REDACTED]  
 SUBJECT: THE ~~CUBAN SITUATION~~

**SECRET**

DATE: June 23, 1961

 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 BY [REDACTED]
SYNOPSIS:

[REDACTED]

(S)

 SJP:ban *ban*  
 (12) *ban*

 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Mr. Sullivan

 1 - [REDACTED]  
 1 - [REDACTED]

 1 - [REDACTED]  
 1 - [REDACTED]

 1 - [REDACTED]  
 1 - [REDACTED]

 1 - Liaison  
 1 - Mr. Papich

 1 - [REDACTED] (CLIP) *(u)*

109-12-210

 5/11/04  
 CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] (SAC/DOJ)  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 5/10/2029  
*classified per DGA ltr dated 5/10/04*

REC-43

 107-2-210 3154  
 10 JUL 6 1961

COPY TO MR TOLSON

 Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b7C

b1  
b3  
(CIA)

UNIDENTIFIED

b7C

 365-608  
 CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] (SAC/DOJ)  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 5/10/2029

 10 JUL 6 1961  
 XEROX

 JUL 3 1961  
 XEROX  
 JUL 7 1961  
 XEROX

7 JUL 13 1961

EX-107

**SECRET**

XEROX

10 JUL 6 1961

b7C

Memorandum [REDACTED] to Sullivan  
Re: THE CUBAN SITUATION

~~SECRET~~

ACTION:

1. Liaison will continue to follow developments through contacts in other agencies.

2.

61

b1  
b3  
(CIA)

10/8 WGS Q. V. K. M. S. C.

DETAILS:

61

b1  
b3  
(CIA)

~~SECRET~~

XXXXXX  
XXXXXX  
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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
**DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET**

2  
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**Section 552** (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3)  
 National Security  
 Act of 1947 and the  
 CIA Act of 1949 (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(F) (b)(8) (b)(9)**Section 552a** (d)(5) (j)(2) (k)(1) (k)(2) (k)(3) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7)

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109-HQ-12-210 - 3154 pages 3 & 4

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 X Deleted Page(s) X  
 X No Duplication Fee X  
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XXXXXX

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum [REDACTED] to Sullivan  
Re: THE CUBAN SITUATION

With regard to the White House position, the individual who has been "calling the shots" appears to be [REDACTED]. He has not come up with anything constructive. In addition, Adolph Berle periodically gets involved in the Cuban situation. Quite often his ideas conflict with those of State officials. [REDACTED] quoted an unidentified State Department official as saying: "You tell us what is going on."

b7C

b1  
b3  
(CIA)

~~SECRET~~

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
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5

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**Section 552**

- (b)(1)  
 (b)(2)  
 (b)(3)  


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 (b)(4)  
 (b)(5)  
 (b)(6)

- (b)(7)(A)  
 (b)(7)(B)  
 (b)(7)(C)  
 (b)(7)(D)  
 (b)(7)(E)  
 (b)(7)(F)  
 (b)(8)  
 (b)(9)

- (d)(5)  
 (j)(2)  
 (k)(1)  
 (k)(2)  
 (k)(3)  
 (k)(4)  
 (k)(5)  
 (k)(6)  
 (k)(7)

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— Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of \_\_\_\_\_

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109-12-210-3155

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X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
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Section 552 (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3)

National Security  
Act of 1947 and the  
CIA Act of 1949

 (b)(4) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(A) (b)(7)(B) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(F) (b)(8) (b)(9)Section 552a (d)(5) (j)(2) (k)(1) (k)(2) (k)(3) (k)(4) (k)(5) (k)(6) (k)(7)

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109-HQ-12-210 - 31510

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**FOIPA**  
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**Section 552**

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| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)    | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3)    | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C) |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D) |                                    |
| <hr/>                              |                                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E) |                                    |
| <hr/>                              |                                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F) |                                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)    | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)    | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)    |                                    |

**Section 552a**

- |                                 |
|---------------------------------|
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| <input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7) |

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 X for this page X  
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F B I

Date: 7/5/61

Transmit the following in

**PLAIN TEXT**

(Type in plain text or code)

Via **AIRTEL****AIRMAIL**

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Evans \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Malone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ingram \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-210)

FROM: SAC, SAN JUAN (109-27)

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA  
IS - CUBAALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 5/7/04 BY b6 b7D b7E b7C b7G/dj

Remyradiogram 7/5/61.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are nine copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above and nine copies of memorandum evaluating informant.

[REDACTED] im enclosed memorandum in [REDACTED]

Source quoted by [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]  
(Bufile [REDACTED] whose identity was not revealed in order to protect informant as information was received in personal conversation.)

Enclosed memorandum has been classified CONFIDENTIAL as disclosure of information therein could possibly lead to identification of security informant of continuing value.

Information herein is being disseminated locally through Weekly Intelligence Summary of 7/5/61.

-P-  
 ③ - Bureau (Enc. 18) (RM)  
 1 - San Juan (109-27)  
 RPP:zc  
 (4)  
 D.D. WICK

**ENCLOSURE**  
 REC-Z  
 109-12-210-3580  
 13 JUL 8 1961  
 Copy to: CIA/State/  
 ONI/CSI/G-2  
 for info.  
 by routing slip  
 Date 7/10/61  
 by [REDACTED]

b7C  
 CC 113-7-210  
 109-12-210-3580  
 13 JUL 8 1961  
 APPROV'D. DIV. SDU  
 EIT

Approved: [Signature]

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

55 JUL 13 1961

b7C

113-7-210

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN 113-7-210